

Stephen Langfur¹

Locating the ‘Inner’

Abstract: *The notion of a mental interior has been derided as a Cartesian relic, the ‘ghost in the machine’ (Ryle, 1963). Yet there is a mental interior — indeed, there are two — only not where we tend to look. When a toddler talks to herself before sleep, she often plays the part of a parent toward herself, mitigating the dread of separation. She thus creates a pretend space between herself-as-parent and herself-as-child. Growing up, she plays others toward herself as well. She and her simulated interlocutors are experienced by her as an expanded self with an inside, namely the place of inner speech. This pretend space is the first non-bodily interior. The second develops as a consequence. The simulated others diminish the dependence on actual others, who therefore cease to appear in their former importance. One yearns for them as they were, but the yearning is blocked — and banished from awareness — by dread of reverting to the earlier dependence. This second interior is the space between the unconscious self and the full kind of other for whom it yearns. The yearning enters conscious life indirectly and unthreateningly, for example in the fictive frame of art and in the relational frame of conversation.*

Keywords: self-awareness; second-person; inner speech; Martin Buber; Vasudevi Reddy.

1. Introduction

When I say that my brain is in me, *in* has the same clear meaning as when I say that the couch is in the house. But when I say that a

Correspondence:
Email: slangfur@gmail.com

¹ Independent scholar.

thought or feeling is in me, the nature of the containing space is not as clear. Should we call it a *mental interior*?

Ryle criticized the notion as a Cartesian relic, the ‘ghost in the machine’ (1963, chapter 1). Wittgenstein too rejected it (1953, §§256–58, 293, 580). I shall argue, nonetheless, that there are two mental interiors. The task is to locate them correctly.

2. The First Type of Mental Interior

Two-year-old Emily, left alone after the bedtime talk with her father, holds back her tears by repeating, in his intonation, the words he used just minutes before: ‘Big kids like Emmy don’t cry’ (Dore, 2006, pp. 258–9). We may assume she knows that she, not he, is the speaker (otherwise she is hallucinating). But she can only get control of her crying if she suspends what she knows and hears the words *as if* they were coming from him. The act of speaking as him and hearing as herself creates a *pretend space* between the ‘two’. It is the initial form of the space that a grown-up Emily will experience as *inner*.

Young Emily’s bedtime narratives were taped for about a year (Nelson, 2006). Among those studying them was psychoanalyst and infancy researcher Daniel Stern:

[I]t was like watching ‘internalization’ happen right before our eyes and ears. After father left, she appeared to be constantly under the threat of feeling alone and distressed... *To keep herself controlled emotionally*, she repeated in her soliloquy topics that had been part of the dialogue with her father. Sometimes she seemed to *intone in his voice* or to recreate something like the previous dialogue with him, in order to *reactivate his presence and carry it with her* toward the abyss of sleep. (Stern, 1985, p. 173, emphases added)

Note the scare quotes around *internalization*. Stern’s caution is exceptional. In psychoanalytic thought generally, the language of the mental interior flows undammed by Ryle. Freud refers to the ‘setting up of the [love] object inside the ego’ (1960, p. 29). Roy Schafer speaks of the ‘introject’ as ‘an inner presence with which one feels in a continuous or intermittent dynamic relationship’ (1968, p. 16). D.W. Winnicott writes:

Gradually, the ego-supportive environment is *introjected* and built *into* the individual’s personality, so that there comes about a capacity actually to be alone. Even so, theoretically, there is always someone present, someone who is equated ultimately and unconsciously with the mother. (Winnicott, 1965, p. 35, emphases added)

Such uses of *in* may tempt us to believe that our basic mental structure already includes an interior, into which a representation of the mother or others is then introduced. I shall argue, however, that in Emily's talk to herself we witness the *creating* of an interior. On one side is the child-playing-father or -mother or (a few years later) -teacher, culture-hero, etc., while on the other side is the child as target of 'their' attention.²

The creation of pretend space is not arduous. The child readily dons the persona of this or that carer. Toward the end of infancy, when experiences of separation become frequent, 'children *duplicate social roles*: behaving "as if" they were mommy, acting from a mommy-like perspective, and expressing mommy-like desires and beliefs, even if they are not the child's own' (Meltzoff and Moore, 1994, p. 54, emphasis added). At this age they are 'virtual "imitation machines"' (Tomasello, 1999, p. 159).

My position puts me at odds with much in psychoanalytic thought, which posits internal objects and fantasies in the preverbal period. I shall have the tools to discuss this question only toward the end of the paper.

2.1. *Mock others*

Over time, the played versions of certain others assume a degree of autonomy. For instance, I-the-adult am walking alone to the store when the thought occurs: 'Don't forget to buy coffee!' I am not aware of speaking the words, rather I hear them, understanding the thought to be mine.

Each of us is accompanied through life by long-played versions of others. I shall call them *simulated* or *mock others*. A mock other is the product of playing someone toward myself so long and so often that her played version is ever in waiting. 'Our inner speech', writes Denise Riley, 'is reassuringly or irritatingly *there on tap*... It offers us the unfailing if ambiguous company of a guest who does not plan to leave' (2004, p. 58).

Let us use the term *self-talk* for speech within pretend space regardless of its direction: from mock others to me or from me to 'them'. In either case I feel attended to. Mock others can also attend when no

² The idea is not new. Lev Vygotsky proposed that the child's self-talk creates internal space (Leont'ev, 1981, p. 57).

speech occurs, as *felt presences*. ‘Ultimately a heard voice is something that communicates, and an entity that communicates can be represented separately from its actual utterances’ (Fernyhough, 2016, location 3224 of 5914). To illustrate: every day during the eight years of grammar school, my classmates and I had George Washington and Abraham Lincoln staring down from their portraits as we pledged allegiance to the flag. Suppose that decades later a psychologist poses the following situation to me: ‘You need rags for cleaning your bathroom, and you find an American flag, so you cut it up. You’re all alone and nobody will ever know. Would you feel all right about it?’ (The question is posed in Haidt, 2012, p. 22.) The premise is wrong: I am not ‘all alone’. I carry my mock others with me, including Washington and Lincoln and the teachers who led us in the pledge. I would feel their eyes upon me if I cut up the flag.

‘Don’t forget to buy coffee!’ I know the words come from me, but I hear them in the way that Emily heard ‘Big kids like Emmy don’t cry’: as if addressed *to* me. Which mock other said that? I do not recognize the voice. Perhaps it is a blended version of many, a ‘generalized other’ (Mead, 1967, chapter 20). Hubert Hermans, originator of Dialogical Self Theory, writes of ‘an affectively charged, gist-like sense of an interpersonal respondent, which is based on stabilized expectancies from many past interactions’ (Hermans, 2004, p. 6).

After my return from the store, I snap my fingers, thinking, ‘Damn! Forgot to buy coffee!’ The roles are now reversed: it is I who speak, addressing my mock others, who regard me with amused or stern reproof. They are the ones for whom I put on the show of snapping my fingers.

Vygotsky held, as I do, that self-talk has its origin in dialogues between children and their carers (1987, pp. 74–6). Some researchers object that, if this were so, inner speech would feature different voices, yet there is usually just the voice of the self (Hurlburt, Heavey and Kelsey, 2013, p. 1488). One speaker is enough, however, provided there is a listener. In adult self-talk, the listener is usually a mock other. More rarely, the mock other speaks, as when reminding me to buy coffee. Or the mock others and I may be silent while jointly attending to a thing outside. When I see an unfamiliar cat in the yard, it is also seen by ‘them’, to whom I may silently say — but need not say, since I know they know — ‘That cat’s an intruder!’

Various forms of self have appeared so far. First, there is the self that dreads separation from the others on whom it depends (e.g. Emily

left alone in her crib). Secondly, when the self plays these others toward itself, as language enables it to do in convincing detail, it feels more secure. It is now a *secure self*. Thirdly, the played versions of others (mock others) accompany the secure self on its journeys. The secure self and the mock others together form a *subject-self*, which relates to items outside their inner circle: *objects*. The subject-self may be likened to a solar system, with the secure self in the centre, surrounded by its mock others, all moving together as a unit in a wider universe of objects. It makes sense, therefore, to speak of a space *inside* the subject, namely the space between the secure self and its mock others. Typically, our inner speech occurs in this space. Because we regard ourselves as subjects, the language of interiority comes readily to us.

During infancy, before a child can talk to herself like a carer, the relation between self and other is not a relation of subject and object. We shall see what it is in the section after the next.

2.2. *Pretend space as a container of feelings*

I have located the space of inner speech, but I need to say more about sensations and feelings, which we also tend to call 'inner'. Some of them clearly start from the body — hunger and gas pangs, for instance. Yet (with a nod to Wittgenstein) the body is not private. Its feelings and sensations are *out in the open* unless special means are taken to keep them from showing (as Emily curbed her crying).

Carers often mirror a baby's expressions. By the second half of the first year, babies know when they are being imitated (Sauciuc *et al.*, 2020, especially Video 1). Mirroring has the unintended effect, therefore, of showing the baby what her feelings look like.

Daniel Stern points out a variant of mirroring: *affect-attunement*. When I-the-baby act on a thing or express an emotion, you-the-carer can match what you take me to be feeling — but in a different behavioural modality. For example, a 9-month-old, after accomplishing something, looks across the room at her mother and exclaims 'Aaah!' The mother makes no sound in response, but she scrunches her shoulders and shimmies, matching the intensity, joy, and duration of the 'Aaah!' (Stern, 1985, p. 140). Affect-attunement occurs with younger babies too. 'Mother holds Nina (2 months) in front of her. Nina's head drops to one side, and mother responds by saying "Opoo"' (Jonsson and Clinton, 2006, pp. 395–7).

In Stern's example, because the mother's shimmy differs from the baby's 'Aaah!', the feeling is singled out as something common to both behaviours and limited to neither. It is distinguishable, with the result that one day it will be nameable. Furthermore, I-the-baby experience the feeling expressed by my 'Aaah!' without seeing what it looks like, but I do see what it looks like on you, namely in your shimmy and facial expression. The same sort of feeling will show up variously in your behaviour on different occasions, but there will be constants, such as intensity, tone (e.g. joy or sorrow), and duration, which (assuming good attunement) match what I feel.

The fact that carer and baby share the singled-out feeling surely plays a part in strengthening their bond — not on a once-only basis, but by many attunements in the course of time. This is probably a factor in creating, by the baby's eighth month, strong attachments to very few carers. A dread of strangers, as well as a dread of separation, starts around that time.

P.F. Strawson points out that, in mastering language, we must learn two kinds of use for each 'psychological predicate' (e.g. *happy, sad, afraid, angry, determined, depressed*): 'X's depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt, by others than X' (Strawson, 1959, p. 109). How do we learn the two kinds of use? In mirroring and affect-attunement, the feeling appears in both ways. The fact (pointed out by Wittgenstein) that another person's fear or pain or joy is perceived at once, without an act of inference, has its source in the interpersonal contexts on the basis of which a toddler acquires psychological concepts.

In infancy, then, a sensation or feeling is not experienced as a phenomenon confined to me, but rather as one that others can understand. Its expression can of course be inhibited, as when Emily checks her crying. By playing her father toward herself, she curbs one feeling by means of others: her desire to be a big kid and her desire for his approval. Since we often curb our feelings at the urging of mock others, we are inclined to think of feelings as *inner*. But a feeling one curbs should not be confused with a feeling in its more original, interactive mode.

3. A Second Type of Mental Interior

We also use the term *inner* for a kind of space which does not arise through playing others toward oneself. Kierkegaardian *inwardness* is

not created by self-talk. And meditators, I am told, find inner peace without inner voices.

Or consider what it is like to have an insight. The prelude may be self-talk that leads nowhere. 'Disgusted with my failure, I went to spend a few days at the seaside, and thought of something else. One morning, walking on the bluff, the idea came to me...' (Poincaré, 1910, p. 327). Unlike the thoughts in pretend space, where I occupy both sides, the arrival of an insight is not guaranteed. Who speaks? Out of what space does the idea 'dawn on me', 'occur to me'?

To answer, I must look more closely at Emily's motive when she repeats her father's words in his intonation. I have already formulated this motive broadly: 2-year-olds need carers for security. But security from what? Against hunger and crocodiles, the played version of a carer is useless. I shall propose a more specific motive: at stake is something for which the played version of a carer is enduringly useful. It is Emily's awareness of her own existence. I made the argument years ago (Langfur, 2014; 2019), but I have refined it since.

3.1. *The You-I Event*

Self-awareness is puzzling. How can the self that is aware be what it is aware of? Is there a part of the self that is the subject, *I*, and a part that is the object, *me*? If so, by what criteria can the part that is aware identify the other part as itself? In the other part, I cannot find the *being aware*. If I try to view the part that is aware by taking a reflective step back for a peek — presto! — a new *I* has arisen: the one who stepped back and is peeking. To view this new *I*, I must step back again, and so on. The part that is aware forever eludes me, like an animal lodging itself in the muscles of its pursuer (Ryle, 1963, p. 178).

Yet clearly, as I walk along admiring the trees, I am aware of myself walking and admiring. In self-awareness, wrote Kant, the unity of the self as subject with the self as object is an 'undoubted fact', although 'impossible to explain' (2002, p. 362). One reason we have trouble with this riddle is that when we decide to think about self-awareness, we tend to turn our attention away from other things and toward ourselves. That is a mistake. The first to correct it was psychologist J.J. Gibson. He wrote that when an animal moves about among relatively stable things, the changes in their visible aspects specify it as one who is bringing these changes about. Thus the animal is present to itself as the specified object and, simultaneously, as the acting subject. 'Ego-

reception accompanies exteroception, like the other side of a coin' (Gibson, 2015, p. 116).³

This proposal may work for many species, but it cannot account for *human* self-awareness. A human baby is aware of herself as a bodily agent before she can crawl. By 15 weeks, she tends to reach only for items within arm's length (Field, 1976); she must be aware of herself as too far away from the others. Or put heavy bracelets (200 grams) on the arms of 6-month-olds while they sit upright, and put light bracelets (2 grams) on the arms of age-mates in the same position. Then place a toy the same distance from each, but far enough away so that only the lightly-braceleted ones can reach it without risk of tipping over. These reach indeed, but those with the heavy bracelets tend not to (Rochat, Goubet and Senders, 1999). To discriminate thus, a baby must perceive the location of the toy *vis-à-vis* herself. Months before she can move like Gibson's animal, she is aware of herself *as a bounded physical entity capable of action*.⁴

Dan Zahavi (2014, p. 22) has suggested another approach. A person is minimally aware of herself as a *how*, not a *who*. How it feels to taste a lemon, for instance, is not to be found in the lemon. It belongs to my subjectivity. But that will not explain the self-awareness of babies in the reaching experiments. Each is aware of herself as more than a *how*. One cannot gauge distance from a *how*.

In yet another approach to the riddle, scientists have shown how the nervous system mutes stimuli resulting from the body's agency, thus freeing attention for external stimuli (Christoff *et al.*, 2011). But this differentiation occurs outside awareness. It 'isn't enough to give you the feeling of being a self who is a thinker of thoughts and a doer of deeds' (Thompson, 2014, p. 344).

Like Gibson's solution, the one I propose takes its start from an environment — not the shifting optic array, rather the *caring* environment. What follows may hold for the young of any species needing care to survive.⁵ In the human case, we shall see, it is the sole source of self-awareness for eight months or so; during this time, the brain grows far beyond its size at birth, in direct exposure to carers.

³ For further discussion of Gibson's solution and variations on it, see Langfur (2019).

⁴ One may attempt to amend Gibson's solution for pre-crawling infants. But if you alter a baby's position in relation to stable objects, only the rapid crawlers track shifts in the optic array (see Bertenthal, 1992). I discuss this issue in Langfur (2019).

⁵ I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

1. Imagine a baby who is aware of others but not of herself. When a carer attends to the baby in certain ways, the baby is aware that the carer is attending. (I defend this claim in the section after the next.)
2. We cannot experience someone's gaze or vocalization as an act of attending unless we understand it to be directed toward something. For instance, if we adults see a person looking intently upward, we tend to follow her gaze in search of its target. By the age of 3 months, babies too follow gazes toward objects (Hood, Willen and Driver, 1998).
3. Accordingly, when a baby looks into the carer's attending eyes, she sees the carer looking. But something unseen dawns into the baby's awareness, for she understands the carer to be looking at something. This is the first appearance of *me*.

We may suppose that the *me* is felt, just as, in later life, there is a feeling when one is looked at, indicated by increased heart rate (Kleinke and Pohlen, 1971) and blood pressure (Williams and Kleinke, 1993).

I have spoken of visual attending, but a newborn also feels attended to when a carer talks *parentese* (Cooper and Aslin, 1990). Jiggling during a feed can also convey the carer's attention (Masataka, 2003, pp. 53–9). The effect in each case is the appearing of the self.

The points above account for my presence to myself as a *me*, but not yet as an agent and perceiver, an *I*. So far, I-the-baby exist in my awareness as your implicit target: what your eyes are gleaming at, what your voice is lilting at, what you are jiggling.⁶

Someone objects: 'To be attended to, you-the-baby must already be present as a body!' Present to a *carer*, yes. Not present to myself. The sensations from the body cannot make me so, because there is nothing in a sensation to indicate the existence of someone sensing it.

The event of becoming self-aware through another's attending will here be called a *You–I Event*. The term is new, but the idea is not. It is central to Martin Buber: 'I become through a You' (*'Ich werde am Du'*) (1995, p. 12). More specifically, the idea that the carer's attending makes the infant self-aware occurs briefly in an essay by D.W.

⁶ The process may precede birth. One study found that, from the twenty-first week, 'fetuses displayed more arm, head, and mouth movements when the mother touched her abdomen and decreased their arm and head movements to maternal voice' (Marx and Nagy, 2015, Abstract).

Winnicott (1985, p. 131). It appears more consistently in the work of Vasudevi Reddy, who speaks of ‘a self first known as an object through experiencing oneself as an attentional and emotional object to another’ (2008, p. 125).

I will follow the idea into new terrain. First, I will take up the question as to how the awareness of oneself as implicit target becomes an awareness of oneself as agent and perceiver (how *me* becomes *I*). The answer will solve the riddle of self-awareness for infants. I shall then extend the solution by showing that You–I Events continue after infancy in a counterfeit mode, namely as the *self-talk* discussed earlier. When playing others toward myself in speech, I-the-child feel attended to, and thus I bestow my own self-awareness. The gain in independence entails a loss, followed by yearning for what has been lost. We will see that the yearning creates a second mental interior.

3.2. *Embodiment, agency, awareness of awareness*

The three points listed in the previous section show how a baby can first become aware of herself — namely as another’s target, a *me*. But how can she become aware of herself in the manner of the braceleted 6-month-olds: as a *physical entity acting on things* — an *I*?

We begin with embodiment. Its principle is this: when a baby basks in a carer’s attention, whatever the baby feels to be included in the carer’s target becomes part of her sense of self. Take social smiling, for example. If orofacial sensations seem part of what you are attending to when smiling at me-the-baby, the sensations are experienced as mine. This requires that in the vast brew of sensations, the orofacial ones are somehow singled out. We may suppose this happens when they seem to bring about a broader smile from you.

The words ‘bring about’ imply a concept of cause and effect. The concept has been found in 6-month-olds (Carey, 2009, pp. 242ff.). Even at 3 months, when a mother puts on a still face, the baby often tries to restart the interaction (Tronick, 1989, pp. 112–19). There would be little point in trying if the baby didn’t know that the gesture might have the desired effect — that is, if she had not, on previous occasions, understood the carer to be *responding*. The carer’s response reflects the baby as provoking it. Returning to our example: the baby’s smile may initially occur without her having decided to smile, hence without agency; but when the carer smiles back often enough and the orofacial sensations get singled out, the baby need only repeat what

she is doing to get a new or bigger smile from the carer. The act becomes deliberate, and the embodied *me* becomes an agent, an *I*.⁷

Recall the riddle: 'How can the self that is aware be what it is aware of?' We have seen how it can be aware of itself as a *me*, the other's target, and we have now seen how this *me* can become aware of itself as *I who act*. But how can it become aware of itself as aware? For this we need an additional step.

On the basis of the account so far, it would seem that I-the-baby must cease to exist in my awareness when you turn aside or go absent. This may happen for a while, but, if so, a day comes when I cease to disappear, for the following reason. Things that were present during our interaction remain present when you leave, and I *associate* them with you. Babies make associations by the age of 3 months (Campanella and Rovee-Collier, 2005).

Following the logic of the You-I account, we may speculate that once things are associated with you-the-carer — *imbued* with you — they prevent the utter loss of self-awareness when you go absent. After all, a reminder of you is also a reminder of me, to whom you attended. Missing, however, is the give-and-take of the You-I Event. Your absence, then, must leave me in a kind of limbo, in which I sense the possibility of not being. For although, by definition, I cannot experience or imagine not being, I can experience its possibility. Since my sense of my existence depends on you, and the alternative is nothingness, I experience the dependence as absolute.

The lack of address and response is partly filled when I make *effects* on the you-imbued things. Just as your response made me aware of myself as provoker, so an effect can make me aware of myself as its cause. During your absences, then, I-the-baby continue to exist for myself. I become aware of the difference between what it is like to be aware of you attending and what it is like to be aware of things that are not you but are imbued with you. At times when you are engaging with me, I can create either of the two conditions by looking at you or not (for instance, in peekaboo). The contrast makes me aware of myself as perceiver.⁸

⁷ On the deliberate repetition of a non-deliberate act, see Piaget (1963, pp. 49ff.). It is tempting to explain the singling out of orofacial sensations as an effect of mirror neurons; we await evidence that these exist in humans at 2 or 3 months. See Heyes and Catmur (2022).

⁸ Infants take an active part in peekaboo from the age of 4 months (Nomikou *et al.*, 2017).

With the last point, the riddle of self-awareness is dispelled, at least for infants. The self *of which* I-the-baby am aware is the implicit target of your attending, a *me*. Through your responses, this self-as-target becomes additionally aware of itself as *acting* toward you, hence as *I*. Through your presences and absences, it becomes aware of itself as *perceiving* you or not, hence again as *I*. The *me* and the *I* are experienced as a single indivisible entity — always and only through direct or indirect relation with you.

The riddle is dispelled for infants, but what about the rest of us? How does the looplike, dependent self-awareness develop into our seemingly independent adult kind? In the answer we shall find the clue to a second form of mental interior.

3.3. *The transition to post-infancy self-awareness*

In the first step of the You–I account, I said that a baby can be aware of a carer as attending, hence as having a mind. A sceptic may wonder, ‘How can anyone be certain other minds exist?’ The long answer is this paper: without other minds, the sceptic would not exist in her own awareness. The short answer is: for prey and predator species, evolution solved the problem long before inventing sceptics (Sloman and Chrisley, 2003).

For human animals, the awareness of other minds underwent additional development. From about two million years ago, during drastic changes of climate in the African tropics, one species of ape was able to survive because it practised *alloparenting*: the mother’s mother, the father, and other relatives helped the mother feed and protect her child. The mother could therefore wean the child at about 3 years (instead of the usual Great Ape 5), becoming fertile again. During epochs of drought, the high rate of reproduction meant that weanlings competed, wittingly or not, for alloparental care. The survivors were the winsome. We have their genes. We are born to connect (Hrdy, 2009, pp. 114–17; 207; 238–42).

The priming for relationship is evident in studies of human newborns. From our first days outside the womb, we prefer eye-contact (Farroni *et al.*, 2002). We also prefer being addressed in parentese (Cooper and Aslin, 1990). Uniquely among mammals, we take turns with the carer when she feeds us, pausing between bursts of sucking, awaiting a jiggle from her (Csibra, 2010). This pattern develops into turn-taking while vocalizing — a forerunner of conversation

(Masataka, 2003, pp. 54–9). In the second month, we smile in response to voices or faces (Wolff, 1987).

Because we descend from endearers, and endearers found joy in relationship, the You–I Event is typically joyful. However, the intervals between Events are tinged with dread, not just because we depend on carers for food and protection, but also because we depend on them for awareness of our existence. From this much you can see what Emily is doing in the dark when she repeats her father's words in his intonation. The hearer of 'Big kids like Emmy don't cry' is restored as a self, for she is the target of an act of attending. Useless against hunger or crocodiles, the well-played father keeps nothingness at bay.

When I-the-toddler talk like you while hearing as the one addressed, or when I play your part as an audience to whom I speak, the product is a thin version of the self I knew in the You–I Event. It is thin because it is brought to presence by another who is no true other, rather myself again in the other's persona.

The original self is the gift of another (it is at once the gift and its receiver). The self-bestowed self, however, has the flatness of a gift I buy for me. The advantage is security, since I can play the other at will. There are many further advantages: self-talk enables me to self-regulate, to practise the language while alone, to carry the culture in my head, to take multiple perspectives, even perhaps to achieve a degree of objectivity. Its chief boon, though, is to ward off nothingness. Hence its uncanny persistence. 'My limit for self-imposed inner silence', writes Bernard Baars, 'seems to be about five seconds' (1997, p. 75).

The self-bestowed self is the *subject* (the secure self attended to by its mock others). After self-talk has become habitual, some flesh-and-blood others remain important, but like everyone and everything in perceptual space, they have ceased to be essential to my awareness of my existence. Only now do they appear as what we call *objects*.

Notice that the You–I Event is not between subject and object. A subject shifts its attention easily from object to object. It is in control. In the Event, by contrast, the distance between you and me is spanned: at every moment, directly or indirectly, I come into existence for myself through you. You differ from me, but you are 'nearer to me than my I' (Buber, 1958, p. 79).⁹

⁹ Buber is echoing Augustine (*Confessions* III, 6, 11). Augustine is addressing God.

When a baby seems obsessed with ripping paper, continuing the practice for months, it is because she gets her *self* from the visual and auditory effects. What happens is like the You–I Event, but she has more control. (When the effects become too predictable — hence, too unlike a You — she moves on to spoons or puddles or something else.) The adult will probably not understand what it is about paper that fascinates her. Paper is simply an *object* to him: he does not get his self from it, and the suggestion that he might would mystify him. He is, after all, a subject: he gets his self from himself.¹⁰

3.4. *The precluded You*

When I have mastered the trick of bestowing a sense of my own existence, the usurpation becomes permanent. For suppose that you now re-enter the room. You can no longer appear to me in absolute importance. My self-talk *precludes* a You-Event between us. Like everyone I shall ever encounter, you are now a potential but precluded You.

Recall, in connection with the infant, that the carer can be present-in-absence, because she imbues the things that remain. Precluded, the You is absent. Does s/he imbue things? Yes, in the form of a *felt insufficiency*. This comes to expression in the question of life's meaning or point. The life to which the question refers is life as we know it, which is under the dominion of self-talk. But the life that covertly motivates the question is life as it was in the period before self-talk, when I was wholly given over to another person from whom I received myself or not. We are 'monads haunted by communion' (Steiner, 1989, p. 140).

The felt insufficiency of everyday life motivates a yearning for the lost Event. One yearns for a You and for the gift of the self that comes into presence when a You attends. This yearning is suppressed by dread of the Event, for the latter would entail absolute dependence. The yearning becomes unconscious — that is, *split-off*. It is not just dread that makes it so, for there is also a change in *structure*. As a subject in relation to objects, I cannot simply dip into a different way of being, in which I must lose myself to be myself. To illustrate the

¹⁰ Because the I of the You–I Event is not a subject, the term *intersubjectivity* does not suit the period before self-talk. The difference between the original I and the subject marks a major turning point; it goes unnoticed when we retroject our subjecthood into our view of the infant's experience.

split-off self: consider the academic who tells a colleague: 'I must get this paper punished.' S/he did not mean to say 'punished', so who did? There is a self up front, intending to say 'published', but another self, outside awareness, exploits an unguarded moment to smuggle its dread of fame into the vocal cords.

Among the concurrent forms of the adult self, we have identified the secure self and the subject. Now we add a vestige of the original self: a split-off self who seeks but dreads the You in each encounter. To avoid multiplying selves, we may suppose that the split-off self is also the one who keeps self-talk going, even while yearning for the You it precludes.

Like the earlier infant self when the carer was absent, the split-off self is incomplete. Like that infant self, it continues to feel and think and make effects. It creates dreams and slips (like 'punish' for 'publish'). Its yearning propels the subject toward love, work, politics, religion, art, and conversation (the last two of which will be discussed below). When self-talk fails to solve a problem, the split-off self works behind the scenes; the space formed by it and its precluded You would be, on this theory, the space out of which an insight 'occurs to me'.

3.5. The space of the fictive frame

We have found a second form of the 'inner' self, namely the unconscious space between the split-off self and the You for whom it yearns but whom it dreads. My aim in this section is to bring the discussion down from the clouds by showing a kind of space in which the unconscious yearning comes to conscious fulfilment — partial, indirect, and relatively unthreatening. I shall speak of art, limiting myself to the viewpoint of its audience.

In a museum, I begin to survey the paintings. One of them makes me linger. There is a moment when I lose myself in it. Its frame is like a window into another world.¹¹ I know that I am in the year 2022 in this museum, and yet I am also in another time, looking, say, at a figure on a tree-sheltered path from the viewpoint of the artist. I am simultaneously outside the frame and in. No matter how engrossed I may become, I remain slightly aware of the frame. I can let myself be

¹¹ Starting with cubism, much Western painting has rejected the dualism of two worlds, but I cannot discuss the rejection here.

sucked in because I know how to leave (I can move to another painting).

To vary the example, consider a story so riveting that self-talk ceases. To rivet, the story must have a fictive frame, which differentiates the world inside it from the world of my everyday life. In this case, too, there is a different time and space (e.g. ‘Once upon a time, in a kingdom far away —’). The frame invites me to leave behind the world of my daily concerns. I can let myself do so because I know the way back.

In both examples, the fictive frame offers safety from a You–I Event — in particular, safety from a state where one depends absolutely on another. The safety is due to structure. In an Event, recall, I become aware of my existence through your attending. The space between us offers no break into which a frame could be inserted. Only when self-talk creates the subject (the counterfeit, internal Event), separating it from objects, is perceptual space so modified that there is room to insert a frame.

Where a frame can be, no You can be. Hence the feeling of comfort when the lights go down in the cinema, or on hearing ‘Once upon a time...’ The ultimate demand will not be made. Entranced by what is inside the frame, but knowing all the while that I continue to exist outside it, I cannot be swept into absolute dependence on anyone.

Yet that is only half the story. Because of the safety a frame provides, self-talk may relax, leaving me open to a limited form of You–I Event. While reading a novel, for instance, I am aware of the author implied by the text. ‘Our sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable meanings but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of action and suffering of all of the characters’ (Booth, 1983, pp. 73–4). While we read, ‘we are being directed all the while, by selection and emphasis and tone. Technically “invisible”, the author remains as... a hidden persuader’ (Tillotson and Tillotson, 2013, p. 7). ‘The author makes his readers’, adds Booth (1983, p. 397), and I suggest that this is like the making of the self in a You–I Event.

As long as I am engrossed in the work, the fictive frame precludes the You–I Event, but just for that reason, a limited kind of Event can occur within it. Because of the security offered by the frame, I can forgo the security offered by self-talk. Given over to the author, becoming her implied reader, I experience a self that is not quite the person I left outside. (The person left outside may be transformed, nonetheless.)

Between implied author and implied reader, the pattern is that of the joint-attentional You–I Event, when the carer points out things and talks, expanding the Event to include them (on joint attention, see Reddy, 2009). Someone may object that there is no give-and-take, no turn-taking, between author and reader, but a little attention will show that the author leaves openings for the reader to fill. She expects responses to which she in turn responds.

In the work of art, then, the sought-for Event re-enters our lives without the dread that usually attends it. There is the same dynamic as in infancy: I am transported out of myself and made new. Unconscious yearning is consciously fulfilled. 'Yes,' someone says, 'but in a frame.' True: on leaving the frame I become a subject once more — a better person, perhaps, but a subject still. The implied author or artist may take a place in my pantheon of mock others.

We go to art for a taste of life's original structure, from which we long ago excluded ourselves and to which we cannot return.

3.6. The space of conversation

There is a simple objection to the You–I account. In ordinary conversation after infancy, while listening attentively to you, I seem to participate immediately in your developing stream of thought (Schutz, 1962, pp. 173–4). The less I talk with myself, the better I grasp what you are saying. Since you attend to me while you speak, shouldn't a You–I Event occur? And yet it hardly ever happens: I do not receive myself from you.

With rare exception, conversations are not full-fledged You–I Events. This is because they too occur in frames, albeit not fictive. The conversational frame is formed by the tacitly agreed limits of the relationship. It determines the kinds of things that can be discussed without embarrassment. To violate the expectations is to break the frame. Such frames come in various sorts: the frame of a friendship differs from that of a job interview, a police interrogation, or a therapy session (on the last, see Young, 2003).

When listening to someone, I can dip into or out of the frame, just as I can with a painting. Engrossed in a painting — that is, undergoing a kind of You–I Event inside the frame with the artist — I know all the while that I am in the museum. While conversing with a friend, I can let myself be swept along in the stream of her thought because I know where the rim is. As with a painting, I easily switch between modes: the more I flow with you in the stream, the less there is of me the self-

talker: *the more you, the less me*. At any moment, however, I can secretly pull back and talk with mock others while seeming to listen, perhaps missing what you say: *the more me, the less you*. In either case, I remain the *secure self*, communing either with you in the frame or with a mock other. Notice the difference from a You–I Event, of which we may say *the more you, the more me*.

Buber's thought has been called a philosophy of dialogue. Typically, however, dialogue occurs in frames. When the frame is one of a friendship founded on trust, I can dare to speak and listen freely. What then takes place in the frame has the looplike form of the You–I Event: my attending evokes your thought, which you perhaps discover in your act of speaking. If humour and ideas emerge from the confluence of minds, this does not necessarily signify that we have overcome our dread and are experiencing a full Event. The reason, more often, is that the frame has suspended dread. The same creative wizard, the split-off self, who smuggles in 'punished' for 'published', who fabricates dreams within the frame of sleep and art within the fictive frame, produces wit and insight in the frame that is formed by friendship, where wizards meet.

Like the frame in art, then, the conversational frame can enable a limited kind of You–I Event. For its sake we seek out company. When the dialogue becomes spontaneous, revealing new things, we feel more alive than usual. It is a taste of the life we don't remember. By contrast with art, however, the conversational frame may dissolve and the You–I Event occur in its original form:

This is certainly something which comes to a man in the course of his life only by a kind of grace, and many will say that they do not know it; but even he to whom it has not come has it in his existence as a constitutive principle, because the conscious or unconscious *lack* of it plays an essential part in determining the nature and character of his existence. (Buber, 1971, p. 170)

That lack is the felt insufficiency of things, the signature of the potential but precluded You.

4. Three Challenges

4.1. A challenge from psychoanalytic thought

If I am right in holding that self-talk creates the first mental interior, then the latter does not exist in the preverbal period. This is at odds

with psychoanalytic thought about infancy, which often refers to inner objects and fantasies.

Recall first that infants have ways to maintain self-awareness when the carer goes absent: they make effects on things that are imbued with her/him through association. I-the-baby need not combine the teddy with the memory of a carer that I ferret up from a mental interior. The combining happens in the brain without conscious effort on my part. True, the brain is inside me, but this does not mean that I *experience* an inside, as I shall after self-talk is established. Rather, I experience the marvelous teddy.

Preverbal fantasies are enacted in the open. Recall Freud's reference to the 'setting up of the [love] object inside the ego'. We have seen that this fantasy too initially happens in the open, when Emily reinvoices her father out loud ('Big kids like Emmy don't cry'). Such acts create an inside (pretend space), where private fantasies will eventually occur.

Psychoanalytic thought is mainly a product of interacting subjects. We subjects cannot remember our infancies. We cannot abandon the only structure we know (although transference and free association release materials from the forgotten structure). Almost inevitably, we retroject the subject-object relation into our picture of infancy. We tend to do the same when observing infant behaviour. Since a subject has a mental interior, it is assumed that an infant has one.

Daniel Stern was both a psychoanalyst and an infancy researcher. Summarizing the revolution in research that began in the 1970s, he wrote:

The infant is... seen as an excellent reality-tester; reality at this stage is never distorted for defensive reasons. Further, many of the phenomena thought by psychoanalytic theory to play a crucial role in very early development, such as delusions of merger or fusion, splitting, and defensive or paranoid fantasies, are not applicable to the infancy period — that is, before the age of roughly eighteen to twenty-four months — but are conceivable only after the capacity for symbolization as evidenced by language is emerging, when infancy ends. (Stern, 1985, p. 11; *cf.* pp. 240ff., 254–5)

4.2. *A challenge based on early imitation*

Infants imitate carers from the start. Why then do I say that imitation of the carer's *speech* is what first creates a mental interior? For the following reasons:

1. In the You–I Event of my infancy, space is formed by two poles: you and me.
2. Speaking, I hear my voice. When I-the-toddler speak as if I were you, at the same time hearing as me, the two poles are simulated, forming pretend space. This was not possible in my previous imitations.
3. I know that I am not you. Playing you toward myself will not make me feel attended to unless, while doing your voice, I suspend this knowledge. I can more easily suspend it if I play you in convincing detail, and language enables this like nothing I have had before. The escape from the dread of separation is the more complete, the better I reactivate your presence.

We may be tempted to soften the position, claiming that when a baby babbles or talks gibberish, she is already playing the carer toward herself as best she can. That may be true, but it does not result in a mental interior. The latter requires boundaries, boundaries require rich texture, and rich texture requires the richness of speech.

4.3. A challenge based on the variability of self-talk

Some readers may object to my thesis as follows: ‘If self-talk becomes the main source of self-awareness, it should recur often. Yet there are self-aware adults who seldom talk to themselves, and some do not at all.’

According to Hurlburt, Heavey and Kelsey (2013), there are indeed adults who never talk to themselves. Perhaps they continue to experience You–I Events. In the intervals, they could remain self-aware by making effects on things. This may be the case for some on the autistic spectrum who claim to ‘have too much insight into other people — detecting every detail of someone’s behaviour, as well as feeling empathy very strongly’ (Fletcher-Watson and Happé, 2019, p. 98).

There are also people who seldom talk to themselves. A number of factors may come into play. Mock others may attend with and to one in silence. We have seen, furthermore, that the fictive frame enables a kind of self-awareness, hence a suspension of self-talk. So does the conversational frame. The case has also been made for *work* (Langfur, 2014). But even when art, conversation, work, and other activities provide temporary relief from self-talk, they occur within a world restructured by it.

5. Concluding Remark

We have few or no memories of You–I Events, but that is to be expected, since we do not remember our infancy. The theory is so counter-intuitive at first that one may be tempted to dismiss it. Yet it jibes with much in infancy research, and it dispels the riddle of self-awareness. When self-talk is introduced, the counter-intuitive explains the intuitive. In its further development, the theory offers an understanding of human complexity, including an aspect that has eluded philosophy: the insistent force and the wizardry of the unconscious.

In this unconscious we have a second mental interior, a consequence of the first. It is the space across which I yearn for a You and for the self that was a gift. I yearn for a way of being that I long ago managed to avoid and cannot cease to avoid. If we cannot cease to avoid the You–I Event, is there nothing to be done? There are openings, exemplified above in art and conversation, through which the Event indirectly enters our lives. It is in these openings that we feel most alive. The openings narrow or widen, depending on the social system. In the social system there are things to be done.

Acknowledgments

I thank William F. Monroe for his sensitivity to nuance, Raphaël Du Bosch for his freshness of vision, copy-editor Andrew Donlan for his helpful comments on structure, and two anonymous referees for raising points that needed treatment.

References

- Baars, B.J. (1997) *In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bertenthal, B.I. (1992) Implicit versus explicit origins of the self, *Psychological Inquiry*, 3 (2), pp. 112–114.
- Booth, W. (1983) *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, 2nd ed., Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Buber, M. (1958) *I and Thou*, Smith, R.G. (trans.), New York: Scribner.
- Buber, M. (1971) *Between Man and Man*, Smith, R.G. (trans.), New York: Macmillan.
- Buber, M. (1995) *Ich und Du*, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam.
- Campanella, J. & Rovee-Collier, C. (2005) Latent learning and deferred imitation at 3 months, *Infancy*, 7 (3), pp. 243–262. doi: 10.1207/s15327078in07032
- Carey, S. (2009) *The Origin of Concepts*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D. & Thompson, E. (2011) Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 15 (3), pp. 104–112. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.01.001

- Cooper, R.P. & Aslin, R.N. (1990) Preference for infant-directed speech in the first month after birth, *Child Development*, **61** (5), p. 1584. doi: 10.2307/1130766.
- Csibra, G. (2010) Recognizing communicative intentions in infancy, *Mind & Language*, **25** (2), pp. 141–168. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01384.x
- Dore, J. (2006) Monologue as reenforcement of dialogue, in Nelson, K. (ed.) *Narratives from the Crib*, pp. 231–260, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Farroni, T., Csibra, G., Simion, F. & Johnson, M.H. (2002) Eye contact detection in humans from birth, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, **99** (14), pp. 9602–9605. doi: 10.1073/pnas.152159999
- Fernyhough, C. (2016) *The Voices Within: The History and Science of How We Talk to Ourselves*, Kindle, London: Profile Books.
- Field, J. (1976) Relation of young infants' reaching behavior to stimulus distance and solidity, *Developmental Psychology*, **12** (5), pp. 444–448.
- Fletcher-Watson, S. & Happé, F. (2019) *Autism: A New Introduction to Psychological Theory and Current Debate*, New York: Routledge.
- Freud, S. (1960) *The Ego and the Id*, Strachey, J. (trans.), New York: Norton.
- Gibson, J.J. (2015) *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*, New York: Psychology Press.
- Haidt, J. (2012) *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided By Politics and Religion*, Kindle, New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
- Hermans, H.J.M. (2004) The dialogical self: Between exchange and power, in Hermans, H.J.M. & Dimaggio, G. (eds.) *The Dialogical Self in Psychotherapy: An Introduction*, pp. 13–28, New York: Brunner-Routledge.
- Heyes, C. & Catmur, C. (2022) What happened to mirror neurons?, *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, **17** (1), pp. 153–168.
- Hood, B.M., Willen, J.D. & Driver, J. (1998) Adult's eyes trigger shifts of visual attention in human infants, *Psychological Science*, **9** (2), pp. 131–134. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00024
- Hrdy, S.B. (2009) *Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hurlburt, R.T., Heavey, C.L. & Kelsey, J.M. (2013) Toward a phenomenology of inner speaking, *Consciousness and Cognition*, **22** (4), pp. 1477–1494. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.10.003
- Jonsson, C.-O. & Clinton, D. (2006) What do mothers attune to during interactions with their infants?, *Infant and Child Development*, **15** (4), pp. 387–402. doi: 10.1002/icd.466
- Kant, I. (2002) What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?, in Allison, H. & Heath, P. (eds.) *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, Allison, H. (trans.), pp. 337–424, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kleinke, C.L. & Pohlen, P.D. (1971) Affective and emotional responses as a function of other person's gaze and cooperativeness in a two-person game, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, **17** (3), pp. 308–313. doi: 10.1037/h0030600
- Langfur, S. (2014) Heidegger and the infant: A second-person alternative to the Dasein-analysis, *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, **34** (4), pp. 257–274. doi: 10.1037/a0038004

- Langfur, S. (2019) Cogitor ergo sum: The origin of self-awareness in dyadic interaction, *Human Studies*, **42** (3), pp. 425–450. doi: 10.1007/s10746-018-09487-y
- Leont'ev, A.N. (1981) The problem of activity in psychology, in Wertsch, J.V. (ed. & trans.) *The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- Marx, V. & Nagy, E. (2015) Fetal behavioural responses to maternal voice and touch, *PLoS ONE*, **10** (6), e0129118. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0129118
- Masataka, N. (2003) *The Onset of Language*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mead, G.H. (1967) *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Meltzoff, A.N. & Moore, M.K. (1994) Imitation, memory, and the representation of persons, *Infant Behavior and Development*, **17**, pp. 83–99, [Online], http://ilabs.washington.edu/meltzoff/pdf/94Meltzoff_Moore_IB&D.pdf.
- Nelson, K. (ed.) (2006) *Narratives from the Crib*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nomikou, I., Leonardi, G., Radkowska, A., Rączaszek-Leonardi, J. & Rohlfing, K.J. (2017) Taking up an active role: Emerging participation in early mother–infant interaction during peekaboo routines, *Frontiers in Psychology*, **8**, art. 1656. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01656
- Piaget, J. (1963) *The Origins of Intelligence in Children*, Cook, M. (trans.), New York: Norton.
- Poincaré, H. (1910) Mathematical creation, *The Monist*, **20** (3), pp. 321–335. doi: 10.1093/monist/20.3.321
- Reddy, V. (2008) *How Infants Know Minds*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Reddy, V. (2009) Before the 'third element': Understanding attention to self, in Eilan, N., Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. & Roessler, J. (eds.) *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds*, pp. 85–109, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Riley, D. (2004) 'A voice without a mouth': Inner speech, *Qui Parle*, **14** (2), pp. 57–104.
- Rochat, P., Goubet, N. & Senders, S.J. (1999) To reach or not to reach? Perception of body effectivities by young infants, *Infant and Child Development*, **8** (3), pp. 129–148.
- Ryle, G. (1963) *The Concept of Mind*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Sauciuc, G.-A., Zlakowska, J., Persson, T., Lenninger, S. & Alenkaer Madsen, E. (2020) Imitation recognition and its prosocial effects in 6-month old infants, *PLoS ONE*, **15** (5), e0232717. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0232717
- Schafer, R. (1968) *Aspects of Internalization*, New York: International Universities Press.
- Schutz, A. (1962) *Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Slovan, A. & Chrisley, R. (2003) Virtual machines and consciousness, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, **10** (4–5), pp. 133–172.
- Steiner, G. (1989) *Real Presences*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Stern, D.N. (1985) *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*, New York: Basic Books.
- Strawson, P.F. (1959) *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, London: Methuen.

- Thompson, E. (2014) *Waking, Dreaming, Being*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tillotson, G. & Tillotson, K. (2013) *Mid-Victorian Studies*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Tomasello, M. (1999) *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tronick, E.Z. (1989) Emotions and emotional communication in infants, *American Psychologist*, **44** (2), pp. 112–119. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.44.2.112
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1987) Thinking and speech, in Rieber, R.W. & Carton, A.S. (eds.) *The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky*, Minick, N. (trans.), New York: Plenum.
- Williams, G.P. & Kleinke, C.L. (1993) Effects of mutual gaze and touch on attraction, mood, and cardiovascular reactivity, *Journal of Research in Personality*, **27** (2), pp. 170–183.
- Winnicott, D.W. (1965) *The Maturation Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development*, London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
- Winnicott, D.W. (1985) *Playing and Reality*, London: Pelican Books.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations*, Anscombe, G.E.M. (trans.), New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Wolff, P.H. (1987) *The Development of Behavioral States and the Expression of Emotions in Early Infancy*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Young, R.M. (2003) The analytic frame, abstinence and acting out, [Online], http://www.psychanalysis-and-therapy.com/human_nature/papers/pap110.html
- Zahavi, D. (2014) *Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Paper received April 2022; revised July 2022.