Table of Contents: Vol. 26, No. 9-10, September/October 2019

Journal of Consciousness Studies controversies in science & the humanities

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness:
Responses to David Chalmers, Part One

Special Issue edited by François Kammerer

4 About Authors

8 Editorial Introduction François Kammerer

19 Bayesing Qualia Andy Clark, Karl Friston & Sam Wilkinson

34 Undermining Belief in Consciousness Justin Clarke-Doane

48 Welcome to Strong Illusionism Daniel C. Dennett

59 Meta-Hard or Hardly Meta? Gary L. Drescher

71 Generating Explanatory Gaps Brian Fiala & Shaun Nichols

83 The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness Keith Frankish

95 We Are Machines That Claim to Be Conscious Michael Graziano

105 Easy Does It Nicholas Humphrey

115 Explaining Variation within the Meta-Problem Elizabeth Irvine

124 The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach François Kammerer

136 A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness Hakwan Lau & Matthias Michel

148 On the Meta-Problem Joseph Levine

160 None of These Problems Are That ‘Hard’… or ‘Easy’ Lisa Miracchi

173 Response to Chalmers’ ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’ David Papineau

182 Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta-Problem of Consciousness Derk Pereboom

194 Chalmers’ Meta-Problem David Rosenthal

205 A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness Bradford Saad

217 From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts Wolfgang Schwarz

228 Underestimating the Physical Galen Strawson

241 No Problem Justin Sytsma & Eyuphan Ozdemir

257 From ‘Consciousness’ to ‘I Think, I Feel, I Know’ Anna Wierzbicka

270 Idealization and Problem Intuitions Helen Yetter-Chappell

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