Cybernetics
& Human Knowing - Thesaurus pilot project
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Distinction |
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Definition |
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| Discrimination
between a class of phenomena and the complement of that class. (PC) A distinction splits the world in two parts, "That" and "This, or "environment" or "system", or "us" and "Them" (IESC, EA) It is the very fundamental act of system theory, the very act of Distinctions coexists with purposes. (IESC) Certainly, it is the most fundamental act of system theory, the very act of defining the system presently of interst, of distinguishing it from its environment (EA)
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Principia Cybernetica (web) |
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| The simplest form or structure we can imagine is a distinction. A distinction can be defined as the process (or its result) of discriminating between a class of phenomena and the complement of that class (i.e. all the phenomena which do not fit into the class). As such, a distinction structures the universe of all experienced phenomena in two parts. Such a part which is distinguished from its complement or background can be called an indication (Spencer-Brown, 1969). If more than one distinction is applied the structure becomes more complex, and the number of potential indications increases, depending on the number of distinctions and the way they are connected. A distinction can be seen as an element of cognitive structuration. Indeed, any process of perception implies a classification between phenomena. This classification operation has two aspects : 1.the phenomena which are put together in a class, are considered to be equivalent with respect to the observer's goals, they are assimilated, they belong to the same equivalence class ; 2.the phenomena corresponding to different classes are distinguished or discriminated, they belong to different equivalence classes. The operations of distinction, and assimilation of phenomena necessarily go together. If a cognitive system would make no distinctions, only assimilations, it would be unable to perceive different phenomena, it would react to all situations in a uniform way ; hence, it would be unable to adapt to a changing environment. On the other hand, a system which would make no assimilations, only distinctions, would be unable to anticipate; hence it would also be unable to adapt. Spencer-Brown (1969) has proposed general axioms for distinctions. With these axioms, he has shown that a set of distinctions has a Boolean algebra structure, isomorphic to the algebra of classes in set theory or to the algebra of propositions in logic (Spencer-Brown, 1969). Spencer Brown showed that distinction algebra implies propositional calculus. B. Banaschewski (1977) showed the opposite entailment in *B. Banaschewski (1977), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 3: 507-509. *Spencer Brown G. (1969) : Laws of Form, (Allen & Unwin, London).
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Encyclopedia Autopoietica |
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| "Unity
distinction ... is not an abstract notion of purely conceptual validity for descriptive or
analytical purposes, but is an operative notion referring to the process through which a
unity becomes asserted or defined: the conditions that specify a unity determine its
phenomenology." (Varela, 1979, p. 31; cf. Maturana & Varela, 1980,
p. 96) The two senses in which this term is employed both refer to this process. They
differ in that one (1.) refers to the process by which a unity is defined by an observer,
while the other (2.) invokes a unity's self-distinction through the topological effect(s)
of its organizational closure. 1. The act or process by which an observer recognizes a unity. Paralleling Spencer Brown (1969), Maturana and Varela use the term "distinction" to denote -- "...the pointing to a unity by performing an operation which defines its boundaries and separates it from a background." (Maturana, 1975, p. 325) Varela (1979a, p. 84) explains: "A distinction splits the world into two parts, 'that' and 'this', or 'environment' and 'system', or 'us' and 'them', etc. ..Certainly, it is the most fundamental act of system theory, the very act of defining the system presently of interest, of distinguishing it from its environment." This parallels in spirit the statements of Bateson (Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, New York: Bantam, 1988, p. 29): "...(P)erception operates only upon difference. All receipt of information is necessarily the receipt of news of difference..." Varela differentiates this sense of the term from 2. (below) by labeling it conceptual (1979, p. 30). Distinction effects a complementary recognition of both unity and background. Through distinction, the observer "...specifies a unity as an entity distinct from a background and abackground as the domain in which an entity is distinguished. An operation of distinction, however, is also a prescription of a procedure which, if carried out, severs a unity from a background, regardless of the procedure of distinction and regardless of whether the procedure is carried out by an observer or by another entity." (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xxii) Distinction constrains the domain of discourse, because the act of distinguishing specifies (even if only implicitly) both something referred to and the context in which it is manifest. Because a unity is brought forth only through distinction, "...each time we refer to a unity in our descriptions, we are implying the operation of distinction that defines it and makes it possible." (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 40) 2. The act or process by which a unity effects or asserts its own separability from its ambience or background. This sense of "distinction" highlights the manner in which an autonomous / autopoietic system establishes, as the topological manifestation of its organizational closure, a literal or functional boundary delineating its extent with respect to its ambience. Varela differentiates this sense of the term from 1. above by labeling it physical (e.g., when realized in the physical space). (1979, pp. 30-31) Cf. criterion of distinction, unity
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International Encyclopedia of Systems & Cybernetics |
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| A relation between phenomena which is conserved in a bijective way
even if the phenomena themselves change during the process. This concept has been discussed by J.A. GOGUEN and F. VARELA who state: "A distinction splits the world into two parts, "That" and "This", or "environment" or "system", or "us" and "them", etc. One of the most fundamental of all human activities is the making of distinctions. Certainly, it is the most fundamental act of systems theory, the very act of defining the system presently of interest, of distinguishing it from its environment. Distinctions coexist with purposes". (1967, p.32) The corresponding logical model is based on SPENCER BROWNs distinction algebra. (1969) It is also useful in order to differentiate causal and stochastic processes, as well as reversible (retrodictable) or irriversible (and more or less predictable) ones. HEYLIGHEN states: "To be meaningful, a distinction must have a minimal stability or invariance (i.e. during (certain) dynamical evolution it must either remain constant or be mapped on another distinction)" (1989, p. 382) "A distinction is constructed by the observer in interaction with the system. As such, a distinction is always to a certain degree subjective, depending on the goal the observer has in mind while modeling the system, but is not arbitrary, because not all distinctions will allow the observer to find coherence between observations performed on the system. Since all phenomena in the universe are by definition different, the number of potential distinctions is infinite. A representation of (part of) the universe is necessarily finite, and, hence, the number of distinctions an observer will make will be infinitely smaller than the total number of distinctions he or she could make" (1990a, p. 427)
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