 |
The View from Within
First Person Methodologies for the Study of Consciousness
Edited by
Francisco Varela
and Jonathan Shear
JCS, Volume 6, 1999: February/March
320 pages
|
Over the last decade there has been a resurgence of interest in the
scientific study of consciousness — an area that has been largely ignored
since the time of William James. This renaissance has primarily been stimulated
by developments in PET, fMRI and other brain-scanning technology that enable
scientists to pinpoint the neural correlates of conscious experience with
ever-increasing accuracy.
However, the study of conscious experience itself has not kept pace
with these advances in third-person methodologies. If anything, the standard
approaches to examining the ‘view from within’ involve little more than
cataloging its readily accessible components. Thus the study of lived subjective
experience is still at the level of Aristotelian science. This has led
many to deny that there could possibly be such a thing as a truly scientific
study of conscious experience, or at least to ask: can one be objective
about the subjective?
Drawing on a wide range of approaches — from phenomenology to meditation
— THE VIEW FROM WITHIN examines the possibility of a disciplined approach
to the study of subjective states. The focus is on the practical issues
involved.
Contents
Introduction
-
Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear: First-person accounts: why,
what, and how
Part I: Introspection
-
Pierre Vermersch: Introspection as practice
-
Claire Peugeot: The intuitive experience: a first-person empirical
investigation
-
Carl Ginsburg: Body-image, movement and consciousness: examples
from a somatic practice in the Feldenkreis method
Part II: Phenomenology
-
Natalie Depraz: Phenomenological reduction as praxis
-
Francisco Varela: The neurophenomenology of time consciousness
-
Andrew R. Bailey: Beyond the Fringe: William James on the transitional
parts of the stream of consciousness
-
Jean Naudin, Caroline Gros-Azorin, Aaron Mishara, Osborne P. Wiggins,
Michael A. Schwartz, Jean-Michel Azorin: Reduction as a method in Psychiatric
experience
Part III: Contemplative traditions
-
Alan Wallace: The Buddhist tradition of samatha: methods for refining
and examining consciousness
-
Jonathan Shear and Ronald Jevning: Pure consciousness: scientific
exporation of meditation techniques
Part IV: Commentaries
-
James H. Austin, Six Points to Ponder
-
Bernard J. Baars, There is Already a Field of Systematic Phenomenology,
and it’s Called ‘Psychology’
-
Guy Claxton, Moving the Cursor of Consciousness: Cognitive science
and human welfare
-
David Galin, Separating First-personness From the Other Problems
of Consciousness, or ‘You had to have been there!’
-
Shaun Gallagher, A Cognitive Way to the Transcendental Reduction
-
E.T. Gendlin, A New Model
-
William S. Haney II, Pure Consciousness and Cultural Studies
-
Piet Hut, Theory and Experiment in Philosophy
-
William Lyons, On the Metaphysics of Introspection
-
Response to Lyons from P. Vermersch
-
Bruce Mangan, The Fringe: A case study in explanatory phenomenology
-
Eduard Marbach, Building Materials for the Explanatory Bridge
-
Gregory Nixon, A ‘Hermeneutic Objection’: Language and the inner
view
-
Response to Nixon from J. Shear
-
Ian Owen and Neil Morris, The Husserlian Phenomenology of Consciousness
and Cognitive Science: We can see the path but nobody is on it
-
Response to Owen and Morris from F.J. Varela
-
John Pickering, Words and Silence
-
Jean-François Richard, Object, Limits and Function of Consciousness
-
Jonathan W. Schooler and Sonya Dougal, The Symbiosis of Subjective
and Experimental Approaches to Intuition
-
Rachel Henley, Distinguishing Insight from Intuition
-
Response to Schooler, Dougal and Henley from C. Petitmengin-Peugeot
-
Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Mental Force and the Advertence of Bare Attention
-
Mark Sullivan, Does Psychiatry need the Husserlian Detour?
-
Response to Sullivan from J. Naudin
-
Max Velmans, Intersubjective Science
Francisco J. Varela and Jonathan Shear, Editors’ Rejoinder to
the Debate