A symposium based on a keynote paper by David Chalmers' has run over several issues of the journal, and the author's response has recently been published.
What are the criteria for evidence regarding conscious experience? The keynote paper claims that the evidence involves comparisons between conscious and unconscious ‘representations and processes’; a good case is comparisons between the conscious and unconscious items in working memory. Baars claims that there is a very plausible cognitive architecture that can explain it — the Global Workspace (GW) architecture, initially developed by Alan Newell’s cognitive architecture group at Carnegie-Mellon University in the 1970s.
Keynote paper by Bernard Baars. Now available: published in Volume 4, No. 4, 1997
Is a self or ‘I’ necessary for consciousness, or can consciousness exist independently of selves? Is it possible to develop a theory of conscious experience without some concept of an experiencer? Are selves constructions of consciousness or is consciousness a function of self? The complexity and multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon of self, like consciousness itself, suggests that no one discipline will be able to capture its full meaning. The aim of this special issue is to explore various dimensions of the self by drawing on a diverse set of disciplines and approaches, including philosophy, developmental and cognitive psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, sociology, anthropology, narrative theories, theories of embodiment, and also religious and meditative approaches as developed in both the East and the West.
Keynote paper by Galen Strawson. Edited by Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear.
Part 1 published in Volume 4, No. 5/6 (1997) now available. This issue is offered free with new subscription for Volume 5 (1998), enquiries to: sandra@imprint.co.uk
Several authors in this journal have championed the viewpoint that consciousness is a unitary phonomenon which (if it can be explained reductively at all), can only be reduced to a unitary state of undifferentiated awareness. However, much of the evidence from neuropsychology would lead to a very different model in which what we call ‘consciousness’ is actually a collection of different cognitive modules. One of the paradigm cases is that of blindsight which suggests to some a computational theory in which phenomenal awareness does not play a necessary role in certain domains of perception. This special issue will present a review of the latest research in the field and also question what the implications are for fundamental models of consciousness.
Edited by Robert Forman and Alfred Kaszniak. Publication: 1998
Enquiries to Robert Forman: RForman383@aol.com
Many authors have argued that we will make no progress at all in our understanding of human consciousness until science is expanded to include subjective experience as a source of empirical evidence. However the study of subjectivity is normally associated with the vagaries of introspectionism to the extent that the word ‘subjective’ is often equated with unverifiable opinion. However, a number of approaches to the study of human experience claim to be as rigorous and testable as the methods adopted by the traditional natural sciences, and to have important results and contributions for current research. Is it possible that the taboo on subjectivity is more of a historical artifact than an in-principle difficulty? This special issue will include contributions from many different traditions, including (Husserlian) Phenomenology, a re-examination of psychological introspection and verbal behaviour, and phenomenological methods from Eastern meditation traditions. The focus of this issue will be on method and hands-on results, rather than philosophical issues.
Edited by Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear. Sponsored by the Institute of Noetic Sciences.
Publication: 1998
Enquiries to Jonathan Shear: jcs@richmond.infi.net
Given the controversial nature of this subject, we felt the only way of covering it in a responsible manner was to have a special issue edited by a balanced team of sceptics and psi advocates. Although the issue will focus on current research, it will start with a sceptical review of the history of the subject and also focus on theoretical issues. What (if anything) does psi tell us about the nature of consciousness?
Edited by Ray Hyman, Jessica Utts, Marilyn Schlitz and Richard Wiseman.
Publication: 1998
Enquiries to Jean Burns: jeanbur@netcom.com
A central aspect of the science/religion debate is whether divine action is compatible with the known laws of physics. Developments in physics are now seen by some scientists and theologians as pointing to a resolution of old conflicts. Others remain adamant that no reconciliation is possible, indeed that our knowledge of physics is now so complete that ‘the end of science’ is in sight. There are even radical theologians arguing that religion does not need an ‘intervening God’. Recent contributions to JCS show that in consciousness studies the old science/religion questions of causality, free-will and mind–matter relations are still very live issues. This Special Issue will aim to cast useful light on all sides of this fascinating and unfolding debate.
Edited by Jean Burns and Anthony Freeman.
Publication: 1999
Enquiries to Anthony Freeman: anthony@imprint.co.uk
Edited by Benjamin Libet and Keith Sutherland.
Publication: 1998/9
Enquiries to Anthony Freeman: anthony@imprint.co.uk
