

Book Reviews

Peter Hadreas

A Phenomenology of Love and Hate

Aldershot: Ashgate (New Critical Thinking In Philosophy), 2007

142 pp., ISBN 978 0754661467 (hbk)

Reviewed by Julian Candy

The phenomenon of love in its many guises is familiar to us all; indeed is so intimate that we have difficulty in recognizing its elements and discerning its lineaments. Likewise, while many of us may attempt to deny or conceal our capacity for hatred, none can evade its impact, especially when it is directed against groups or races and culminates in terrorist acts.

This book aims to tease out and lay before us the ‘logical underpinnings’ of these so significant, yet often poorly conceptualised, experiences. It draws on a remarkably wide range of reference and allusion, both scholarly and lay, and in its course Peter Hadreas illuminates such issues as the incest taboo, the distinction between nudity and nakedness, and the overriding significance of generalisation in the genesis of hatred, whether of an individual or of a group.

The central tool in his analysis is Husserlian phenomenology, which in recent years has undergone significant expansion and clarification. It used to be thought that Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) hadn’t taken his phenomenology much beyond establishing methodological procedures for examining consciousness, leaving to his followers the task of developing and applying them. Thanks in large measure to the sequential publication of English translations of his later works, now at the 34th volume, we can appreciate that his later thinking extended and deepened both the sophistication and the application of his method. He dealt in particular with inter-subjectivity, with ethical issues and with the function of human consciousness within a

community, where his elucidation of the concept of home and alien cultures has been especially fruitful.

Peter Hadreas notes that phenomenology is particularly suited to the study of interdisciplinary topics such as love and hate. We cannot for example begin to comprehend the actions of Klebold and Harris in opening fire on fellow students and others at Columbine High School unless we can meaningfully draw together individual psychopathology with the complex interpersonal and social context within which that psychopathology played itself out. While it may not be the only means to achieve this level of analysis (the integral approach of Ken Wilber may be another), any method which fosters the study of those crucial topics that lie between disciplines is to be welcomed.

In the final scene of Goethe's *Faust*, a choir of angels use 'a shaft of Eros' to distract Mephistopheles as he is about to lay hold of Faust's soul. As they accompany that now liberated 'noble part' on its journey from earth to heaven and spiritual reunion with Gretchen, the innocent girl he had so grievously misused, they sing as though to justify their action the famous words, *Wer immer strebend sich bemüht, Den können wir erlösen* ('He who constantly exerts himself in striving, he we can redeem').

Peter Hadreas uses this passage in a more literal rendering: 'He who takes the trouble to strive ...' to illustrate that striving, more precisely what he calls 'pre-objective' striving, is in the first instance a prime characteristic of Personal Love, 'Pre-objective' because like breathing it initially involves no intentional or conscious pleasure or desire, though if blocked straightway 'we emerge as a self-conscious ego'. This can be seen in its original form as the infant at the breast. Moreover, Husserl extends this notion further to life itself. He writes in characteristic style: 'Life is striving in the manifold forms and contents of intention and fulfilment; in the broadest sense, it is pleasure in fulfilment; in the lack of fulfilment, life is a tending towards pleasure as a pure striving that desires or as a striving that slackens off in the realisation that fulfils it and that accomplishes its purpose in the process of the realisation of the life-form of pleasure with its release of tension.' And more succinctly, 'Lovers bind themselves in a loving partnership so that all the striving of one enters into the striving of the other' (p 16. and note 10; some ellipsis). Personal Love arises from a bundling together of striving subjects who take 'security in one another'. Such striving is directed in particular towards the two other elements that are required if the lover is to reach out to and make one with the beloved: 'contact', and 'understanding after one another', a best attempt rendition of Husserl's coinage *Nachverstehen*. These

subtle concepts are clearly explained and vividly illustrated by Hadreas.

Sexual Love, by contrast, is characterised by a shift from vision to touch as the leading sense modality, which in turn requires a temporal ordering of parts rather than the simultaneity of the glance that grasps the whole: sexual parts become objects organised by touch, and nudity, unlike nakedness 'appears as a relation of parts where some remain hidden, but promise delight through uncovering' (p. 63). The antagonism between Personal Love that strives to embrace the whole and Sexual Love that set parts against the whole provides the energy that fuels the incest taboo.

His treatment of Hatred, particularly in its virulent form as expressed in terrorism and in mass killings such as those in Oklahoma, is especially timely, since it encourages us to focus on the group and individual mechanisms necessary if thinking and feeling are to culminate in action. Two conditions are identified: the principle of harm or ill will; and the principle of blame or the extra vituperative principle. Both principles display the logical properties of generality and exclusivity. Although hatred focused on an individual contains these elements, they are taken to their limit in the group-focused hatred that is almost *lovingly* nurtured by mass killers and terrorists.

Phenomenology poorly expounded may give the impression of reiterating the obvious without adding to our understanding: of course hatred involves ill will, and a lover's embrace can indeed express a desire to include, to devour the beloved whole. Where does this lead us? As though in response to such objection, this volume demonstrates the strength and the value of phenomenology by providing for us an exemplary and wide ranging exposition of the significant relationships between the elements that go to make up overflowing concepts that we use every day 'without thinking', thereby often confusing ourselves and others. Students of Husserl will enjoy its comprehensive application of our new-found appreciation of his philosophy, and anyone, our leaders not least, who needs to understand terrorism rather than merely label it as evil will benefit from the constructive framework it provides for the development of countermeasures that go beyond defensive security and military repression.

Russell T. Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel*Describing Inner Experience: Proponent Meets Skeptic*

Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, 2007, 322 pp.

Reviewed by Bill Faw, Brewton Parker College, bfaw@bpc.edu

Compulsive *JCS* readers, who devour each issue before the next arrives, will have read at least three articles by Schwitzgebel (in 9:5–6; 11:7–8; 14:3) and one by Hurlburt (11:7–8). They'll know about Hurlburt's Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) beeper methodology. Recognizing that introspection is neither easy nor infallible, it nevertheless requires subjects to report on whatever is in their minds whenever a beep sounds at random intervals. As avid readers will also know, Schwitzgebel is a sceptic about persons' accuracy in even *knowing* — let alone *reporting* — their inner experience, and has used Hurlburt's beeper method to determine whether inner experience is (using a 'soup' metaphor) 'rich' (that we are constantly experiencing background input from each sensory modality) or 'thin' (that we only experience the things in sharp focus).¹

At the 2002 Tucson conference, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 'presented opposing papers on the matter and instantly became friends, arguing over dinner, then over margaritas, then again the next day, then in the airport waiting for flights home'. While at Tucson, Schwitzgebel became a beeper subject. Then they undertook a joint project, using the DES method that Hurlburt has been developing since 1974, with a young college graduate in philosophy and psychology named 'Melanie' as subject — which led to this book.

In the opening and closing chapters, they present their respective views and methods. They maintain that in the 1990s 'introspection has re-entered' psychology and philosophy 'with little examination'. While 'without introspection, we might not even know that we *are* conscious in the relevant sense' (p. 53), introspection, they say, is used less carefully in modern consciousness science than in the heyday of the 'introspectionists' over 100 years ago!

Hurlburt lists guidelines for a controlled use of introspection such as: be sceptical; introspect with little delay; target specific natural brief episodes; disturb the experience as little as possible; don't ask participants to infer causation; separate reports from interpretations. He believes that DES reports generally mirror inner experience

[1] After hearing Schwitzgebel use these metaphors at the recent Tucson conference, David Chalmers commented to me that these are strange opposites — for example, Paris Hilton is *both* rich and thin!

because the method is sophisticated. Interviewers become proficient in bracketing presuppositions, while leading the witness is less problematic with reports about actually occurring events. Subjects in general are sceptical yet say they give accurate and complete reports; they show no reluctance to report on whatever they think is in their minds, and there is more variability in reports than would be expected if people were merely uttering implicit folk theories.

Schwitzgebel 'inverts' Descartes' view that knowledge of ones own mind serves as the basis of ones knowledge of the world. Instead, according to Schwitzgebel, people spend most of their time thinking about the outer world. 'The "inner world" of conscious experience is reflected on only rarely and is known only poorly' (p. 53). This leads to introspective error: experience is fleeting, we're not in the habit of attending introspectively to experience, the concepts and categories to characterize experience are limited and derivative, and reports of experience are likely to be distorted by pre-existing theories and situational demands. As mentioned above, Schwitzgebel holds that self report is hampered by an intrinsic difficulty in even *knowing* what one is thinking — let alone translating it into language!

Melanie wore a private easily-detectable unambiguous beeper, as she went about her normal daily business, for 3+ hours a day for 6 days. When she heard the beep (in random sequence six times per day), Melanie jotted down notes about her inner experience *just before* the beep. Within 24 hours after each beeping day, the three of them held an expositional interview, in which Melanie gave more detail and the interviewers raised questions to clarify her report. Hurlburt defends his method against Schwitzgebel's objections that the episodes of reporting are too-few and too-sketchy, and that there can be considerable memory failure and confabulation because of the delay between beeps and interviews. In some previous experiments, Hurlburt varied delay times and lengths of notes made after beeps. He contends that interviews seem very similar. The middle six chapters present verbatim selections and summaries of these interviews.

Hurlburt took the lead and interviewed Melanie in person, with Schwitzgebel on speaker phone. Interspersed among the verbatim reports and other chapters, are 88 'boxes' in which one or both write comments about the verbatim, with titles such as 'doubts about Melanie's "inner thought" voice', 'Melanie's and Eric's believability as subjects ...', and 'Consolidating Melanie's sense that she is self-analytical'. I experienced a ping-pong effect reading along in a verbatim and then stopping to read a referenced box in which Schwitzgebel said he had no confidence that Melanie was reporting her experience

accurately, or such. But this is a great alternation between the careful parsing of first-person experience and a debate involving Locke, Berkeley, Wundt, Dennett, and Tye. Unlike most, *these* verbatim chapters are anything but boring.

Hurlburt shows an almost flawless use of a Rogerian-Husserlian interpersonal phenomenological dialogue which takes self-report very seriously, probes the participant's reported experience, and helps the latter 'bracket' her implicit folk-psychology assumptions. The authors acknowledge that these verbatim reports must be quite different than if Eric had not been involved with Russ — with Eric being relatively untrained in DES, having a disembodied presence, and having a free license to probe Melanie's report as often and almost extensively as he wished. But this triologue is great! In my own soundless inner-speech, I kept saying, '*This is so good!*'

I especially appreciated the many times Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel discussed the topic 'Are people mostly alike?' (as in Box 7.4) Hurlburt comments that Schwitzgebel has problems accepting some of Melanie's reports because of the 'if-I-don't-do-it-then-others-must-not-do-it-either' syndrome. Schwitzgebel partially concedes, but assumes that 'people are probably mostly similar if there are no gross differences in behavior or physiology'. This argument, of course, is why people did not accept the reality of synaesthesia for so long. Hurlburt counters: 'it is a large mistake to think that there's prima facie reason to suppose that people are mostly similar', and then describes some of the range of mental life that has been 'sampled' using his technique — in which people report very different mixes of inner speech, inner hearing, images, sensory awareness, thinking without words, images or other symbols, indeterminate images, 'feeling fact of body', kinesthetic imagery, and feelings. Hurlburt concludes: 'so, yes, I think people are importantly different when it comes to inner experience'.

I just *had to be* the reviewer of this book. You recall Schwitzgebel's and Hurlburt's opposing papers and margaritas at Tucson? Well, while I missed out on the dinner and margaritas, I *also* gave a paper at that conference. All three of us heard each others' papers, over two concurrent sessions. In the Q/A of my paper on mental imagery, both Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel challenged my *knowledge* of my self report that I am a mental non-imager! Hurlburt even made a vague offer to 'put me on the beeper'. I was writing the Tucson 2002 conference review, so did not follow through on his offer. So, Schwitzgebel gets the great book with Hurlburt and dinner and margaritas — and I just get a lousy tee-shirt and two reviews!

Marcel Kuijsten (Ed.)*Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness:**Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited*

Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2006, 446 pp. \$35.00

ISBN 978 0979074400 (hbk)

Reviewed by Ilkka Kallio, Statistics Finland, Helsinki

Julian Jaynes (1920–97) was a Princeton psychologist with a reputation as something of a maverick genius. His best known work, *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*, appeared three decades ago. It certainly contributed to the late 20th century renaissance in consciousness studies, but seems generally to have been regarded as a bit of an anomaly. Nevertheless some of Jaynes' ideas have had an enduring influence; Endel Tulving, Daniel Dennett, Merlin Donald, Robin Dunbar, Elkhonon Goldberg, Susan Blackmore, Roy Baumeister, and Guy Claxton, for example, have all either incorporated aspects of Jaynes' thinking into their own theories or have otherwise been sympathetic to his ideas.

There has lately been a revival of interest. A biennial 'Julian Jaynes conference on consciousness' is held at the University of Prince Edward Island. An active 'Julian Jaynes Society' publishes a quarterly newsletter for members, runs a useful web site (www.julianjaynes.org), arranged a workshop at Tucson 2008 and has also published this book. Edited by Marcel Kuijsten, founder and organizer of the society, the book is a compilation of four (republished) articles by Jaynes himself and nine others — many of them reprints or revisions of original papers — by aficionados of his theory, preceded by an editor's introduction looking at reasons for the relative neglect of Jaynes in academic circles. Overall, it is clearly an invitation to reassess the worth of Jaynes's contributions to the theory of consciousness.

Jaynes aimed to show that, in the past, societies existed within which social control was based on auditory hallucinations. In the papers reprinted here, the idea offers insights into otherwise inexplicable aspects concerning the pharaoh Tutankhamun and dragon-motifs in Shang China. He took William Blake for an example of the occurrence of this sort of 'bicameral' mentality, along with his ordinarily conscious one, in relatively recent times. To this day, he also pointed out, auditory hallucinations are surprisingly common, even in sane people.

According to Jaynes, consciousness equals the concept of consciousness. Thus it is a linguistically constructed mental entity, actually a Searlean institutional fact (Searle, 1997). Consciousness is the

ability to experience experiences in addition to physical things, the ability to 'see' with the mind's 'eye'. On the basis of the earliest translatable texts and archaeological evidence, he traced its origins to a breakdown of a previous 'bicameral' form of mentality.

Before consciousness emerged, human decision-making was based on auditory hallucinations, a slowly evolved side-effect of language. Originally just a form of memory for speech, as language and society became more complex these hallucinations developed into cultural concretions and were referred to as 'gods'. Particularly in moments of stress, they often told people what to do — as is often the case with contemporary schizophrenics' hallucinated voices — but in socially adaptive ways. The commands, Jaynes hypothesized, originated in the right brain and were 'heard' and obeyed by the left hemisphere, the cerebral as well as the functional organization thus being bicameral. These voices ruled Old World ancient societies until some three millennia ago, and those of the Incas and Mayans nearly up to their conquest by the Spaniards.

The hallucinatory social control being inherently fragile, bicameral societies broke down due to strains caused by population growth, ecological adversity, the invention of writing, and other factors. The gods were less and less frequently heard and a void of decision-making methods ensued. Several forms of divination developed as stop-gaps but a lasting solution to the decision problem arrived only with the gradual invention of the concept of consciousness, based on language's disposition to metaphor and analogy.

In addition to Kuijsten's extensive review of empirical evidence for the four independent hypotheses of Jaynes' theory — consciousness's being based on language, the bicameral mind, the historical dating, and the neuropsychology — two contributors defend Jaynes' theory with original empirical studies of their own.

I think John Hamilton's work on auditory hallucinations of congenital quadriplegics who have never spoken in their lives may put a strong constraint on the feasible theories of auditory hallucinations not easily reconcilable with the claim by Peter Bick and Marcel Kinsbourne that auditory hallucinations are silent talking to oneself, the stand embraced even by Dennett, the most Jaynesian of the presently prominent philosophers of mind. Michael Carr's corroborative evidence for Jaynes's psychohistory in ancient China is perhaps the most important of the contributions. He concentrates on the personation ceremony of the dead in which a young relative acts as an intermediary for messages from the deceased by hallucinating them, an apparent remnant of a waning bicameral management of affairs.

Jan Sleutels ingeniously refutes Ned Block's criticisms of Jaynes via an *a priori* argument that consciousness can in fact be identified with its concept. Other conceptual developments of Jaynes' theory are less persuasive. The significance of consciousness' being identical with its concept is missed by John Limber in his erudite elaborations on how consciousness, language, and Jaynes' theory relate to each other. It is suggested by Brian McVeigh that the self provides us with volition through division into two mental subcomponents, one of which is able to command the other. This makes Jaynes' heritage look uncomfortably ambiguous, as my guess is that he himself would rather have put (our delusional belief in) free will (Jaynes, 1990, p. 345) in the role of provider of conscious volition (1990, pp. 98–9).

Scott Greer traces the basis of Jaynes' thinking, suggesting that his theory has Aristotelian roots. William Woodward and June Tower give a brief biography, presenting Jaynes as a man of principle, imprisoned for pacifism during the Second World War and impatient with academic formalities and their implicit threat to creativity. D.C. Stove's tribute to him is an appreciation of Jaynes' explanation of religion by the bicamerality hypothesis.

Bringing together current Jaynesian thinking is a laudable accomplishment. However, this volume also has its failings. It doesn't provide a good overview of Jaynes' theory, so anyone wanting to understand it properly would have to resort to originals (Jaynes, 1990; 1986). Novel theoretical developments are few and far between and not of breakthrough quality. Informed, or indeed any, critiques are missing. So, too, is a connection to mainstream consciousness studies.

Jaynes' theory clearly belongs in the class of higher-order theories of consciousness. It is essentially about how higher-order mental states have become possible at all and its mechanism for generating consciousness is arguably not all that different from the ones usually suggested, except in the exclusive role given to language. If for no other reason than its untapped potential to facilitate contemporary consciousness studies, Jaynes' theory merits in my view the reassessment by the scientific community urged in this volume.

References

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Daniel D. Hutto*Folk Psychological Narratives:**The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons*

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, 343 pp., £24.95

ISBN 978 0262083676 (hbk)

Reviewed by Jane Mathison

The main theme of this book is that our ability to understand the intentions embodied in narratives is sociologically grounded and language dependent. It can be explained by what the author terms 'the narrative practice hypothesis' (NPH), which will, he hopes, supersede existing approaches such as theory theory or simulation theory. Claiming originality, Hutto sets out to persuade the reader by means of a series of closely structured arguments, rebutting other contemporary theories about the origins of narrative practice and supporting his NPH with evidence from a wide variety of sources. These range though ethology, primatology, child development, studies of autistics, recent developments in neurology and even palaeo-anthropology.

In his view, folk psychological narratives play two vital roles in 'common sense' as it is practised; they shape expectation and are an essential medium through which we develop our basic understanding of how we use reasons as grounds for actions. Such narratives help to normalize events by creating conceptual connections between them, and may even explain the eccentric or unusual. The consequence is that people are thus able to make sense of the actions of others.

Exploration of the role of narratives would seem to be critical nowadays, given contemporary information overload. Most of this information is presented as narratives of one kind of another, whether computer games that engage players in *ersatz* violence, soap operas, news bulletins, or academic papers. Many believe there is an urgent need to understand the effects of this tidal wave of pre-structured information. Gregory Bateson's call for understanding of how our epistemology impacts on our interactions with each other and our environment has never seemed more apt. I had initially hoped that NPH might shed light on recent findings about the effects of the structure of folk psychological narratives on our current ways of making sense, and how this generates and justifies actions. But I was disappointed.

What the book does is to provide a closely argued story about how humans acquired the ability to use propositional thought and narrative reasoning. Thus children acquire an understanding of the core structures of the norms governing the folk psychology of their culture,

but only through language — their exposure to discourse and story telling. Animals (referred to confusingly as ‘non-verbals’) do not have this ability. The account focuses on an academic review of history and development, rather than current moral dilemmas. Frequent use of acronyms throughout the book is irritating. There is a list of 35 of them at the beginning of the book, and the reader must often flip back and forth between concentrating on content, and de-coding acronyms, many of which seemed unnecessary. One of those used in the text (ACR, Action Co-ordination Routines) was not even listed.

The emergence of language is proposed as a turning point in human development, whether ontogenetic or phylogenetic. This is an essential component of NPH. Although Hutto suggests that it is difficult to know how ‘non-verbals’ make sense, he claims that what he calls ‘the basic worldly engagements’ of animals do not involve such acts as conceiving, categorising, classifying or otherwise ‘representing that which is the focus of such responding, and certainly not representing it as such’ (p. 51). As a Zoologist by training, I thought this simply incredible. I was even more startled by his interpretation of bees’ dances, well known for conveying information to hive mates about the location of food sources. Hutto says this does not involve any ‘extraction of information’ (p. 55) on the part of hive mates, but merely guides action directly. However, hive mates do gain information and must attend to the dance, so his claim is not obviously meaningful.

Although the Haeckelian dictum that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (an observation made in the second half of the nineteenth century as Darwinism was increasingly becoming a dominant folk psychological narrative in its own right) is never explicitly stated, it is implied by the structure of the book. Having reviewed aspects of animal and child behaviour, Hutto goes on to interpret the human fossil record. He concludes that discursive practices arrived late in our ancestry, under selective pressures (there’s a metaphor for philosophers to conjure with!), emerging between 30,000 and 60,000 years ago. Although he admits that this is sheer speculation, he adds ‘it is “not wild”’ (p. 239). Well ... we all like to believe our own favourite ‘Just So’ stories!

Hutto concludes that his NPH has more to offer than rival theories, dismissing these as offering little more than ‘promises and excuses when details are called for’ (p. 246). Paradoxically however, in the final paragraph, he claims that his own long and detailed narrative in support of the NPH ‘does not try to supply any such story and it promises none’ (pp. 246–7). Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the book is that its own story line owes much to one of our dominant

current folk psychological narratives, namely Neo-Darwinism. In Hutto's own words, 'folk psychology is the practice of predicting, explaining and explicating intentional actions by appeal to "reasons"'. The intentional actions behind this book were to place the emergence of folk psychological narrative within a developmental and evolutionary framework, using the device of the NPH. It is implicit in the structure of the book that there is a demonstrable, if tenuous relationship between children's conceptual development, selected aspects of the behaviour of our 'non-verbal' fellow creatures, and the emergence of the ability to conceive of, and communicate, narrative structures in Evolution. The implied 'reasons' and associated causes are assigned to the role of that complex Darwinian reification, Natural Selection, and the forces of biological evolution.

The book thus offers an object lesson in the construction of plausibility by embedding scientific findings and personal beliefs within a popular dominant folk narrative. There is no attempt to critically evaluate this hidden narrative structure. This is a pity at a time when Maturana and Varela have proposed a different approach to our understanding of evolutionary theory, while Gregory Bateson's explorations of how we might understand ourselves and our 'non-verbal' co-inhabitants of this planet differently are gaining increasing attention. Hutto claims not to tell a story, but paradoxically embeds his stated hypothesis within a story. There's something reminiscent of Epimenides' paradox here — the story is that this is not a story; true or false? But I had better stop here. My two Border Collies have brought me their leads, and are gazing intently at me as it is time for their walk. Of course, they are incapable of conceiving, classifying, communicating intentions, or representing what is involved in the notion of 'walkies'. They are mere non-verbals.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent review

- Ashberger, Cynthia, *The Rhythm of Space and the Sound of Time: Michael Chekhov's Acting Technique in the 21st Century* (Rodopi 2008)
 Barnett, Daniel, *Movement as Meaning in Experimental Film* (Rodopi 2008)
 Bever, Edward, *The Realities of Witchcraft and Popular Magic in Early Modern Europe: Culture, Cognition, Everyday Life* (Palgrave Macmillan 2008)
 Haney, William S., *Integral Drama: Culture, Consciousness and Identity* (Rodopi 2008)
 Holman, John, *The Return of the Perennial Philosophy* (Watkins 2008)
 McCutcheon, Jade Rosina, *Awakening the Performing Body* (Rodopi 2008)
 Strawson, Galen, *Real Materialism and Other Essays* (OUP 2008)