

Book Reviews

Book Reviews Editor

With this issue of *JCS*, Dr Chris Nunn is stepping down after more than four years sterling service as the journal's books editor. His quiet and firm efficiency has kept a steady flow of high quality reviews from a wide range of contributors, and we say a heartfelt 'thank you' on behalf of editors and readers alike.

We are pleased to announce that his place is being taken by Dr Julian Kiverstein, a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at Edinburgh University, funded as part of the collaborative research project, Consciousness in Interaction (CONTACT). Julian is a philosopher with wide interests in areas related to this journal. Last year he contributed to the *JCS* symposium on 'Machine consciousness, embodiment and imagination' with a paper that asked 'Could a robot have a subjective point of view?' [For the answer see *JCS* 14 (7), pp. 127–39.]

Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Anthony Freeman

Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi

The Phenomenological Mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science

London and New York: Routledge. 2008. 244 pp.

ISBN 978-0415391221 (pbk), 978-0415391214 (hbk)

Reviewed by Sophie R. Allen

This book can be applauded, even before it is opened: not because it has a particularly attractive cover (it hasn't), but because it promises to fill a void in the introductory literature by investigating the contribution that the so-called 'continental' phenomenological tradition can make towards resolving problems which plague explanations of consciousness.

It has been fashionable in Anglo-American circles to neglect continental philosophy, for reasons the book attempts briefly to trace (or, by the authors' own admission, to reconstruct) - to the extent that most contemporary philosophers of mind could be forgiven for being entirely ignorant of the fact that many of the difficulties with which they contend, concerning explanations of consciousness and subjectivity, were raised up to a century and a half ago by German-speaking psychologists and philosophers. What began as a geographical and linguistic division between separate groups of scholars interested in the study of mind developed into a conceptual chasm which few are now able to negotiate with any confidence. Consequently, when problems arose within the analytic, largely functionalist approach to the explanation of mind, a degree of ignorance and prejudice combined to ensure that few philosophers, cognitive scientists or neuroscientists had the wherewithal, or indeed the inclination, to look towards the phenomenological tradition for inspiration or guidance. A growing realization that the continental tradition might have something very useful to say about the nature of conscious mind, and that people working within the confines of the analytic tradition have often been reinventing the wheel, has led to increased emphasis upon linking the two disparate philosophical strands. But this increase in communication has rarely extended to the introductory level; students of the philosophy of mind have thus generally been educated in a very traditional, Anglo-American spirit.

At the very least, these on-going concerns mean that the book raises high expectations; perhaps too high to be met by any single volume. The authors have done their best to be as comprehensive as possible, with chapters on consciousness, time, perception, intentionality, embodiment, action and agency, other minds, and the self and person. They have also managed to refer to the work of particular philosophers in some depth (for an introductory volume) by choosing a representative philosopher upon whom to concentrate in relation to each topic: Sartre on pre-reflective self-consciousness; Husserl on time; Merleau-Ponty on perception and embodiment; and so on. Scholars of these and other philosophers will no doubt find opportunity to quibble about the choice of representatives, and about how their work is presented, but some of these failings are probably inevitable in a volume of this size.

The book is engagingly written, and proceeds smoothly for a co-authored text, with useful references and convenient footnotes. But a general criticism concerns its suitability as an introductory text; I certainly felt that my comprehension of the arguments or concepts

employed occasionally relied upon extensive prior knowledge of the philosophy of mind. While it is an ample and excellent introduction to the phenomenological view of mind, given a background either in philosophy of mind or in continental philosophy, I might hesitate to recommend it to an average undergraduate with no prior experience of these topics. That said, the book varies in this regard: whereas the chapter on perception is accessible to a beginner, the chapter on time is much harder to grasp (especially when the authors link time-consciousness to dynamical systems theory, pp. 80–2), so one could pick and choose introductory reading from it.

On the other hand, the authors' intention to write an introduction sometimes results in over-simplistic presentations, or in instances where potential objections to the phenomenological approach are countered with arguments which lack sufficient depth to be even mildly convincing. On the former count—when writing about the classical representationalist view of perception for example (pp. 92–4) and the phenomenological criticisms of it—the authors excuse themselves on the grounds that many neuroscientists such as Damasio and Crick still write as if the classical account is correct. However, although this may be the case, one is left unsure about how more sophisticated analytic views of perception would fare when faced with similar objections.

A prime example of the latter difficulty (of insufficient attention to counter-arguments and objections) occurs in Chapter 6 on Intentionality during the discussion of Husserl's view that different intentional states inherently involve experiential differences. Here the authors raise the important objection that it is frequently presumed that intentional states such as beliefs, desires, judgments and so on, have no phenomenal qualities at all except for those which are due to whatever mental imagery happens to accompany the intentional states. Phenomenal qualities are associated only with sensations and emotions, at least in the opinion of a significant proportion of the followers of the analytic tradition. But, in this case, Gallagher and Zahavi's counterargument to this commonly-held view is remarkably brief, stating that some intentional states lack mental imagery — mathematical beliefs such as 'the thought that 'every algebraic equation of uneven grade has at least one real root'' for example (p. 116) — and that this does not entail that such thoughts lack phenomenality. However, the existence of states lacking mental imagery (the mathematical examples of which would be contested by philosophers of mathematics of a continental bent, such as the intuitionists) does not entail that they do have a phenomenal aspect either, so the detractors

will remain dissatisfied; nor do the examples from Husserl which follow, which contrast the difference between hearing a word as a meaningless noise or as a meaningful sound, do much to strengthen the case. In each of these counterexamples, the intuitive differences which are evoked can equally be given non-phenomenal explanations; perhaps Gallagher and Zahavi should have done more to strengthen their alternative view, or at least to point the reader in the direction of further discussion.

However, these criticisms seem a little unfair given the ambitious scope of the project and the difficulties inherent in presenting an introduction to an alternative paradigm. It might have been better if the authors had been more forthright and simply stated where differences of opinion with the analytic tradition lie, rather than mounting superficial defences of some of the basic assumptions of the phenomenological view. Overall, the book comes across as fascinating and useful, but does not provide a comprehensive introduction to some of the highly-charged debates in the philosophy of mind on which it touches.

Talis Bachmann, Bruno Breitmeyer, and Haluk Ogmen

Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness: A Brief Dictionary

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 125 pp.

ISBN 978-0195316902

Reviewed by Bill Faw, Brewton Parker College

This is indeed a 'brief dictionary'. Its 106 numbered pages give definitional treatment to 112 terms in alphabetical order, from one functional sentence on 'filled-space illusions' to five-and-a-half great pages on 'masking'. Anywhere from none to two pages of references are given at the end of an entry. In addition 23 other terms are interspersed, which reference the 112. Thirty six additional terms are listed for the reader's independent follow-up — including Libet's Effect, Phantom Limbs, and the Thatcher Illusion.

As is the case with OUP's most famous dictionary (of the English Language, unabridged version: check out the pages on 'conscious' and 'consciousness' sometime!), the long general articles — especially 'ambiguous figures', 'binocular rivalry', 'change blindness', 'dichotic listening effects', 'filling in', 'hallucination', 'illusions', 'masking', 'multistability', and 'tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon' — are especially interesting: listing various examples of that phenomenon, experimental timing or intensity conditions under which the

phenomenon is found, and (in some cases) physiological mechanisms. I was hoping for more of the last — especially more treatment of Talis Bachmann's intriguing theories about masking involving the interplay of fast specific-thalamic relay action plus slow nonspecific-thalamic modulation. This was only touched on briefly under 'tandem effect'.

In its introductory material, this book presents its 'selection criteria for dictionary terms'. The first two of seven criteria determine what is included:

- Included are effects and phenomena that have a direct, conscious, experiential counterpart to observers' awareness (or its lack thereof), in comparison with the conditions that provide opposite effects.
- Some theoretical and practical implications of the phenomena and effects are included, where appropriate.

The other five criteria are all exclusionary, such as effects that are behavioristic but not directly experienced; effects depending on thinking and decision-making instead of on sensory, perceptual, and attentional factors; effects that are purely physiological or optical; inferred laws of perception or attention.

The criteria for *including* experimental paradigms and effects would suggest a much broader range of topics than is found here. However the exclusionary criteria shut out all but 'sensory, perceptual, and attentional' ones. There are a few terms that are essentially 'attentional' (such as attentional blink, attentional tracking, change blindness, cocktail party effect, covert spatial attention, covert object/attention effect, dichotic listening, inhibition of return) but most items are sensory/perceptual. Thus, these exclusory criteria end up cutting out many interesting neurological and experimental paradigms relevant to modern consciousness science.

All of this leads to a good treatment of *a very narrow range* of experimental phenomena of consciousness, despite its much broader title and the broad claims on its dust jacket — that it is 'the definitive collection of consciousness phenomena in which awareness emerges as an experimental variable'... 'its comprehensive ... entries' ... and 'a valuable reference tool for libraries and for researchers at all levels in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy who are investigating consciousness, cognition, perception, and attention'. Similar claims are made on the jacket in quotes from four stars in modern consciousness research. However, I would have commented that the dictionary often misses what is at the heart of consciousness science

— most of the phenomena defined show how the *content* of visual consciousness can be *changed* by peripheral contrasts, motion, and the like; but they mostly don't deal with real conscious/unconscious contrasts such as how you *perceive* what is *not* there or *fail* to perceive what *is* there. Some of the latter phenomena (like filling-in, binocular rivalry, blind-sight, and visuo-spatial hemi-neglect) are included, but make up a small percentage only of the total.

This book would have been better titled: '*Visual Psychophysical Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness: A Brief Dictionary.*' It is only when one reads the unsigned Preface that one sees reference to 'the most important experimental phenomena and research paradigms that have become the psychophysical basis for the modern empirical studies of consciousness' or learns that 'the authors have approached the agenda of consciousness from within the same scientific camp... All three authors have been active in studying visual masking and related spatiotemporal visual phenomena from the combined psychophysical and psychophysiological modeling perspective.'

To make sure that the impressions I was picking up from reading through the book were not due to some form of 'halo effect', 'semantic satiation', or a cognitive form of 'illusory contour' (three of the terms treated in the book), I did some post-hoc quantitative analysis. Of the 112 terms, only a few (such as blind-sight, change blindness, covert spatial attention, hallucinations, illusions, semantic satiation, synesthesia, tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, and visuo-spatial hemi-neglect) are not limited to psychophysics. And 96 of the phenomena are strictly *visual*. The non-psychophysical entries mentioned above go only some of the way towards filling large blanks left by the strict exclusion criteria.

Now, I am still glad I read it and would have bought it even if the title had revealed its limited range and even if I had not gotten it free to review, because: I know and highly respect the senior author Talis Bachmann; I reviewed an earlier book of his for *Consciousness and Emotion*; my own doctoral dissertation in 1989 was based on visual psychophysics; the senior author heard me present on psychophysics in Berlin just a month before I wrote this review; I have been teaching courses on sensation/perception and psychology of consciousness for 15 years. But I needed to reveal to less nerdy *JCS* readers that the fascinating brief entries in this book are almost entirely confined to visual psychophysics.

I will close on this happy note to those readers who, along with me, have thoughts of writing such dictionaries, encyclopedias, or compendia on Consciousness Science: this book has not stolen all of our

thunder! There are many *other* such books that can be written to cover the stated topic of *this* book: ‘experimental phenomena of consciousness’! Go ahead; write one of those books and ask that nice new books editor at *JCS* to assign me to review it!

Helmut Wautischer (ed.)

Ontology of Consciousness: Percipient Action

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, 638 pp. ISBN 978 0262232593 (hbk) £54.95; ISBN 978 0262731843 (pbk) £24.95.

Reviewed by Graham Dunstan Martin

Few discussions of consciousness have the wide-ranging unconventionality of this new collection of essays. It starts with Richard Sorenson’s clear thumbnail sketch of the schools of Buddhist philosophy leading up to the development of Tantrism, which is followed by an illuminating account of the Tibetan variety. The author makes sensitive comments on his experience of young apprentice monks and the form that their learning and education takes in Tibetan monasteries. The value of Tantrism (as of other modes of Buddhist meditation) is that it is an *empirical* tradition which claims to gaze into the sources of being itself; and is one of the most remarkable explorations of the nature of consciousness at its deepest level, namely beyond dualistic thought.

The articles by Edith Turner and David Hufford address the metaphysical terror that often afflicts contemporary Westerners faced with reports of ‘spirits’ from other societies, along with their reluctance or refusal to admit that, in our own society, such experiences ever occur. Both essays offer evidence and argument for such reports to be taken seriously. A principal problem is that Western mainstream materialism rarely listens to views other than its own — when, at an anthropological conference in 1985, Hufford raised mild objections to this prejudice, he found his paper had been left out of the printed conference proceedings (p 289).

Courban’s chapter on ‘the Brain–Mind Problem in Byzantine Culture’, I find too widely focussed. He mentions Maximus of Chrysopolis (c 580–662) as an important but little-known thinker. However, this account is too brief and sketchy to allow readers to form their own judgement. I remain uncertain whether Maximus was genuinely a ‘monist’ as Courban claims — let alone whether this monism was of an interesting kind. Next, Polemis’s essay claims that our modern times are grievously at fault in their treatment of *psychê* (soul) and

paideia (education). There is however too little argument or exposition, in that he never explains what he claims to be the key function of *erôs* in ancient Greek philosophy, nor the consequences of Christians' replacing it by *agapê*. I am worried too by his seeing Descartes as having attempted to *overcome* (sic) dualism.

Markl's proposals in 'Language and the Evolution of the Human Mind' are a quite different affair. Here we have a clear account by an evolutionist of the likely interaction of language with social evolution. He emphasizes the importance of individual consciousness as 'a virtual space for trying out behavioural games', for checking out 'what might happen if I do A or B.' He connects this with the human love of fiction and drama. He emphasizes the value of language for social relationships, in that a shared language both cements a social group together, and closes it against outsiders.

Pavel Ivanov begins by asserting that 'consciousness is present in the brain only as a way of coordinating mental processes imposed by the specific social environment in which the individual lives.' (p 266) In short his definition of consciousness is post-Marxist. He believes that 'no body, however complex, can contain subjectivity', that 'mental processes can be localized in cultural space', that 'consciousness is not material, but can only exist as a relation between material bodies' and that 'consciousness cannot be a property of the human body, or part of it, being rather determined by the social role.' This essay constitutes a clear account of an interesting theory, though the present reviewer considers the latter to be demonstrably false, for Ivanov has mistaken certain determinants of the *content* of consciousness for consciousness itself.

There follow two long essays (by Mariela Szirko and Mario Crocco) based on an Argentinian tradition of neurobiology which, it is asserted, originated over two centuries ago. Several unusual claims are made, including that (1) minds have a special relationship to time; (2) in consequence, true memory is a reliving of the past, which is still 'present'; (3) minds react only to *some* of the causal factors affecting them; it follows that they resemble Aristotle's Unmoved Mover - i.e. the will is free and the mind is self-moving, or (as these theorists' terminology has it) 'semovient'. (4) Minds share some of the properties of light (readers will recall that there is a special sense in which the passage of a photon is instantaneous). These are remarkable, important and exciting claims; however, I am unable to judge them or their theoretico-scientific basis to any precise degree, since Szirko's essay is couched in a difficult English which at times lapses into howlers, such as : '... ontic consistency — which phenomenisms are

steadfastly purposed to snub.' (p 351). This is an unfortunate failure of editing, and an expert Spanish translator should have been employed.

Next we have an unusually clear exposition of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, in which there is a hierarchy of consciousness, rising from plants through animals, then humankind to godhead — a level of consciousness which he expects eventually to become part of earthly life. In passing, Cornelissen mentions Dennett's 'skyhooks' and comments, quite correctly, that they represent a misunderstanding on Dennett's part. The latter's trick is to misrepresent opposing views by caricaturing them as something which, if it were material-physical, would be grotesque.

I should here mention Graham Parkes's essay on Zen Rock Gardens, a most informative and revelatory account of that tradition. To the Japanese Buddhist, solid rock is simply a denser configuration of cosmic energy, fitting into the general hierarchy presented in the last paragraph.

A cool and rational look at the claims for 'miracle-working' by the followers of Sai Baba, an Indian 'God-Man', is offered by Erlendur Haraldsson. He has investigated various other cases in which he detected fraud; but confesses himself unable to do so in this instance. He compares his subject with various Christian cases such as Padre Pio, and notes that one particular Catholic priest has been excommunicated for believing Sai Baba's miracles.

The book is wrapped up by Thomas Szasz — who asserts that human beings are, not existential robots, but *primarily moral agents* — and by De Quincey, who adds a short tail-piece where he points out that, since the scientist's so-called objective evidence is invariably derived from subjective experience, we have no reason to privilege the sensory data which scientists rely on. *All* experience, including the results of meditation and other spiritual practices, is worth taking seriously.

The above are the major contributions. Clear accounts of the philosophy of Xavier Zubiri, of the Nahua pre-Conquest view of the universe and its sacred energy *teotl*, of community versus the individual in African thinking, are to be found elsewhere in the book, as is a fine exposition of Kierkegaard. We also find Steriade arguing that those who want to understand consciousness are best advised to continue reading Dostoyevski, Proust and Joyce.

This book offers us, not a determinedly single-minded path, but a many-coloured conflict of perspectives upon consciousness. It is informative, imagination-provoking and thoroughly to be recommended.

Peter and Elizabeth Fenwick*The Art of Dying*

London: Continuum, 2008, 251 pp. ISBN 978 0826499233 (pbk).

Reviewed by Chris Nunn

You might suppose from the title that this is a DIY guide to good dying — thus continuing a literary tradition that originated in ancient Egypt, flourished in the mountains of Tibet and greatly exercised early modern Europeans. The last two chapters are a bit like that, but the main aim is even more quixotic. It is to examine what is good *about* death. The authors not only manage to show that it isn't always all bad, but raise profound questions about the nature of consciousness. Peter Fenwick is a distinguished British neuropsychiatrist, who specialized in EEG studies and subsequently became interested in NDEs (Near Death Experiences), while his wife Elizabeth is well known as a commentator on social issues. Neither appears to have any specific religious axe to grind.

Their method was to collect accounts of strange experiences reported either by the dying or by their associates. Chapter titles give a flavour of the range; they include 'Deathbed visions', 'Deathbed coincidences', 'Bereavement and hallucinations', 'Visions of light and mist', 'The grandfather clock and other odd incidents'. Many of the anecdotes are very affecting. I won't repeat any here as there is not space to convey their full emotional impact. Suffice it to say that the dying report visions of deceased relatives, light and feelings of all-encompassing love, often in circumstances where one might expect only confusion, distress or pain. Even those with advanced Alzheimer's occasionally appear to have moments of being their 'old selves' immediately before death. Others are said to have had foreknowledge of, or apparently some control over, precisely when they would 'pass on'.

Relatives and carers have sometimes shared in the dying person's 'hallucinatory' and other experiences, but more usually receive a 'visitation' from the deceased, which may be a vision or simply an overwhelming sense of presence, often coinciding remarkably with the actual time of death (even when the death was not anticipated and/or was far away). These visitations may occur in clear consciousness, but are more often associated with waking from sleep. Most are experienced as comforting. Then there are the oddities, like favourite clocks stopping at the moment of death, machinery failing, or animals or birds behaving in uncharacteristic ways.

One can always dismiss events and coincidences like these, however remarkable they may seem at first sight. After all, around one hundred people on average die every *hour* in the UK alone, so there's plenty of room for co-incident and tail-of-statistical-distribution happenings. The authors do not address such issues directly. Instead they emphasize that what matters about these experiences is their *meaning*, especially their meaning to the bereaved. The implication of course, though they do not spell it out, is that the statistics are irrelevant, or at least are relevant only as background enablers. And they are surely correct about this. Suppose for instance that, after a hard winter, you wake up one day and find a warm breeze blowing into your window, meaning that spring is on the way. The breeze could be explained in terms of statistical thermodynamics, indeed it's the outcome of thermodynamics, but that's entirely irrelevant to its meaning as far as you are concerned - and similar considerations apply with these deathbed anomalies. Statistics belong to one explanatory world, meaning to quite another — albeit one on which we don't yet have any very firm handles.

So, focussing on meaning as the Fenwicks do, what conclusions do they draw? One is that death may carry a very different meaning for those on its threshold from what spectators might suppose. Regardless of religious belief or its absence, death can actually be experienced as a positive, partially controllable, process, 'rounding off' a life and perhaps preparing for a new beginning; at the very least, few feel any need to 'rage, rage against the dying of the light'. Another conclusion is that, when there is any obvious meaning in the anomalous experiences, it often appears to be driven by the dead or dying person, not by the hopes, fears or expectations of the bereaved. Telepathy may play a part here, they speculate.

The human condition being as it is, this book can be recommended to everyone. But what are its specific implications for consciousness studies? The Fenwicks devote a chapter to describing various concepts of 'soul', perhaps hinting that we might do well to take another look at substance dualism. It is certainly true that, if one accepts the testimony of this book (and it would be hard not to do so), some forms of monism (e.g. eliminative materialism, computationalism) are dead as the dodo — perhaps even deader if dodos were like people! - but others may survive and even benefit. Maybe it's best to avoid theory at this stage and to simply accept the phenomena, along with their implication that we don't understand as much as we would like about conscious mind, which is wilder, wider and stranger than we often allow.

John Baer, James C. Kaufman, and Roy F. Baumeister (eds.)

Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will

New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 356 pp.

ISBN 978-0195189636

Reviewed by Sven Walter

Free will used to be a problem best left to philosophers who, after all, make their living trying to solve the unsolvable. Things began to change when Benjamin Libet discovered that simple motor actions are preceded by a readiness potential starting 350 ms before the subject is consciously aware of an 'urge' to 'voluntary' action; during the past 25 years, neuroscientific research has been thought relevant to the free will debate.

Simplifying somewhat, neuroscientists are claiming that free will is impossible because our actions originate in our brains, and our brains are deterministic causal systems. Philosophers respond that this is a category mistake because freedom is to be found in the realm of mental reasons, not in the realm of physical causes. The neuroscientists in turn point out that, since reasons can make a difference only via deterministic neurophysiological processes, the philosophers' suggestion is of little help. Recently, social psychologists like Daniel Wegner have joined this melee, arguing that, since the *feeling* of willfully doing something can be separated from the *act* of willfully doing something, the former is an 'illusion' and not a reliable indicator of an authoritative free agent or self.

The situation is confusing, to say the least. Among the things one would like to know are: (1) What, exactly, is the empirical evidence? (2) Is the claim that free will is illusory supported by the evidence, or is it based on philosophically myopic interpretations of the evidence? (3) What can the empirical sciences contribute to the free will debate, assuming any conclusive experiment remains elusive because there will always be scope for philosophical re-interpretations? In the case of neuroscience, these sorts of issues have been addressed in Susan Pockett *et al.*'s *Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?* (MIT Press, 2006). For psychology, there is now this new book. It brings together 17 papers, written mostly by psychologists but also by cognitive scientists and philosophers, and promises to look 'both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways psychologists deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will' (pp. 3–4).

(1) *What is the empirical evidence?* Two lines of evidence from social psychology seem to threaten the possibility of free will. On the one hand, Wegner and colleagues argue that, since subjects can be lured into feeling they willfully did something they in fact did not do and, conversely, can act without reporting a feeling of being the actor, the experience of willfully acting is a *post hoc* interpretation by our brain and as fallible as any other causal interpretation (Wegner, ch. 11). On the other hand, the research of John Bargh and colleagues on *automaticity* suggests that most of our everyday behavior is determined, not by our conscious intentions and deliberate choices, but by mental processes that are unconsciously triggered by extraneous, environmental factors (Myers, ch. 3; Bargh, ch. 7; Kihlstrom, ch. 8, on the other hand, argues that automaticity is not as widespread as Bargh claims).

(2) *Unimpeachable evidence or mere interpretation?* Regarding Wegner's experiments concerning the dissociability of the feeling of agency and *de facto* agency, it ought to be kept in mind that to show that the feeling of agency is *sometimes* illusory is not to show that it is *always* illusory and thus never an indicator of freely exercised will (Mele, ch. 18).

Regarding Bargh's research on automaticity, it is usually taken for granted that, if our actions spring mostly from automatic and unconscious mental processes, then we are not as free as we like to suppose (Myers, ch. 3; Bargh, ch. 7). But why this should be so? One possibility would be to claim that, for an action to count as free, it must be due *only* to factors of which the agent is conscious. However, no one, not even libertarians it seems, would accept such a strong view (see Nichols, ch. 2; Dweck and Molden, ch. 4; Shariff *et al.*, ch. 9 for the different conceptions of free will). What, then, is the connection between automaticity research and the free will debate? Compatibilists (Bandura, ch. 6; Dennett, ch. 12; Baer, ch. 16) argue that, since free will is compatible with determinism, they are immune to empirical challenges that purport to show that our actions are neurally determined. According to compatibilism, we are free if we are *in control* of our actions in the sense that our actions accord with our consciously reflected beliefs, desires, dispositions and values (see Bandura, ch. 6; Roediger *et al.*, ch. 10; Howard, ch. 13; Miller and Attencio, ch. 14 for the notion of 'control'). But automaticity research seems to suggest precisely that we do not exert this kind of control because the goals of our actions can be induced in us by environmental factors without us being consciously aware of it. A striking and

rarely noticed consequence of this is that compatibilism could be true and free will nevertheless impossible.

(3.) *What else can psychology contribute?* Is our folk notion of free will a compatibilist or an incompatibilist one? Usually, this is regarded as a purely philosophical question. However, recent experiments in psychology (Nichols, ch. 2) seem to suggest that the folk concept of free choice (which is already employed by children) is incompatibilist because it involves the idea that agents could have done otherwise than they did.

Another area where psychology can contribute to the free will debate, even if it cannot decisively resolve it, has to do with what would happen to our moral, legal, and social system if free will turned out not to exist. This, too, has been taken to be a purely philosophical question. Yet recent psychological research suggests that, when subjects are induced to believe that determinism is true and free will illusory (see Pinker, ch. 17 on the threats of determinism), they behave less ethically than when being primed neutrally or pro-free-will (Shariff *et al.*, ch. 9). One suggestion for further research would be to test whether subjects' tendency for *blame* and *praise* are equally diminished by a belief in determinism, or whether, as I would predict, they continue to hold people responsible for the good things done, but not for the bad ones.

For readers new to the field and with interests broader than the purely philosophical, the book contains valuable background material covering the basic arguments, positions, and distinctions. One may of course quibble over the details of some contributions, but overall they are interesting and unlikely to lead anyone seriously astray. The book's most important virtue, perhaps, is that it moves beyond the largely theoretical libertarianism vs. compatibilism and determinism vs. indeterminism arguments that have shaped the philosophical debate hitherto, and instead focuses on some interesting and potentially more constructive narrower issues (e.g. the notion of 'control') to which psychology can fruitfully contribute.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent review

- Ben Shaul, Nitzan, *Hyper-Narrative Interactive Cinema: Problems and Solutions* (Rodopi 2008)
- Clack, Beverley & Clack, Brian R., *The Philosophy of Religion: A Critical Introduction* (Polity 2008)
- Eceru, Bernard, *The First Call: To Be Human* (Trafford Publishing 2008)
- Fuller, Steve, *Science vs. Religion? Intelligent Design and the Problem of Evolution* (Polity 2008)
- Gallagher, Shaun, *Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the Mind* (Imprint Academic 2008)
- Harris, Roy, *Mindboggling: Preliminaries to a Science of the Mind* (Pantaneto Press 2008)
- Hutchinson, Phil, *Shame and Philosophy: An Investigation in the Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics* (Palgrave Macmillan 2008)
- Matura Romesin, Humberto & Verden-Zöllner, Gerda (ed. Pille Bunnell), *The Origin of Humanness in the Biology of Love* (Imprint Academic 2008)
- Power, Cormac, *Presence in Play: A Critique of Theories of Presence in the Theatre* (Rodopi 2008)
- Rao, K. Ramakrishna et al. (ed.), *Handbook of Indian Psychology* (Foundation Books 2008)
- Smit, Alexander, *Consciousness: Talks About That Which Never Changes* (Epigraph Publishing 2008)
- Sokolowski, Robert, *Phenomenology of the Person* (Cambridge University Press 2008)
- Sumegi, Angela, *Dreamworlds of Shamanism and Tibetan Buddhism: The Third Place* (SUNY Press 2008)
- Wallace, Alan B. and Brian Hodel, *Embracing Mind: The Common Ground of Science and Spirituality* (Shambhala 2008)
- Weiskrantz, L. & Davies, M. (ed.), *Frontiers of Consciousness: The Chichele Lectures* (Oxford University Press 2008)
- Wesling, Donald, *Joys and Sorrows of Imaginary Persons (On Literary Emotions)* (Rodopi 2008)