Gilbert Hall raises an interesting issue when he said:
I have always thought John Searle's "Chinese Room" argument oddly incomplete for this reason. He seems unaware that the same argument applies to the chemistry going on in the brain. Vast numbers of mindless chemical reactions must surely be just as devoid of meaning as a computer that could simulate them.
Actually, Leibniz gave the first version of Searle's CRA when he proposed a certain thought-experiment designed to show that perception and cognition based on perception can't be explained by mechanical means. L's t-e was based on enlarging the brain and its parts so that one could walk around in it. He said:
This being supposed, you might enter its inside; but what would you observe there? Nothing but parts which push and move each other; and never anything that could explain perception.
I'd be inclined to turn Hall's reasoning on its head. If Searle's CRA is sound, then cognition (etc.) can't consist merely of "chemistry going on in the brain." Searle's CRA is sound. Ergo, cognition can't consist merely of "chemistry going on in the brain."
These issues are dealt w/ in (Bringsjord, 1992).
selmer bringsjord
Bringsjord, S. (1992) *What Robots Can & Can't Be* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer).
=============================================================== Selmer Bringsjord * selmer@rpi.edu * Associate Professor Dept. of Philosophy, Psychology & Cognitive Science Department of Computer Science ----------------------------- http://www.rpi.edu/~brings ----------------------------- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy New York 12180 ===============================================================
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