Having followed the debate for some time from the sidelines I would now like to contribute with some thoughts and observations which have notapparently so far been discussed. For the first I will state that I believe that self consciousness is an emergent property of a very complex neural system (1), which is only identified with certainty in humans and probable in chimpanzees (2). In the case of humans it is closely related to our social communication and development of language. Thus while the genetic potential is present in the infant , the creation of the self conscious identity is a learning process somewhat similar to that for language. Obviously this identity must build on the biological awareness/attentional system of the brain (3). This is after my reading what is presented in Cotterill's paper (4), only I have some reservations on whether awareness can be equated with consciousness in all cases.
My principal reservations are based on observations from hypnosis (5). Under hypnosis the subject is capable of apparently dissassociating eperiential data from consciousness to quite a remarkable degree. Examples can be given of induced deafness, partial blindness, pain suppression (operations having been carried out on such patients). However under a later hypnosis a "hidden observer" can report on what has been said, seen or the pain experienced, only that this information is not available to conscious memory, here I believe it is the brains awareness system that is active.
The interesting point with hypnosis is that a simple verbal suggestion is sufficient to couple the sense experiences (qualia) from the subjective conscious experiences .This fact suggests that:-
Such a view is consistent with the observations of Libet (6) regarding time delays between the registrating of an action potential in the motor cortex and the experiencing of the conscious decision to carry out the volentary movement. The time delay being associated with the additional neural computing associated with the creation of the self conscious experience. In addition split brain data (7) indicates that it is the dominant left hemisphere, with the linguistic centres, which is conscious. In particular these investigations have highlighted a principle characteristic of our self consciousness, namely when the right hemisphere reacted on information known only to itself, the left hemisphere having seen only the action associated with the left hand would come up with an apparently appropriate explaination for the action without the slightest hesitation. Indicating perhaps the necessity for our self consciousness to maintain its illusion ofcontrol over its brain/body by telling stories. This is somewhat similar to the after rationalisations which we make to explain our non characteristic behaviour after the event.
I am aware that these views are not popularly held and an alternative explaination would be welcomed. I would also be interested in hearing on whether any work has been done on identifying any changes in brain behaviour under hypnosis, in particular brain scan data in connection with sense experiences of the type described above.
Rick Bennett
rbennett@inet.uni-c.dk
Cognitive Reseach Press, Sankt Annae Gade 22,1 tv, DK-1416 Copenhagen,
Denmark
References
1. Bennett, R.(1995) Towards a theory of the brain, consciousness and the mind.,Copenhagen, Cognitive Research Press
2. Seyfarth, M. I., Petersen, S.E.(1992) Meaning and mind in monkeys. Sc. Am. Vol.267, No. 6,78-85
3. Posner, M.I.,Petersen, S.E.(1990) The attentional system of the human brain. Annual Review of Neurosc. Vol. 13, 25-42
4. Cotterill, R.J.(1995) On the unity of conscious experience JCS, Vol. 2,No.4, 290-312
5. Brown, P. (1991) The hypnotic brain. New York, Yale Univ. Press
6. Libet, B. (1985) Unconscious cerebral initiation and the role of the conscious will in voluntary actions. Behavioural and Brain Sc. Vol 8. 529-566.
7. Gazzaniga, m.s., LeDoux, J.E. (1978) The integrated mind. New York, Plenum Press
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