Keith Sutherland:
Given Bernie's theory requires multiple cortical self-systems, then why are there not multiple memories (this would surely be more logical).
First, the key here is to focus on evidence. It's irrelevant whether my THEORY requires multiple cortical self-systems, but whether there is compelling EVIDENCE to that effect. I believe there is. Some of it is detailed in my 1988 book, and some of it appears in my current book (coming out in the Fall Season), but it is so far no integrated in any single place with the kind of comprehensive rigor that is needed.
Second, to have different self-systems (narrative, sensorimotor, social, etc.) in different places does not mean that they FUNCTION separately. The brain is a distributed organ that is yet highly coordinated. Different locations do not imply differential functioning.
Third,
Then why are there not multiple memories (this would surely be more logical).
Yes, indeed, there are multiple memories. Not just the usual collection of implicit vs. explicit, procedural vs. semantic, etc, but even semantic memories now appear to reside in different locations, see recent work by Damasios in Nature, etc.
And yet, there are several kinds of conscious unity, and several kinds of unity of self. Coordination, integration, and yet distributed location and some distributed functioning. Those are key insights into the mind-brain connection.
Bernie
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