Journal of Consciousness Studies
jcs-online debate

Microphysics

Paul Bains

A few comments from a v. confused 'observer': Have we 'explained' consciousness with a description of it in terms of qm? Yes, if description = explanation. Which apparently is the case since Galileo.

Some scientists argue that an explanation provides a generative mechanism that would produce the phenomenon that is to be explained. But if there is a kind of proto-subjectivity all the way down, one cannot posit a generative mechanism anymore than one can explain why there is something rather than nothing?

As has been noted in recent posts there is a _metaphysical_ assumption in assuming that there is a purely physical basis from which subjectivity (and eventually s. consc.) would 'emerge' or be generated. Why is this assumption made? (Whitehead, Leibniz, Amit Goswani, Spinoza, Deleuze, to pick just a few dilettantes, don't make it) - are/were they "soft in the head" or "ageing hippies"?

Gordon Globus:

Raymond Ruyer's discusses this idea in 'Paradoxes de la Conscience et limites de Automatisme', (Paris: Albin Michel, 1966, p69-70). Ruyer gives the example of a man with a perspex cranium (which Ruyer adapts from S.C. Pepper, Dimensions of the mind). What we see is 'in' our heads without projection. Kohler understood this.

Ruyer also discusses microphysics: "What seems shocking in materialistic theses which affirm that 'matter can think' is that they appear to pose a magical relation btwn 'thought' and 'matter' - matter being understood as a material substance. But if we substituted for 'matter' a 'unitary domain of space-time' and if one said 'a unitary domain of space-time can be conscious' - there would no longer be recourse to a magical union, but rather a faithful account of a fundamental phenomenon".

The old opposition btwn matter/mind disappears with the shift of perception that there is a micropsychical domain that -is- the microphysical. Our problem is finding the vocabulary and concepts to express this: autopossession, self-enjoyment, primary consciousness, subjectless subjectivity, emotional intensity. 'There is more to being than thinking.' (Felix Guattari).

Gordon:

It doesn't seem so dark for Castenada when you fly on the wings of intent.

Paul.


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