I have one question about Hardcastle's view of naturalism. Let me preface asking it by stating the prejudice that has led me to be puzzled. I was always under the impression that that the "nature" part of "naturalism" referred to nature. From that, I always thought that the test for a view's being "naturalist" was whether or nor it placed the explanandum within nature, given a theory of what nature is like.
Hardcastle now proposes that the criteria of naturalism is "empirically testable given present technologies." Is Valerie proposing an analysis of *nature* in which what is and is not part of nature depends on our abilities to empirically test for it? If not, why does her view deserve the label "naturalism"?
One problem case: consider two hypotheses.
By stipulation, hypotheses one and two are empirically indistinguishable. Not only can we not run any tests to rule between them, but such tests are ruled out in principle. Both are entirely compatible with the present laws of physics being exactly what they are (the history of the universe doesn't change the laws).
Q: Does that make the hypothesis that the universe is billions of years old "nonnatural"?
Another problem case. Consider two hypotheses:
Again, by stipulation, the two hypotheses are equivalent with regards to the lab.
Q: Does that make the hypothesis that the brain is identical to the mind "nonempirical"?
I'm assuming Valerie is going to answer these problem cases by appeal to "superempirical" criteria. That is, by appeal to epistemological and conceptual analysis. Does that make *her* a "non-naturalist?" Also, as soon as superempirical criteria are admitted relevant, I assume she must then be willing to address issues like "What is identity, and what conditions does an identity claim have to meet to be true? What kinds of explanations are there? Are all kinds of explanatory connectons compatible with materialism?" And so forth.......
As soon as she does this, she is on Chalmers ground and needs to meet his arguments directly.
So, here's the dilemma I want to paint for Valerie: either superempirical standards are revelvant to issues of explanation and ontology, or they are not.
If they are not relevant, *every* position is "non-natural" by your criteria since there will *always* be competing hypotheses that are empirically indistuishable from it.
If they are relevant, you must treat Chalmers' arguments seriously, and cannot stipulate them away as "I can't imagine..." arguments.
--Gregg
The term "naturalism" in philosophy arises out of the history of Logical Positivism and, given how the LP (and later rebels) thought of science, the term has developed to mean more than "of nature" or "part of the natural world." I have the weight of history on my side here. See esp. discussions of Quine and company.
Superempirical virtues are used in evaluating theories, of course. Saying a theory needs empirical support or to be tested does not say this is the *only* way we have for evaluating theories. (So, Gregg's questions are easily answered by appeal to these virtues.) However, "I can't imagine this" or some other intuitive reaction like that is *not* a superempirical virtue. Nor are other aspects of "conceptual analysis." The superempirical virtues generally include things like simplicity, consilliance, coherent, parsimony, and things like this. There is a large literature of these virtues and how they are supposed to work already existant in philosophy. I need not reivent the wheel here.
I have however devoted a large portion of my publishing career to answering the sorts of questions Gregg proposes: "'What is identity, and what conditions does an identity claim have to meet to be true? What kinds of explanations are there? Are all kinds of explanatory connectons compatible with materialism?' And so forth......." I don't want to reinvent that wheel either here.
Valerie Hardcastle
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