Sutherland on Philosophers

Valerie Hardcastle

Two brief comments:

1. I hope Keith Sutherland wasn't intending to tar me with the same brush as Metzinger when he wrote, "It's a pleasing observation on the multidisciplinary nature of consciousness studies that a technical symposium like the ASSC Newman thread should include no less than three commentaries by philosophers (Flanagan, Hardcastle, Metzinger), but are they playing by the same rules as the laboratory workers?" That is, I sincerely intend to play by the same rules as laboratory workers, and if I am not, then I expect to be called on it. In other words, I don't buy Metzinger's distinction between "conceptual" and "empirical" theories. All theories, to me, are both.
2. I do (generally) lump naturalists and materialists together in the same boat, although I also recognize that the words don't mean the same thing. Whether Chalmers' approach is naturalistic is a point that divides him and me (I think McGinn is clearly not a naturalist, since he claims that we can't have a theory of consciousness) and I think the divide comes out clearly in Sutherland's definition of a naturalist:

naturalism (philosophy): a scientific account of the world in terms of causes and natural forces.

where "natural" means:

based on the principles and findings of human reason rather than on revelation.

IMHO, naturalism is a bit more. I would add to the definition that a natural account must also be supported by or at least fit with empirical evidence and other related theories. This is not to say that I am a reductionist (believing that all theories ultimately reduce to QM; I am not and I don't), but it is to say that there are important theoretical connections to be forged among related theories. (I go into excruciating detail how all this should work in Hardcastle 1996.)

By Sutherland's definition, Chalmers' hypothesis is naturalistic. By mine, it is not. It isn't because (1) there isn't a single shred of empirical evidence (indirect or otherwise) to support the claim that consciousness is a fundamental building block of the universe ['I can't imagine otherwise' doesn't count as empirical evidence] and (2) it doesn't fit with other accepted theories of the world.

My position does entail that any theory which posits a new fundamental doo-dad (without [sufficient] empirical support) in the universe isn't naturalistic, which might bother some, but seems correct to me. That is, Einstein's original conjectures about relativity weren't naturalistic, because, at the time, there wasn't good empirical support for his claims (though they were based soundly on the findings of human reason). Later, after data accrued, the theories became "naturalized." So too might this happen with Chalmers...but until then, by my lights, Chalmers isn't a naturalist.

Hardcastle, VG (1996) How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science. SUNY Press.

Valerie Gray Hardcastle
valerie@vt.edu