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Contents
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Implications of Synaesthesia for Functionalism: Theory and Experiments
abstract
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Jeffrey A. Gray, Susan Chopping, Julia Nunn, David Parslow, Lloyd
Gregory, Steve Williams, Michael J. Brammer, Simon Baron-Cohen
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Evidence for Symbolic Language Processing in a Bonobo (Pan paniscus)
abstract
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James Benson, William Greaves, Michael O’Donnell and Jared Taglialatela
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Why I Am Not a Property Dualist full
text
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John R. Searle
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Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection
abstract
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David Hodgson
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The Need for a Noetic Revolution: Review of Alan Wallace’s The Taboo
of Subjectivity full
text
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David Lorimer
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Annual Indexes (Volume 9) full
text
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ABSTRACTS
Jeffrey A. Gray, Susan Chopping, Julia Nunn, David Parslow,
Lloyd Gregory, Steve Williams, Michael J. Brammer and Simon Baron-Cohen
Implications of Synaesthesia for Functionalism: Theory and Experiments
Abstract: Functionalism offers an account of the relations that hold between
behavioural functions, information and neural processing, and conscious
experience from which one can draw two inferences: (1) for any discriminable
difference between qualia there must be an equivalent discriminable difference
in function; and (2) for any discriminable functional difference within
a behavioural domain associated with qualia, there must be a discriminable
difference between qualia. The phenomenon of word–colour (‘coloured hearing’)
synaesthesia (in which individuals see colours when they hear or see words)
appears to contradict the second of these inferences. We report data showing
that this form of synaesthesia is genuine and probably results from an
aberrant projection from cortical language areas to a region (V4/V8) specialized
for the perception of colour. Since functionalism purports to be a general
account of consciousness, one such negative instance, if it can be further
sustained empirically, is sufficient to invalidate it.
Correspondence: Jeffrey A. Gray, Institute of Psychiatry, De
Crespigny Park, Denmark Hill, London SE5 8AF, UK. Other authors currently
at same address except: Julia Nunn, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths
College, London SE14 6NW, UK. Lloyd Gregory, Section of GI
Sciences, University of Manchester, Hope Hospital, Stott Lane, Salford,
M6 8HD, UK. Simon Baron-Cohen, Department of Experimental
Psychology, Cambridge University, Cambridge, CB2 3EB, UK.
James Benson, William Greaves, Michael O’Donnell and
Jared Taglialatela
Evidence for Symbolic Language Processing in a Bonobo (Pan paniscus)
Abstract: Evidence that an animal is capable of some degree of symbolic,
human language processing supports the argument that the animal’s consciousness
is to some degree human-like. In this paper, we reinterpret the findings
of Savage- Rumbaugh et al. (1993) using the twin tools of Deacon’s referential
hierarchy and Systemic Functional Linguistics, with a view to providing
further corroborative evidence for a Bonobo ape’s symbolic processing abilities,
and as a result to open a window into the consciousness of at least one
non-human primate.
Correspondence: James Benson, Department of English, Glendon College,
York University, Toronto, Canada
David Hodgson
Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection
This article supports the proposition that, if a judgment about the aesthetic
merits of an artistic object can take into account and thereby be influenced
by the particular quality of the object, through gestalt experiences evoked
by the object, then we have free will. It argues that it is probable that
such a judgment can indeed take into account and be influenced by the particular
quality of the object through gestalt experiences evoked by it, so as to
make it probable that we do have free will. The proposition is supported
by reference to two basic tricks apparently involved in conscious processes,
which I call the qualia trick and the chunking trick; and it is suggested
that these tricks make possible and indeed probable the existence of a
third trick, which I call the selection trick.
Correspondence: David Hodgson, Supreme Court of NSW, Queens Square,
Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia
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