Contents

INTERVIEW

Shaun Gallagher and Marc Jeannerod
From Action to Interaction  abstract

REFEREED PAPER

Erik Myin and J. Kevin O’Regan
Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology?  abstract

OPINION

Christoph von der Malsburg
How Are Neural Signals Related to Each Other and to the World?   abstract
Herms Romijn
Are Virtual Photons the Elementary Carriers of Consciousness?   abstract

REVIEW ARTICLE AND BOOK REVIEWS

David W. Salt
A Truly Hard Problem: A Review of Neural Correlates of Consciousness, ed. Thomas Metzinger  full text
Alwyn Scott
P.B. Andersen et al. (ed.), Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies, and Matter
Anthony Freeman
William Lyons, Matters of the Mind
René Stettler
Roy Ascott (ed.), Art, Technology, Consciousness
Roblin Meeks
Anita Avramides, Other Minds
Chris Nunn
Philip van Loocke (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness
Gary Fuhrman
Charles Travis, Unshadowed Thought
Chris Nunn
Peter Zachar, Psychological Concepts and Biological Psychiatry
 

ABSTRACTS

Shaun Gallagher and Marc Jeannerod

From Action to Interaction

Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, not only as we are actively moving, but as we plan to move, as we imagine moving, and as we observe others move. His work also captures important distinctions between pathological and non-pathological experience. In The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action (1997), Jeannerod focussed on object-oriented actions. What happens in the brain and what do we experience when we reach to grasp an object? How do we plan an action of that sort? To what extent does explicit motor imagery contribute to such action? What role does a motor representation or motor schema play in the accomplishment of action? At the very end of that book he raises questions that seem quite different. How is it possible to understand the intentions of others? Precisely what mechanisms allow us to imitate other people’s actions? In more recent years much of Jeannerod’s work has been in pursuit of these questions about interaction with others, and he has helped to show that there are intimate connections between moving ourselves and understanding others.

Jeannerod’s work does not lack important implications for a philosophical understanding of human activity. Although in contemporary philosophical debates on consciousness one can still find arguments that simply ignore bodily movement as an important factor in cognition, several recent works have returned to serious consideration of movement and action (e.g., Hurley, 1999; Sheets-Johnstone, 2000). In the following interview Jeannerod discusses many issues relevant to the philosophy of mind and action, including concepts of intentionality, movement and consciousness of movement, the role of simulation in understanding others, and the best way to conceptualize brain processes in all of these regards. Importantly, he makes constant reference to the empirical evidence, much of it developed in his own experimental studies.

Correspondence: Shaun Gallagher, Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo,
NY 14208, USA. Email: gallaghr@canisius.edu

Christoph von der Malsburg

How Are Neural Signals Related to Each Other and to the World?

The core of this paper is a discussion of how the physical signals of the nervous system acquire significance and meaning on the basis of relationships with each other and with the environment. Signal relations are discussed in terms of coherence (defined as lack of resistance), prediction, intentionality, inner reality and meaning. The original and most basic type of signal relation has the form of temporal correlations on coarser or finer time scales, and all other relations must ultimately be built up by the brain from this basis. Consequently, consciousness is the state of coherence of the brain in terms of signal relationships within it and with the environment. In this view, consciousness is of critical functional importance and far from a superfluous epiphenomenon. Understanding the mechanisms by which meaningful signal relationships are established in the brain is of great importance for the future of information technology.

Correspondence: Christoph von der Malsburg, Institut für Neuroinformatik, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44780 Bochum, Germany.

Erik Myin & J. Kevin O’Regan

Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories. A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology?

We address the thesis recently proposed by Andy Clark, that skill-mediated access to modality implies phenomenal feel. We agree that a skill theory of perception does indeed offer the possibility of a satisfactory account of the feel of perception, but we claim that this is not only through explanation of access to modality but also because skill actually provides access to perceptual property in general. We illustrate and substantiate our claims by reference to the recently proposed ‘sensorimotor contingency’ theory of visual awareness. We discuss why this theory offers a distinctively attractive access-based approach to perceptual consciousness because it ‘dereifies’ experience and permits otherwise problematic aspects of phenomenal perceptual consciousness to be explained. We suggest our approach thus offers the prospect of ‘naturalizing phenomenology’.

Correspondence: Erik Myin, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vakgroep Wijsbegeerte, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B1050 Brussel, Belgium. 


J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire de Psychologie Expérimentale, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, Université René Descartes, 92774 Boulogne Billancourt, France.

Herms Romijn

Are Virtual Photons the Elementary Carriers of Consciousness?

Abstract: Based on neurobiological data, modern concepts of self-organization and a careful rationale, the hypothesis is put forward that the fleeting, highly ordered patterns of electric and/or magnetic fields, generated by assemblies of dendritic trees of specialized neuronal networks, should be thought of as the end-product of chaotic, dynamically governed self-organization. Such patterns encode for subjective (conscious) experiences such as pain and pleasure, or perceiving colours. Because by quantum mechanical definition virtual photons are the theoretical constituents of electric and magnetic fields, the former hypothesis can be re-formulated as follows: it is the highly ordered patterns of virtual photons that encode for subjective (conscious) experiences. Arguments are then given that consciousness did not emerge during evolution only after neuronal networks had been formed able to generate electric and/or magnetic fields of sufficient complexity but, rather, that subjectivity already existed in a very elementary form as a fundamental property of the omnipresent virtual photons, i.e., of matter. The contribution of neuronal networks to consciousness was to generate highly ordered patterns of germs of subjectivity (virtual photons), so allowing complex subjective (conscious) experiences. Due to the omnipresence of virtual photons, it follows finally that the whole universe must be imbued with subjectivity. An experimental strategy is proposed to test the hypothesis.


key words: consciousness, brain, electric fields, magnetic fields, virtual photons.

Dr. H.J. Romijn, Netherlands Institute for Brain Research, Meibergdreef 33, 1105 AZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: hermsromijn@hetnet.nl

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