Contents

REFEREED PAPERS

 
Edward Feser   Abstract
Qualia: Irreducibly Subjective But Not Intrinsic
Andrew Botterell   Abstract
Conceiving What Is Not There
David Holdcroft and Harry Lewis   Abstract
Memes, Consciousness, Design and Social Practice

CONTINUING DEBATE

Benjamin Libet
Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain: Commentrary on John Searle’s Article Benjamin Libet
John R. Searle
Further reply to Libet

OBITUARY NOTICE

Evan Thompson
Francisco J. Varela (1946–2001)   full text

CONFERENCE REPORT

Bill Faw
Whither Consciousness Studies? ASSC-5 Conference at Duke, June 27–30, 2001   full text
 

BOOK REVIEWS

Josh Weisberg
Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way
Chris Nunn
Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (ed.), The Cauldron of Consciousness
Hans Dooremalen
Scott Sturgeon, Matters of Mind, Consciousness, Reason and Nature
Julian Paul Keenan
Todd E. Feinberg, Altered Egos
Bruno Deschenes
Ciarán Benson, The Cultural Psychology of Self, Place, Morality and Art in Human Worlds
Gary Fuhrman
Radu Bogdan, Minding Minds
Rahul Banerjee
Yvonne P. Bouin, Effects of Meditation on Respiration and the Temporal Lobes
Rüdiger Vaas
Sangeetha Menon et al. (ed.), Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness
John Dance
Mary Midgley, Science and Poetry
John McCrone
G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham, When Self-Consciousness Breaks
Peter W. Ross
Michael Tye, Color, Consciousness, and Content
Rocco J. Gennaro
Jospeh Levine, Purple Haze
Gary Schouborg
Charles T. Tart, Mind Science
Alexander Batthyany
Daniel D. Hutto, Beyond Physicalism
Imants Barušs

Jeffrey Mishlove, The PK Man 

Andrew Botterell

Conceiving What Is Not There

Abstract: In this paper I argue that certain so-called conceivability arguments fail to show that a currently popular version of physicalism in the philosophy of mind is false. Concentrating on an argument due to David Chalmers, I first argue that Chalmers misrepresents the relation between conceivability and possibility. I then argue that the intuition behind the conceivability of so-called zombie worlds can be accounted for without having to suppose that such worlds are genuinely conceivable. I conclude with some general remarks about the nature of conceivability.

Correspondence: Andrew Botterell, Department of Philosophy, Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, CA 94928, USA. Email andrew.botterell@sonoma.edu

Edward Feser

Qualia: Irreducibly Subjective but not Intrinsic

Abstract: The indirect realist theory of our knowledge of the external world which Russellian philosophers of mind have appealed to in formulating and defending a unique version of the mind–brain identity theory can be applied also to the formulation and defence of a unique version of functionalism. On the view that results, qualia turn out to be features which do not exist over and above the natural world (as materialistic functionalists and Russellians would agree), and are irreducibly subjective (as dualists and Russellians would agree) but are non-intrinsic properties of brain states (as functionalists would agree but Russellians would not). This view, which can be called ‘Hayekian functionalism’ (after F.A. Hayek, some of whose neglected writings inspired it), thus shows how we can combine the best insights of functionalism with the respect for the subjectivity of qualia which critics of functionalism claim it cannot accommodate.

Correspondence: Edward Feser, Department of Philosophy, Loyola Marymount University, 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045. Email: edwardfeser@hotmail.com

David Holdcroft and Harry Lewis

Memes, Consciousness, Design and Social Practice

It has been proposed by Dawkins, Dennett and others that memes are the units of cultural evolution. We here concentrate on Dennett’s account because of the role it plays in his explanation of human consciousness — which is our principal target. Memes are claimed to be replicators that work on Darwinian principles. But in what sense are they replicators, and in what way are they responsible for their own propagation? We argue that their ability to replicate themselves is severely limited, particularly in the case of language-borne memes. We contend, too, that the theory has unacceptable consequences for the role of design in accounting for cultural change, unless we seriously want to entertain the thought that design has as little relevance to cultural evolution as it does to the evolution of species. Finally, we argue that the account fails to do justice to the complexities of social practices.

Correspondence: David Holdcroft and Harry Lewis, School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK. Email: PHLDH@arts-01.leeds.ac.uk

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