Contents

REFEREED PAPERS

Glenn Braddock
Beyond Reflection in Naturalized Phenomenology  Abstract
Michael Kurak
Buddhism and Brain Science   Abstract
Jürgen Schröder
Higher Order Thought and Naturalist Accounts of Consciousness   Abstract

CONTINUING DEBATE

Patrick Haggard and Benjamin Libet
Conscious Intention and Brain Activity  Abstract

REVIEW ARTICLES

Carl Ginsburg
Mind and Motion: A review of Alain Berthoz’s The Brain’s Sense of Movement
Allan Combs
All Levels, All Quadrants: A review of Ken Wilber’s A Theory of Everything
Jack Petranker
Who Will Be the Scientists? A review of B. Alan Wallace’s The Taboo of Subjectivity  Full Text
Justus de Swart
The Biological Conditions of Consciousness: A review of Edelman & Tonini’s A Universe of Consciousness

Glenn Braddock

Beyond Reflection in Naturalized Phenomenology

Abstract: In this paper, I defend a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which will provide evidence for particular accounts of experience without relying exclusively on the reflective method or on intuition as a criterion for truth. To this end, I discuss the prospects for indirect phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology ought to be defined by its object of investigation, first-person experience, and not by any particular method of gaining access to this object of investigation. On this view, an integration of naturalized phenomenology into the cognitive sciences is far more feasible than we might have expected.

Correspondence: G. Braddock, University at Albany, State University of New York, USA
Email: braddock@albany.edu

Michael Kurak

Buddhism and Brain Science

Abstract: Explanations of consciousness from both philosophy and cognitive science are traditionally conceived in terms of how an active self-consciousness relates to the various aspects of the world with which it is faced. This way of framing the problem is intuitive, but it also leads ultimately to an infinite regress. A better approach to consciousness is suggested by Buddhism, which responds to the regress by arguing that consciousness and its apparent relata are, in any given instance, actually simultaneously illuminated isolates of an underlying unity. This response circumvents the regress, but does not offer an explanation of consciousness as such. Nevertheless, insights such as this can be integrated into contemporary scientific theorizing about cognition and the brain with surprisingly fruitful results.

Correspondence:
Michael Kurak, 269 Glenforest Road, Toronto, Ontario, M4N 2A5, Canada
Email: mkurak@yahoo.ca

Jürgen Schröder

Higher-Order Thought and Naturalist Accounts of Consciousness

Abstract: This paper makes a comparison between naturalist and non-naturalist theories of consciousness with respect to their explanatory merits. It focuses on David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory, arguing that the motives for higher-order theories are based on a confusion of three distinct meanings of the term ‘intrinsic’. The explanatory power of HOT theories is compared with that of an alternative nonrepresentational theory, offered as an example of a naturalistic account. The latter is found overall to have more virtues and less shortcomings that the higher-order theory.

Correspondence: Dr. Jürgen Schröder, Grünewaldstr. 12, 69126 Heidelberg, Germany.

Patrick Haggard and Benjamin Libet

Conscious Intention and Brain Activity

Abstract: The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. An influential series of experiments by Libet has suggested that conscious intentions arise as a result of brain activity. This contrasts with traditional concepts of free will, in which the mind controls the body. A more recent study by Haggard and Eimer has further examined the relation between intention and brain processes, concluding that conscious awareness of intention is linked to the choice or selection of a specific action, and not to the earliest initiation of action processes. The exchange of views in this paper further explores the relation between conscious intention and brain activity.

Correspondence: Patrick Haggard, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, Alexandra House, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK. Email: p.haggard@ucl.ac.uk

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