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Journal of Consciousness Studies
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Table of Contents
REFEREED PAPERS
Alvin I. Goldman Abstract
Can Science Know When You’re Conscious? Epistemological Foundations
of Consciousness Research
Stephen E. Robbins Abstract
Bergson, Perception and Gibson
J. Fahrenberg & M. Cheetham Abstract
The Mind–Body Problem As Seen By Students of Different Disciplines
Damjan Bojadziev Abstract
Perlis on Strong and Weak Self-Reference: A Mirror Reversal
Don Perlis Abstract
What Does It Take To Refer? A Reply to Bojadziev
REVIEW ARTICLES
Alwyn Scott Full Text
How Smart Is a Neuron? Review of Christof Koch’s Biophysics of Computation
Johannes Roessler Full Text
Attention and the Self: An Appreciation of C.O. Evans’ The Subject
of Consciousness
BOOK REVIEWS
Susan Hurley, Consciousness In Action, reviewed by Josh Weisberg
Robert A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil (ed.), The MIT Encyclopedia
of the Cognitive Sciences, reviewed by Paul Rogers
Robert L. Solso (ed.), Mind and Brain Sciences in the 21st
Century, reviewed by Selmer Bringsjord
Jerry Fodor, In Critical Condition, reviewed by John
Dance
Ruth Anna Putnam (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William
James, reviewed by Philip J. Knight
David B. Resnik, The Ethics of Science: An Introduction,
reviewed by Norman R. Gall
J.C. Crabbe, From Soul to Self, reviewed by Preben Bertelsen
Raymond A. Moody, Jr., The Last Laugh: A new philosophy of
near-death experiences, reviewed by M. Farias & C. Coelho
Dipanker Home, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Physics,
reviewed by Burton Voorhees
ABSTRACTS
Damjan Bojadziev
Perlis on Strong and Weak Self-Reference – A Mirror Reversal
Abstract: The kind of self-reference which Perlis (1997) characterizes
as strong, as opposed to formal self-reference which he characterizes as
weak, is actually already present in standard forms of formal self-reference.
Even if formal self-reference is weak because it is delegated, there is
no specific delegation of reference for self-referential sentences, and
their ‘self’ part is strong enough. In particular, the structure of self-reference
in Gödel’s sentence, with its application of a self-referential process
to itself, provides a model of Perlis’ characterization of a self. This
structure can also be interpreted visually, in a way relevant to self and
consciousness, namely as self-recognition in a mirror.
Damjan Bojadziev, Department of Intelligent Systems, Jozef Stefan Institute,
Jamova 39, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia.
Jochen Fahrenberg and Marcus Cheetham
The Mind–Body Problem As Seen By Students of Different Disciplines
Abstract: The mind–body problem is a continuing issue in philosophy. No
surveys known to us have been conducted about the actual preferences of,
for example, psychology students for particular preconceptions about the
mind–body relation. These preconceptions may have different practical implications
for decisions concerning the object and method of research, the choice
of explanatory device for psychological and other research data and for
the approach of professionals in practice. A questionnaire comprising ten
different preconceptions about the mind–body relation and other items was
returned by 209 German students of various disciplines (including psychology)
and by a second sample of 233 first year psychology students. Identity
theory, interactionism and complementarity were preferred most. The students
clearly believed that the preference for certain preconceptions has important
practical implications. There were no differences between the students
of different disciplines in the choice of preferred preconceptions about
the mind–body relation or in the view that these preconceptions are of
practical importance.
Prof. Dr Jochen Fahrenberg, Psychologisches Institut, Forschungsgruppe
Psychophysiologie, Universität Freiburg, Belfortstr. 20, D-79085 Freiburg
i. Br., Germany. Email: fahrenbe@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de
Alvin I. Goldman
Can Science Know When You’re Conscious? Epistemological Foundations of
Consciousness Research
Abstract: Consciousness researchers standardly rely on their subjects’
verbal reports to ascertain which conscious states they are in. What justifies
this reliance on verbal reports? Does it comport with the third-person
approach characteristic of science, or does it ultimately appeal to first-person
knowledge of consciousness? If first-person knowledge is required, does
this pass scientific muster? Several attempts to rationalize the reliance
on verbal reports are considered, beginning with attempts to define consciousness
via the higher-order thought approach and functionalism. These approaches
are either (A) problematic in their own right, or (B) ultimately based
on a first-person access to consciousness. A third approach assumes that
scientists can trust verbal reports because subjects reliably monitor or
‘introspect’ their conscious states. This raises the question of whether
the reliability of introspection (or self- monitoring) can be validated
by independent criteria. Merikle’s attempts to validate this reliability
are shown to involve some unavoidable circularity. It is conjectured that
scientists’ reliance on their subjects’ verbal reports tacitly appeals
to their own introspective reliability, which is not independently validatable.
Some epistemologists might conclude that this renders scientists’ conclusions
about conscious states unjustified.
Correspondence: Alvin I. Goldman, Dept. Of Philosophy, University of
Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA
Don Perlis
What Does It Take To Refer? A Reply to Bojadziev
Abstract: Bojadziev has taken issue with my distinction between strong
and weak self-reference, in saying that it is reference in general and
not simply self-reference, that either is strong or weak. I agree completely.
Here I clarify how I intend those notions and why I think that the strong
case of self-reference is worthy of special attention. In short, I argue
that all forms of referring involve a kind of self-referring.
Correspondence: Don Perlis, University of Maryland, College Park MD
20742, USA. Email: perlis@cs.umd.edu
Stephen E. Robbins
Bergson, Perception and Gibson
Abstract: Bergson’s 1896 theory of perception/memory assumed a framework
anticipating the quantum revolution in physics, the still unrealized implications
of this framework contributing to the large neglect of Bergson today. The
basics of his model are explored, including the physical concepts he advanced
before the crisis in classical physics, his concept of perception as ‘virtual
action’ with its relativistic implications, and his unique explication
of the subject/object relationship. All form the basis for his solution
to the ‘hard’ problem. The relation between Bergson and Gibson as natural
complements is also explored, with Bergson providing the framework that
explicates Gibson’s concept of direct perception, with Gibson’s resonance
model as a precursor to dynamic systems models of the brain and his reliance
on invariance laws defining perceived events providing more detail for
the mechanisms Bergson only envisioned from afar, and with Bergson providing
the basis for an otherwise missing Gibsonian model of direct memory.
Correspondence: Center for Advanced Product Engineering, M and I Data
Services, 10850 W. Park Place PP12, Milwaukee, WI 53224, USA. Email: Stephen.Robbins@midata.com
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