Table of Contents

REFEREED PAPERS

Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain
John R. Searle   Abstract

The Inner Sense of Action: Agency and Motor Representations
Vittorio Gallese   Abstract

The Emancipation of Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century America
David Schmit   Abstract

OPINION

Responsibility Without Choice: A First-Person Approach
Anthony Freeman   Full Text

BOOK REVIEWS, ETC.

Phenomenology and Consciousness: Review Article
John Dance

Why Do We Want To Open the Black Box?
Review of Susan Greenfield’s Brain Story
Keith Sutherland   Full Text

Species of Confusion: A Short Reply to Michael Corner’s Review of  Species of Mind
Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff

Books Received

Book Reviews:
M. Deric Bownds, The Biology of Mind, reviewed by John Pickering
Howard C. Hughes, Sensory Exotica, reviewed by Bruno Deschênes
Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, reviewed by David Newman
Geoffrey Miller, The Mating Mind, reviewed by Anthony Campbell
Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and, reviewed by Alterity John Burkey
William Seager, Theories of Consciousness, reviewed by Anthony Freeman
Max Velmans, Understanding Consciousness, reviewed by Greg Nixon

ABSTRACTS

Vittorio Gallese

The Inner Sense of Action Agency and Motor Representations

We live in a meaningful world. Our capacity to deal with the ‘external world’ is constituted by the possibility of modifying the world by means of our actions; by the possibility of representing the world as an objective reality; and by the possibility of experiencing phenomenally this same objective reality, from a situated, self-conscious perspective. It is tempting to address these different articulations of the sense of ‘being related to the world’, of our intentional relation to the world, by using different languages, different methods of investigations, perhaps even different ontologies.

In the present paper I will start to explore the possibility of reconciling some of these different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective. I will confine my analysis to the relationship between agency and representation and I will show how representation is intrinsically related to action control. To that purpose, I will present a new account of action, arguing against what is still commonly held as its proper definition, namely the final outcome of a cascade-like process that starts from the analysis of sensory data, incorporates the result of decision processes, and ends up with responses (actions) to externally- or internally-generated stimuli. I will argue against this account of action by presenting and discussing recent findings from the investigation of neural mechanisms that are at the basis of sensorimotor integration. It will become clear that the so-called ‘motor functions’ of the nervous system not only provide the means to control and execute action but also to represent it. Actually, following this view, action control and action representation become two sides of the same coin.

Correspondence: Vittorio Gallese, Istituto di Fisiologia Umana, Università di Parma, Via Volturno 39, I-43100 Parma, Italy.

David Schmit

The Emancipation of Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century America

Abstract: Amidst the current profusion of research on consciousness, discussions of the historic origins of the topic are frequently overlooked. At the beginning of the nineteenth century in the West, the nature of consciousness was barely understood, nor differentiated from its esoteric and religious contexts. By the end of the century, however, novel ideas about the structure of consciousness were proposed by Janet, James, and the Society for Psychical Research. This article proposes that these discoveries were intrinsically linked to popular nineteenth-century explorations of unorthodox religious experiences and trance states. Operating outside mainstream religious, medical, and academic settings, alternative spiritual and medical sub-cultures such as Mesmerism, Mind Cure, Spiritualism, Transcendentalism and Orientalism provoked scientific discourse about consciousness that advanced the field. Examining these developments sheds light on the current renaissance in consciousness research and its relation to popular interest in states of consciousness, meditation and powers of mind.

Correspondence: David Schmit, Box 4096, College of St. Catherine, 2004 Randolph Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55105, USA. Email: dtschmit@stkate.edu

John R. Searle

Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain

Abstract: This article has three aims. First, I want to situate an account of the consciousness of free action, a form of consciousness I will call ‘volitional consciousness’, within an account of consciousness generally. To do that I have to explain — briefly — some general features of consciousness. Secondly I want to discuss some of the implications of volitional consciousness for the explanation of rational behaviour and the existence of the self. Finally I want to relate this whole discussion to the traditional problem of the freedom of the will, and propose ways in which the problem of free will might be solved as a neurobiological problem.

Correspondence: John R. Searle, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94270, U.S.A.


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