REFEREED PAPERS

David Kahn, Stanley Krippner and Allan Combs   Abstract
Dreaming and the Self-Organizing Brain

Kristin Andrews   Abstract
Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance

Mehdi Nasrin   Abstract
Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism

OPINION

William Irwin Thompson   Full Text
Speculations on the City and the Evolution of Consciousness

POETRY   Full Text

Haiku (At a Temple)  Basho
Before Thought  Debra Jan Bibel
Seamless States  John Allsop
Unconscious  Ivo Mosley

REVIEW ARTICLES

Shaun Gallagher
Review of  José Luis Bermúdez’s 'The Paradox of Self-Consciousness'

Ted Honderich
Consciousness and Inner Tubes: Review of David Papineau’s 'Introducing Consciousness'

Keith Sutherland and Jordan Hughes   Abstract
Is Darwin Right? A Review Essay

Larry Arnhart (response)
Thoughts on Darwinian Natural Right
 

BOOK REVIEWS

  • H. Atmanspacher, A. Amann and U. Muller-Herold (ed.), On Quanta, Mind and Matter: Hans Primas in Context, reviewed by Eric Wallich
  • Victor S. Johnston, Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions, reviewed by Gary Schouborg
  • Gail Weiss and Honi Fern Haber (ed.), Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersection of Nature and Culture, reviewed by John Pickering
  • Robert Bruce, Astral Dynamics: A New Approach to Out-of-Body Experiences, reviewed by Mark Seelig
  • Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People, reviewed by Bruno Deschenes
  • Nils L. Wallin, Björn Merker and Steven Brown (ed.), The Origins of Music, reviewed by Vernon Pickles
  • Books received

    • ABSTRACTS

    Kristin Andrews

    Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance

    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a ‘theory of mind’, and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett’s theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett’s position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.

    Correspondence: Kristin Andrews, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA. Email: andrewska@conrad.appstate.edu

    David Kahn, Stanley Krippner & Allan Combs

    Dreaming and the Self-Organizing Brain

    We argue that the rapid eye movement (REM) dream experiences owe their structure and meaning to inherent self-organizing properties of the brain itself. Thus, we offer a common meeting ground for brain based studies of dreaming and traditional psychological dream theory. Our view is that the dreaming brain is a self-organizing system highly sensitive to internally generated influences. Several lines of evidence support a process view of the brain as a system near the edge of chaos, one that is highly sensitive to internal influences. Such sensitivity is due to several factors. First, the dreaming brain normally gates out external input and thus operates without the stabilizing influences of external feedback. Second, the pre-frontal cortex is only minimally activated during REM sleep, and hence the brain operates with weakened volition, reduced logic, and diminished self-reflection. Third, because the neuromodula tory inhibition mechanism is turned off during REM, the brain responds spontaneously to the least provocation. In addition, the dreaming brain is also subject to powerful intermittent cholinergic stimulation which may stimulate creative patterns of dream activity.

    Correspondence: Allan Combs, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Asheville, NC 28804-8508, USA. Email: combs@unca.edu

    Mehdi Nasrin

    Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism

    Functionalism argues that since any mental state can be realized by different physical systems, it is therefore wrong to define or identify a mental state of an organism by the corresponding physical-chemical state of its body (as type physicalism has intended to do). In this paper, I argue that since a single mental state can also be realized in different functional patterns, multiple realizability creates the same problem for functionalism. This means that it is wrong to implicitly define a mental state by its causal role in an interconnected network of inputs, outputs and internal states. It is discussed that the functionalists’ responses to this criticism are as plausible as the physicalists’ responses to the problem. It is concluded that in dealing with the multiple realizability problem, functionalism has no advantage over its rival, type physicalism.

    Correspondence: 70 Laurier Ave., Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada. E-mail: Mehdi_Nasrin@yahoo.com

    Keith Sutherland and Jordan Hughes

    Is Darwin Right?

    Review of Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (SUNY Series in Philosophy and Biology). This review article discusses the implications of this important book for ethics, politics and religion.

    Correspondence: Keith Sutherland, Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton EX5 5YX, UK. Email: keith@imprint.co.uk.

    Jordan Hughes, Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, Department of Cognitive Science, 0515, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093. Email: jordan@ucsd.edu


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