JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 97-107
Allan L. Smith, 99 Anderson Street, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA <plato9@aol.com>, and Charles T. Tart
The descriptions in the literature of mystical experience and psychedelic experience, such as that induced by LSD, are usually written by persons who have actually experienced only one or perhaps neither of the two states. Because many of the most important effects can be understood by direct experience but only partially described in ordinary language, such lack of direct experience is a major drawback. Since there is disagreement over the question of whether mystical experience and LSD experience can be `the same', it would be helpful if an individual who has experienced aspects of both states would compare them. One of the authors (ALS) describes his experience with both states. A particular form of mystical experience, cosmic consciousness (CC), occurred spontaneously; no mind altering drugs were used. ALS later took LSD on 12-15 occasions. Both states of consciousness involved alterations in time sense, subject/object boundary, cognition, mood and perception. However, the changes with CC were qualitatively and quantitatively different from those of LSD. The authors conclude that CC and LSD can be quite different states of consciousness, although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that psychedelics might sometimes induce the same kinds of mystical experiences that occur for non-drug reasons.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 67-85
Tom R. Burns, Uppsala Theory Circle, Department of Sociology, PO Box 821, University of Uppsala, SE-751 08 Uppsala, SWEDEN <tom.burns@soc.uu.se>, and Eric Engdahl
This paper outlines, from a sociological and social psychological perspective, a theoretical framework with which to define and analyse consciousness, emphasizing the importance of language, collective representations, conceptions of self, and self-reflectivity in understanding human consciousness. It argues that the shape and feel of consciousness is heavily social, and this is no less true of our experience of collective consciousness than it is of our experience of individual consciousness. The paper is divided into two parts. Part One argues that the problem of consciousness can be approached fruitfully by beginning with human group and collective phenomena: community, language, language-based communication, institutional and cultural arrangements, collective representations, self-conceptions, and self-referentiality. A collective is understood as a group or population of individuals (or collective agents as members) that possesses or develops collective representations of itself: its values and goals, its structure and modes of operating, its strategies, developments, strengths and weaknesses, etc. Collective reflectivity emerges as a function of an organization or group producing and making use of collective representations of the self (`we', our group, community, organization, nation) in its discussions, critical reflections, and planning. A collective monitors its activities, achievements and failures, and reflects on itself as a defined and on-going collective being. In this perspective, human consciousness is understood as a type of reflective activity: observing, monitoring, judging and re-orienting and re-organizing self; considering what characterizes the self, what self perceives, judges, could do, should do (or should not do). The reflectivity is encoded in language and developed in conversations about collective (as well as individual) selves. Part Two of the paper applies the framework to analysing the individual experience of consciousness, self-representation, self-reference, self-reflectivity and self-development.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 86-96
Peter G. Petty, Dept. of Clinical Neurosciences, Royal Melbourne Hospital, Melbourne 3050, Australia <peter.petty@onaustralia.com.au>
A neurosurgical view of consciousness is presented. It is biased by our need to deal with coma. The concept of primary or neurosurgical consciousness is discussed, and the anatomy, physiology, pathology and clinical features described in a simple a way. It is suggested that the dynamic interaction between the reticular activating system and the cerebral cortex is the anatomic and physiologic basis for primary consciousness. It is emphasised that this in no way diminishes the role of the cortex in either primary or higher-order consciousness. In essence, a presentation is made of the neurosurgical view of cortex-brainstem inter- relationships, and the importance of this interrelationship to consciousness.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 5-18.
Philip M. Merikle, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 <pmerikle@watarts.uwaterloo.ca> and Meredyth Daneman
This paper reviews the history of psychological investigations of unconscious perception and summarizes the current status of experimental research in this area of investigation. The research findings described in the paper illustrate how it is possible to distinguish experimentally between conscious and unconscious perception. The most successful experimental strategy has been to show that a stimulus can have qualitatively different consequences on cognitive and affective reactions depending on whether it was consciously or unconsciously perceived. In addition, recent studies of patients undergoing general anaesthesia have shown that the effects of stimuli perceived unconsciously during surgery can last for approximately 24 hours. Taken together, the results of these recent psychological investigations provide empirical support for the importance of unconsciously perceived information in determining cognitive and affective reactions. 216 5 1
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 59-66
Harry A. Lewis, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK. <H.A.Lewis@leeds.ac.uk>
The problem of consciousness arises when we accept that humans are subject to conscious experiences, and that these experiences resist explanations of a kind that other puzzling phenomena permit. I first consider the case that such experiences exist and then the reasons for taking a pessimistic view of our chances of explaining them. I argue that the fact that conscious experience is ineffable makes the problem even harder than Chalmers allows, as it undermines a presentation of the problem of reductive explanation in this case. The fact that conscious phenomena require a first-person perspective provides a further reason for taking a pessimistic view of the chances for the kind of theory that Chalmers seeks. In a final section I consider what form solutions to the problem, as revised, might take.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 19-33
William S. Haney II, Eastern Mediterranean University, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
As a method of oppositional reading, deconstruction argues that a text, and by extension any object of observation including the self, is characterized by disunity rather than unity. The present paper proposes that if we define the self as having a dimension that is not an object of observation, but is a pure witness, or what in Eastern cultures is known as `pure consciousness', then deconstruction can be seen to undo in practice what it claims to do in theory. This reversal has implications for the postmodernist self, which is thought to be fragmented by a multiplicity of social voices and the loss of a unifying depth of feeling. Through an analysis of the deconstructive notions of consciousness and language, this paper suggests that fragmentation can in effect take the postmodernist self toward a sense of wholeness. In theory deconstruction undermines the unity of language and consciousness, while in practice it invites a nonconceptual response similar to that of aesthetic experience. The deconstructive `freeplay' of language empties out the meaning of a text and leads the reader toward a state of being anterior to thought, toward an experience of awareness itself as opposed to its phenomenal content.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 53-8
William M. Greenberg, Department of Psychiatry, Bergen Pines County Hospital, 230 East Ridgewood Avenue, Paramus, New Jersey 07652 USA <73207.2643@compuserve.com>
David Chalmers has proposed several principles in his attack on the `hard problem' of consciousness. One of these is the principle of organizational invariance (stipulating that two systems with the same functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences), which he asserts is significantly supported by two thought experiments involving human brains and their functional silicon-based isomorphs. I claim that while the principle is an intelligible hypothesis and could possibly be true, his thought experiments fail to provide support for it.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 108-114
R. Harry Bradshaw, Animal Welfare and Human-Animal Interactions Group, Department of Clinical Veterinary Medicine, University of Cambridge, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 OES, U.K.
The existence of consciousness in animals may have been overlooked. Continuity in consciousness between humans and animals is predicted by evolutionary theory. However, there are specific methodological difficulties associated with investigating such a phenomenon: (1) it cannot be directly measured; (2) animals, unlike humans, cannot directly tell us about their conscious experience; (3) experiments which have made comparisons to human consciousness cannot detect consciousness of a different form; (4) application of the law of parsimony in science has traditionally led to the conclusion that it does not exist.
JCS, 5 (1), 1998, pp. 34-52
Gordon G. Globus, 360 San Miguel Dr., Suite 603, Newport Beach, CA 92660, USA <ggglobus@aol.com>
If the brain has a level of quantum functioning that permits superposition of possibilities and nonlocal control of states, then new answers to the problem of the consciousness/brain relation become available. My discussion is based on Yasue and co-workers' account of a quantum field theory of brain functioning, called `quantum brain dynamics'. In the framework developed each person can properly state: `I am nonlocal control and my meanings are control variables.' Cognition is identified with a conjugate reality and perception is where quantum cognition, quantum memory and the quantum re-presentation of quantum reality meet and make a conjugate match. A new problem arises with regard to the world, however, since on this interpretation the one world-in-common is relinquished in favour of multiple parallel world-thrownnesses. But since quantum physics remains to this day deeply uncommonsensical, we should not hope to provide quantum solutions in consciousness studies without overturning the deepest convictions of common sense.
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