Strawson, G., Jesus College, Oxford OX1 3DW, UK galen.strawson@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
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The substantival phrase `the self' is very unnatural in most speech contexts in most languages, and some conclude from this that it's an illusion to think that there is such a thing as the self, an illusion that arises from nothing more than an improper use of language. This, however, is implausible. People are not that stupid. The problem of the self doesn't arise from an unnatural use of language which arises from nowhere. On the contrary: use of a phrase like `the self' arises from a prior and independent sense that there is such a thing as the self. The phrase may be unusual in ordinary speech; it may have no obvious direct translation in many languages. Nevertheless all languages have words which lend themselves naturally to playing the role that `the self' plays in English, however murky that role may be. The phrase certainly means something to most people. It has a natural use in religious, philosophical, and psychological contexts, which are very natural contexts of discussion for human beings. I think there is a real philosophical problem about the existence and nature of the self, not just a relatively uninteresting problem about why we think there's a problem. It is too quick to say that a `grammatical error . . . is the essence of the theory of the self', or that ``the self'' is a piece of philosopher's nonsense consisting in a misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun' (Kenny, 1988, p. 4).
The first task is to get the problem into focus. I will recommend one approach, first in outline, then in slightly more detail. (I will model the problem of the self, rather than attempting to model the self.) I think the problem requires a straightforwardly metaphysical approach; but I also think that metaphysics must wait on phenomen- ology, in a sense I will explain. Most recent discussion of the problem by analytic philosophers has started from work in philosophical logic (in the large sense of the term). This work may have a contribution to make, but a more phenomenological starting point is needed.
I will use the expression `the self' freely -- I am already doing so -- but I don't want to exclude in advance the view that there is no such thing as the self, and the expression will often function as a loose name for what one might equally well call `the self-phenomenon', i.e. all those undoubtedly real phenomena that lead us to think and talk in terms of something called the self, whether or not there is such a thing.
Ramachandran, V.S., and Hirstein, W., Brain and Perception Laboratory, 0109, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093, USA
Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and `qualia'. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of `three laws of qualia' based on a loose analogy with Newton's three laws of classical mechanics. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset as green, or feel pain as if it were an itch; second, qualia do not always produce the same behaviour: given a set of qualia, we can choose from a potentially infinite set of possible behaviours to execute; and third, qualia endure in short-term memory, as opposed to non-conscious brain states involved in the on-line guidance of behaviour in real time. We suggest that qualia have evolved these and other attributes (e.g. they are `filled in') because of their role in facilitating non-automatic, decision-based action. We also suggest that the apparent epistemic barrier to knowing what qualia another person is experiencing can be overcome simply by using a `bridge' of neurons; and we offer a hypothesis about the relation between qualia and one's sense of self.
Bermúdez, J.L., Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland jb10@stir.ac.uk
Galen Strawson's keynote paper (1997) offers us one way of modelling the self, one that starts from the phenomenology of the sense of self and derives from that metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the self. Strawson is surely correct to hold that phenomenological considerations cannot be ignored in thinking about the metaphysics of the self. I am not as convinced as he is, however, that phenomenology is the royal road to metaphysics. What I want to sketch out in this short paper is another approach to the metaphysics of the self, one that is driven by reductivist concerns. As far as I can see it is an open question whether there are any global points of disagreement between us (although there are certainly some local ones).
Cole, J., Department of Clinical Neurophysiology, Poole Hospital,
Poole BH15 2JB, UK
jcole@minstead.demon.co.uk
Blachowicz, J., Dept. of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626, USA.
What is the cognitive significance of talking to ourselves? I criticize two interpretations of this function (the reflection model and the social model), and offer a third: I argue that inner speech is a genuine dialogue, not a monologue; that the partners in this dialogue represent the independent interests of experienced meaning and logical articulation; that the former is either silent or capable only of abbreviated speech; that articulation is a logical, not a social demand; and that neither partner is a full-time subordinate of the other. I examine the views of Plato, Arendt, Gadamer, Ryle, Piaget and Vygotsky on the nature of inner speech, and the views of Gazzaniga and Dennett on the role of inner speech in the constitution of human consciousness
Perlis, D., Department of Computer Science and Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA. http://www.cs.umd.edu/~perlis perlis@cs.umd.edu
I argue that (subjective) consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see that world model as residing in its belief base (part of itself), while then representing the actual world as possibly different, i.e., forming a new world-model. This suggests particular computational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably could be discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into artificial systems that may need such capabilities.
Consciousness, then, is not an epiphenomenon at all, but rather a key part of the functional architecture of suitably intelligent agents, hence amenable to study as much as any other architectural feature. I also argue that ignorance of how subjective states (experiential awareness) could be essentially functional does not itself lend credibility to the view that such states are not essentially functional; the strong self-reference proposal here is one possible functional explanation of consciousness.
Edey, M., PO Box 2681, Vineyard Haven, MA 02568, USA MaitEdey@aol.com
Many definitions and theories of self assume that "self" refers to some part of the world. Similarly, "consciousness" is assumed to refer to a property of such a part. These basic assumptions are mistaken, and generate some of the deepest confusions in the philosophy of mind. Such distinctions as seer/seen, hearer/heard, and thinker/thought generalize to subject/object. The realization of the subject, and the distinction between the subject to awareness and the object of awareness, are prior to any theories about the nature of the self: before I can even begin to wonder what I am, I must have already realized that I am. Neither the subject nor consciousness can be conceived correctly as any kind of object or property. The distinction between subject and object is more fundamental than the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter, with which it is often conflated. "I am conscious" and "I am" are variant expressions of the same basic realization, suggesting that "consciousness" and "being" are convergent concepts.
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