Willis Harman, by Jane Clark
JCS, 4 (3), 1997, pp.195-214
Shaun Gallagher, Department of Philosophy, Canisius College, Buffalo,
NY 14208, USA
gallaghr@canisius.edu
This article provides a critical review of recent work at the intersection
of phenomenology and cognitive science. What is and what ought to be the
relationship between these two approaches to the study of consciousness?
This review explores problems involved with expressing subjective experience
in an objective fashion, and issues involved in the use of principles of
isomorphism to explain how brain and consciousness are interrelated. It
suggests that strict lines cannot be drawn between third-person theory
and phenomenological description, that the division of labour between phenomenology
and cognitive science is not very strict, and that the best model for understanding
the relation between these two approaches is one that emphasizes an externalist
viewpoint.
JCS, 4 (3), 1997, pp.215-230
Alexandra Nagel, Department of Theoretical Production-ecology, Wageningen
Agricultural University, PO Box 430, 6700 AK Wageningen, The Netherlands
Views of `plant consciousness' in the literature are classified on a scale
ranging from descriptions of plant phenomena using consciousness as a metaphor,
to explicit statements that plants are conscious beings. The idea of plant
consciousness is far from new, but it has received a new impetus from recent
claims by psychics to communicate with plants. The literature surveyed
is widely scattered and very diverse, but it can teach us much about the
views that various segments of society hold on plant consciousness.
JCS, 4 (3), 1997,pp.231-247
Rodney M.J. Cotterill, Biophysics Group, Building 307, Danish Technical
University, DK2800 Lyngby, Denmark
firodcot@gbar.dtu.dk
The master-module theory of consciousness (Cotterill, 1995; 1996) is
considered in the light of experimental evidence that has emerged since
the model was first published. It is found that these new results tend
to strengthen the original hypothesis. It is also argued that the master
module is involved in generation of the schemata previously postulated
to be associated with consciousness (Bartlett, 1932). The recent discovery
of attention-related activity in the thalamic intralaminar nuclei is taken
to indicate that these structures constitute an important part of the feedback
loop which the theory conjectured to mediate thought. The theory is shown
to lead to a remarkably simple rationalization of the cerebral cortex,
and it offers explanations of attention, binocular rivalry and qualia.
It also makes the surprising prediction that Broca's area might not exclusively
serve speech.
JCS, 4 (3), 1997, pp.248-268
David Ray Griffin, Claremont School of Theology and Claremont Graduate
School, Claremont, CA 91711, USA
The intractable (not merely hard) mind-body problem, which involves accounting
for freedom as well as conscious experience, is created by the assumption
that the brain is comprised of insentient things. Chalmers is right, accordingly,
to suggest that we take experience as fundamental. Given this starting-point,
the hard problem is twofold: to see sufficient reason to adopt this long-despised
approach, and to develop a plausible theory based on it. We have several
reasons, I suggest, to reject the notion of `vacuous actuality' and to
adopt, instead, the view that all true individuals have experience and
spontaneity. After suggesting criteria for an acceptable theory, chief
among which are `hard-core common-sense notions', I point out why dualism
and materialism have been unable to fulfil these criteria. The strength
of dualism has been its organizational duality, the strength of materialism
its rejection of ontological dualism. I suggest that panexperientialist
physicalism, by allowing for `compound individuals' and thereby a `nondualistic
interactionism' that combines these strengths, can provide a theory that
overcomes the problems of materialist physicalism.
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