 |
|
JCS, 4 (2), 1997, pp.100-21
James Newman, Colorado Neurological Institute, 740 Clarkson Street,
Denver, CO 80218, USA
Newmanjb@aol.com
Part I of this two-part paper (Newman, 1997)
provided a broad overview of clinical and experimental findings bearing
on the neural correlates of conscious processes. It was argued that several
neurocognitive models related to: orienting to the outer world, dream (REM)
sleep, and the integration of sensory-motor representations, converge upon
a core `conscious system', dubbed the extended reticular-thalamic activating
system (ERTAS). The functions of the ERTAS, which shares extensive
projections with the cerebral cortex, are mostly `implicit', in contrast
to the explicit representation of conscious content within the neocortex.
Part II expands this ERTAS model to encompass: the generation of coherent
patterns of EEG activation, the integration of distributed cortical processes
into a stream of unified percepts (binding), and selective attention, as
well as links between the ERTAS and systems providing the neural substrates
for episodic memory and volition.
JCS, 4 (2), 1997, pp.122-42
Brian L. Lancaster, School of Human Sciences, Liverpool John Moores
University, Trueman Building, 15-21 Webster Street, Liverpool L3 2ET, UK
B.L.Lancaster@livjm.ac.uk
The nature of perceptual and memory processes is examined in the light
of suggested complementarity between introspective and empirical traditions.
The introspective material analysed here is that found in the Buddhist
Abhidhamma literature of the Pali canon on the stages of perception. Possible
psychological and neurophysiological correspondences to these stages are
proposed. The model of perception advanced here emphasizes two phases.
The first involves sensory analysis and related memory readout. I postulate
that this phase is completed when coherence in oscillatory neuronal patterns
indicates a `match' between sensory input and memory readout. The second
phase results in consciousness of the object, which comes about when a
connection is effected between the representation of the input as generated
in phase one and a representation of self (or `I'). `I' is itself generated
in this second phase in relation to the memory readout of phase one, since
this readout includes relevant prior formations of `I'. It is suggested
that `I' functions in the organization of memory and recall.
JCS, 4(2), 1997, pp.143-66
Rafel E. Núñez, Institute of Cognitive Studies, University
of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
nunez@cogsci.berkeley.edu
The recently celebrated division into `easy' and `hard' problems of
consciousness is unfortunate and misleading. Built on functionalist grounds,
it carves up the subject matter by declaring that the most elusive parts
need a fundamentally and intrinsically different solution. What we have,
rather, are `difficult' problems of conscious experience, but problems
that are not difficult per se. Their difficulty is relative, among other
things, to the kind of solution one is looking for and the tools used to
accomplish the task. I argue that the study of conscious experience in
our scientific and philosophical tradition is a very difficult problem
because it has been addressed with inappropriate tools: with harmful long-lasting
and inadequate dogmas that have dogged science for centuries. I describe
five of these dogmas, which are: (1) the existence of an objective reality
independent of human understanding; (2) the subordination of epistemology
to ontology; (3) the restricted view of the objectivist– subjectivist dichotomy;
(4) the exclusion of the body from the study of the mind; and (5) the idea
of explaining the mind in terms of the neurophysiological processes of
individual brains.
I claim that conscious experience is not a transcendental, paranatural, mystic or magic phenomenon. It is tractable and approachable with scientific methods. However, one must look not only for non-reductionist views to approach it, but also for views that avoid the dogmas here described. Conscious experience is a living phenomenon and it has to be understood as such. Accordingly, our understanding of it has to make sense at several levels, from evolution to morphophysiology, from neuroanatomy to language. I put forward an approach to conscious experience which is free of the dogmas that make the study of conscious experience so difficult. This view, called ecological naturalism, is a non-functionalist and non-reductive view that provides an naturalistic account of the mind. It also puts special emphasis on irreducible supra-individual biological (SIB) processes that are essential in the realization of mental phenomena and therefore conscious experience.
JCS, 4(2), 1997, pp.167-80
Piet Hut, School of Natural Sciences, Institute for Advanced Study,
Princeton, NJ 08540, U.S.A
piet@sns.ias.edu
Bas van Fraassen, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University,
NJ 08544, USA
fraassen@pucc.princeton.edu
When we start with a scientific view of the world, we are at a loss
when we try to deal with notions such as value, beauty, or meaning -- or
more down to earth: anger, fear, joy, colour, smell, and other `secondary'
qualities whose putative reduction seems today as difficult as ever. Do
these qualities then have to be put in by hand, so to speak? Or could it
mean that the scientific view itself fails to capture aspects of reality
at least as fundamental as basic physical notions such as space, time,
energy?
These were some of the questions that came up in conversations between an astrophysicist (Piet) and a philosopher (Bas) that began two years ago, as they met, often by accident, usually in a café for breakfast. What happens if a philosopher and a scientist discuss such questions? Well, this was an experiment, and here is the outcome. We still think of it as an experiment, an exploration, without any definite conclusion.
Jaron Lanier, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University,
500 W 120th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA
jaron@well.com
The role of consciousness in contemporary scientific thought is similar to the role of death in everyday emotional life. It is usually ignored or denied outright, frequently obsessed over, and is sometimes the inspiration for uncharacteristic breaches of common sense. It is time to state the obvious. The problem of consciousness is deeply interwoven with the problem of death. And yet death is rarely mentioned in relation to consciousness studies. Consciousness is the thing of consequence that dies. Surely this explains a great deal of why there is such an energetic conversation about consciousness, and why passions are so often raised concerning a subject whose basic nature is so elusive and disputed.
See
also special offer on new subscriptions
Home
page
