JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.4-6
Daniel C. Dennett
Center for Cognitive Studies,
Tufts University,
Medford,
MA 02155,
USA.
Abstract:
The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but
it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's (1995) attempt to sort
the `easy' problems of consciousness from the `really hard' problem is
not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector
of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe
two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers'
recommendation.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.7-13
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Department of Philosophy,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg,
Virginia 24061–0126,
USA.
Abstract:
In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division between
the materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quite
deep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise.
In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me,
arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In section
II, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists and
the sceptics, suggesting that this difference is not something that further
discussion or argumentation can overcome. In the final section, I outline
one view of scientific explanation and conclude that the source of conflict
really turns on a difference in the rules each side has adopted in playing
the game.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.14-25
William S. Robinson
Department of Philosophy,
Iowa State University,
Ames,
IA 50011,
USA.
Email: wsrob@iastate.edu
Abstract:
This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved
within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property
of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the
kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences
that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons
that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly
developed representative version of relational theory (namely, David Rosenthal's,
1986; 1990) and explain why I do not find it acceptable. This rejection
requires a nonrelational alternative, which I describe and defend against
a certain further objection. Finally, I discuss implications of the foregoing
for the views of McGinn (1991) and Chalmers (1995).
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.26-32
Eugene Mills
Div. of Philosophy,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
915 West Franklin Street,
Richmond,
VA 23284-2025,
USA.
Email: eomills@gems.vcu.edu
Abstract:
David Chalmers (1995) calls the problem of explaining why physical
processes give rise to conscious phenomenal experience the `hard problem'
of consciousness. He argues convincingly that no reductive account of consciousness
can solve it and offers instead a non-reductive account which takes consciousness
as fundamental. This paper argues that a theory of the sort Chalmers proposes
cannot hope to solve the hard problem of consciousness precisely because
it takes the relation between physical processes and consciousness as fundamental
rather than explicable. The hard problem of consciousness is, for reasons
Chalmers himself gives, insoluble. Its insolubility does not, however,
impugn the naturalistic respectability of consciousness.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.33-35
Benjamin Libet
Department of Physiology,
University of California,San Francisco,
CA 94143-0444,
USA.
Abstract:
Solutions to the `hard problem' of consciousness must accept conscious
experience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmers
suggests. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but I
find basic flaws in these. Our own experimental investigations of brain
processes causally involved in the development of conscious experience
appear to meet Chalmers' requirement. Even more directly, I had previously
proposed a hypothetical `conscious mental field' as an emergent property
of appropriate neural activities, with the attributes of integrated subjective
experience and a causal ability to modulate some neural processes. This
theory meets all the requirements imposed by the `hard problem' and, significantly,
it is experimentally testable.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.36-53
Stuart Hameroff
Departments of Anesthesiology and Psychology,
University of Arizona,
Tucson,
Arizona,
USA.
Roger Penrose
Mathematical Institute,
University of Oxford,
24–29 St. Giles,
Oxford OX1 3LB,
UK.
Abstract:
What is consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that
`qualia', or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived,
exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described
the universe as being comprised of `occasions of experience'. To examine
this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must
be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of space–time —
as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity — and its relation
to the fundamental theory of matter — as described by quantum theory. This
leads us to employ a new physics of objective reduction: OR
which appeals to a form of `quantum gravity' to provide a useful description
of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose,
1994; 1996). Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness
occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain
quantum coherent superposition until a specific `objective' criterion (a
threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then
self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type
of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature
of consciousness. OR is taken as an instantaneous event — the climax
of a self-organizing process in fundamental space–time — and a candidate
for a conscious Whitehead-like `occasion' of experience. How could an OR
process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account
for other features of consciousness? We nominate an OR process with
the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules
within the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose,
1995; 1996).
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.54-68
Jonathan Shear
Dept. of Philosophy,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
Richmond,
VA 23284–2025,
USA.
Email: jcs@richmond.infi.net
Abstract:
It stands to reason that full understanding of what is involved in
the `hard problem' will emerge only on the basis of systematic scientific
investigation of the subjective phenomena of consciousness, as well as
the objective phenomena of matter. Yet the idea of such a systematic scientific
investigation of the subjective phenomena of consciousness has largely
been absent from discussions of the `hard problem'. This is due, apparently,
both to philo- sophical objections to the possibility of such a science
of consciousness, and to the absence of appropriate subjective investigative
methodologies. The present paper argues (1) that cognitive-developmental
research on the development of the mental/physical distinction in young
children undercuts standard philosophical objections to the possibility
of an appropriate scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness, (2)
that methodologies for exploring the contents and dynamics of consciousness
akin to those developed in Eastern cultures could play a significant role
in the development of such a science of consciousness, and (3) that the
experience of `pure consciousness' often reported in association with these
methodologies suggests reformulation of our ordinary ideas about the relationships
between consciousness, qualia, and the objective world that may prove particularly
useful for resolution of the `hard problem'.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.69-75
David Hodgson
Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Queens Square,
Sydney,
NSW 2000,
Australia
Abstract:
David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness — why
should a physical system give rise to conscious experiences at all — with
what he calls the easy problems, the explanation of how cognitive systems,
including human brains, perform various cognitive functions. He argues
that the easy problems are easy because the performance of any function
can be explained by specifying a mechanism that performs the function.
This article argues that conscious experiences have a role in the performance
by human beings of some cognitive functions, that can't be realised by
mechanisms of the kind studied by the objective sciences; and that accordingly
some of Chalmers' easy problems will not be fully solved unless and until
the hard problem is solved.
JCS, 3 (1), 1996, pp.76-88
Gregg H. Rosenberg
Dept. of Philosophy,
Sycamore 026,
Indiana University,
Bloomington,
IN 47405–2601,
USA.
Email: ghrosenb@phil.indiana.edu
Abstract:
If experience cannot be explained reductively, then we must embrace
a revised understanding of nature to explain it. What kind of revision
is required? A minimal revision would merely append a theory of experience
onto an otherwise adequate theory of cognition, without going far beyond
considerations peculiar to the study of the mind. I argue that we will
need a more expansive revision, requiring us to rethink the natural order
quite generally. If this is right, we will view the mind as a special context
in which something new to our understanding of the world, and much more
general, is being manifested.
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