The full text of the target paper, Todd Moody's Conversations with Zombies is available.
JCS, 2 (4), 1995, pp.290-311
Rodney M.J. Cotterill
Biophysics Group,
Building 307,
Danish Technical University,
DK2800 Lyngby,
Denmark
Email: firodcot@gbar.dtu.dk
Abstract:
It is suggested that consciousness is primarily associated not with
stimuli and perception, as commonly supposed, but with movement and responses.
Consciousness of stimuli arises in situations in which possible movements
are planned, or in which information must be actively acquired rather than
passively registered, and may or may not require overt movements to be
performed. By emphasizing response, this formulation provides a simple
explanation for the perceived unity of consciousness: though stimuli can
be diverse, with independent components, movements must necessarily be
coordinated. Therefore, if we are to look for a `site' for consciousness,
it is likely to be in a region such as the anterior cingulate that is neurally
close to the higher motor hierarchical levels, and also accessible both
to real sensory feedback and also to virtual feedback derived through mechanisms
of efference copy from actual or proposed motor commands. It is suggested
that synchrony of arrival of such information may be an important prerequisite
of this unity, and that on this basis such a `master node' might
be expected to be temporally `equidistant' from each of these sources;
this may well be true of the anterior cingulate, but no doubt also of other
structures.
JCS, 2 (4), 1995, pp. 313-321
Owen Flanagan
Departments of Philosophy,
Psychology, and Neurobiology
Thomas Polger
Department of Philosophy,
Box 90743,
Duke University,
Durham,
NC, 27707,
USA.
Email: twp2@acpub.duke.edu
Abstract:
Todd Moody's Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show
that `conscious inessentialism' is false or in need of qualification. We
defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that
zombie thought experiments highlight the difficulty of explaining why consciousness
evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in
consciousness studies.
JCS, 2 (4), 1995, pp.322-326
Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University,
Center for Cognitive Studies,
11 Miner Hall,
Medford,
Massachusetts 02155-7059,
USA.
Abstract:
Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations
are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes
philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run
headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang
there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes
over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely
attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that
I think is wrong with current thinking about consciousness. Philosophers
ought to have dropped the zombie like a hot potato, but since they persist
in their embrace, this gives me a golden opportunity to focus attention
on the most seductive error in current thinking.
JCS, 2 (4), 1995, pp.326-333
Güven Güzeldere
Department of Philosophy and Center for the Study of Language & Information,
Stanford University,
Stanford,
CA 94305–4115,
USA.
Email: guven@csli.stanford.edu
Abstract:
On the basis of distinguishing three different kinds of zombies (behavioural,
func- tional, physiological), I argue that Moody's argument (1994) against
the conscious inessentialism thesis and physicalism is invalid, and comparatively
analyse similarities as well as differences between two responses to Moody:
Flanagan & Polger (1995) and Dennett (1995).
JCS, 2 (4), 1995, pp.348-351
Selmer Bringsjord
Dept. of Philosophy,
Psychology & Cognitive Science,
Department of Computer Science,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
Troy,
NY 12180,
USA.
Email: selmer@rpi.edu.
http://www.rpi.edu/~brings
Abstract:
Moody is right that the doctrine of conscious inessentialism (CI) is
false. Unfortunately, his zombie-based argument against (CI), once made
sufficiently clear to evaluate, is revealed as nothing but legerdemain.
The fact is — though Moody has convinced himself otherwise — certain zombies
are impenetrable: that they are zombies, and not conscious beings like
us, is something beyond the capacity of humans to divine.
JCS, 2 (4), 1995, pp.353-358
Avshalom C. Elitzur
School of Physics and Astronomy,
Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences,
Tel-Aviv University,
Tel-Aviv 69978,
Israel
E-mail: cfeli@weizmann.weizmann.ac.il
Abstract:
Moody's thought-experiment invoking zombies to demonstrate the uniqueness
of consciousness is commended. His conclusions accord well with previous
ones arrived at by Penrose, Chalmers and myself. All these works lead to
a disturbing conclusion: consciousness, as something distinct from the
brain processes, interferes with physical reality. Ergo, it is no longer
possible to adhere to any of the modern theories of mind that preserve
the completeness of physics. This conclusion is, in principle, testable.
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