This is the first of a three-part special issue on Explaining Consciousness - the ``Hard Problem''.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 200-219
David J. Chalmers,
Department of Philosophy,
University of California
Santa Cruz, CA 95064,
USA.
Email: chalmers@ling.ucsc.edu
Abstract:
Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the
mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience,
but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena
have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness
has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the explanations
always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to suppose
that the problem is intractable, and that no good explanation can be given.
To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance and a double-aspect view of information.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 241-54
Thomas W. Clark,
7 Partridge Ave.,
Somerville, MA 02143,
USA.
Email: twc@world.std.com
Abstract:
This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely something
extra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyond
the functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view creates
the `explanatory gap' between function and phenomenology which many suppose
cannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodological
considerations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism,
an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experience
is identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions,
not something which emerges from them. This hypothesis explains the isomorphism
between the structure of experience and neural organization, while providing
a naturalistic account of qualia as relational properties of informational
states, not a separate ontology of phenomenal essences. On this functionalist
view, the hard, empirical problem of consciousness is to discover precisely
which neural functions constitute subjective experience.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 231-40
C.J.S. Clarke,
University of Southampton,
Faculty of Mathematical Studies,
Highfield,
Southampton SO17 1BJ,
UK.
Email: cjsc@maths.soton.ac.uk
Abstract:
The dominance in normal awareness of visual percepts, which are linked
to space, obscures the fact that most thoughts are non-spatial. It is argued
that the mind is intrinsically non-spatial, though in perception can become
compresent with spatial things derived from outside the mind. The assumption
that the brain is entirely spatial is also challenged, on the grounds that
there is a perfectly good place for the non-spatial in physics. A quantum
logic approach to physics, which takes non-locality as its starting point,
offers a non-reductive way of reconciling the experience of mind with the
world description of physics. For further progress it is necessary to place
mind first as the key aspect of the universe.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 266-71
E.J. Lowe,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Durham,
Durham, UK.
Email: E.J.Lowe@durham.ac.uk
Abstract:
This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems
of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly
being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms
and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia'
resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued,
rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience
and their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally important
insight of Kant. From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptual
thought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousness
that it is an illusion to imagine that there are any `easy' problems
of consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 220-30
Colin McGinn,
Dept. of Philosophy,
Rutgers University,
P.O. Box 270,
New Brunswick,
NJ 08903-0270,
USA.
Abstract:
Consciousness lacks extension and other spatial properties. But how
can this be, if it arises from matter in space? The paper argues that this
conundrum can only be solved by recognizing that our current conception
of space is fundamentally inadequate. However, no other conception is available
to us.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 272-88
William Seager,
University of Toronto,
1265 Military Trail,
Scarborough,
Ontario M1C 1A4,
Canada.
Email: seager@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
Abstract:
The generation problem is to explain how material configurations or
processes can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that this
is what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposes
to side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness is
an absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agree
that the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousness
to be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about what
it is to be a fundamental feature of the world. In fact, I argue that taking
the idea seriously ought to lead to some form of panpsychism. Powerful
objections have been advanced against panpsychism, but I attempt to outline
a form of the doctrine which can evade them. In the end, I suspect that
we will face a choice between panpsychism and rethinking the legitimacy
of the generation problem itself.
JCS, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 255-65
Max Velmans,
Department of Psychology,
Goldsmiths, University of London,
New Cross,
London, SE14 6NW,
England.
Email: mlv@gold.ac.uk
Abstract:
Within psychology and the brain sciences, the study of consciousness
and its relation to human information processing is once more a focus for
productive research. However, some ancient puzzles about the nature of
consciousness appear to be resistant to current empirical investigations,
suggesting the need for a fundamentally different approach. In Velmans
(1991a; b; 1993a) I have argued that functional (information processing)
accounts of the mind do not `contain' consciousness within their workings.
Investigations of information processing are not investigations of consciousness
as such. Given this, first-person investigations of experience need to
be related nonreductively to third-person investigations of processing.
For example, conscious contents may be related to neural/physical representations
via a dual-aspect theory of information. Chalmers (1995) arrives at similar
conclusions. But there are also theoretical differences. Unlike Chalmers
I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional
accounts rather than the term `awareness'. I do not agree that functional
equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest
a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight.
I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce
a different form of dual-aspect theory involving `psychological complementarity'.
I also suggest that the hard problem posed by `qualia' has its origin in
a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.
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