JCS, 2 (1), 1995, pp.10-29
Rick Grush and Patricia Smith Churchland,
Philosophy Department,
University of California at San Diego,
La Jolla,
CA 92093,
USA.
Email: rick@twinearth.wustl.edu
Email: pschurchland@ucsd.edu
Abstract:
Using the Godel incompleteness result for leverage, Roger Penrose has
argued that the mechanism for consciousness involves quantum gravitational
phenomena, acting through microtubules in neurons. We show that this hypothesis
is implausible. First the Godel result does not imply that human thought
is in fact non-algorithmic. Second, whether or not non-algorithmic quantum
gravitational phenomena actually exist, and if they did how that could
conceivably implicate microtubules, and if microtubules were involved,
how that could conceivably implicate consciousness, is entirely speculative.
Third, cytoplasmic ions such as calcium and sodium are almost certainly
present in the microtubule pore, barring the quantum-mechanical effects
Penrose envisages. Finally, physiological evidence indicates that consciousness
does not directly depend on microtubule properties in any case, rendering
doubtful any theory according to which consciousness is generated in the
microtubules.
JCS, 2 (1), 1995, pp. 30-51
Güven Güzeldere,
Center for the Study of Language and Information,
Stanford University,
Stanford,
CA 94305-4115,
USA
Email: guven@csli.stanford.edu
Abstract:
This article is a version of the first half of an introduction to an
anthology on consciousness. It is aimed at tracing the study of consciousness
in psychology roughly since psychology pulled itself apart from philosophy
as an independent discipline in the late nineteenth century. The second
half, which will appear as a sequel to the present article, will cover
the various philosophical problems involving consciousness, and trace the
consciousness debate to date. The two articles are intended as a general
introduction to the forthcoming special issue, Explaining Consciousness:
the Hard Problem.
JCS, 2 (1), 1995, pp. 52-66
Donald Michie,
1 University of Edinburgh,
UK
Email: d.michie@ed.ac.uk
Abstract:
This paper's first part (JCS, 1, pp. 182-95), reviewed attempts
to model real-world problem solving as machine-executable logic. Part 2
considers an alternative model in which the solution of problems is primarily
the work of visualization supported by automatized skills. Consciousness
operates at the level of goal-setting and monitoring, and of the construction
and communication of after-the-event commentaries, not as a problem solver.
Engineering designs based on this model have proved convenient and effective. `Structured induction' is now routinely used to recover and articulate expertise that in the human solver remains tacit. A seminal case of computer-mediated superarticulacy is described in which a human problem solver was enabled to transform an elaborate, but largely blind and unconscious, mental skill into a fully aware, communicable and machine-executable theory.
JCS, 2 (1), 1995, pp. 76-81
Jaron Lanier,
134 Duane Street,
Apt. 3N,
New York,
NY 10013
Email: tickl@well.sf.ca.us
Abstract:
In the conclusion to his article, `Consciousness as an engineering
issue' (JCS, 2 (1995), pp. 52-66), Donald Michie argues that the
inclusion of intelligent computer systems in workgroups will lead to a
blurring of the distinction between human and machine consciousness. He
also refers to the increasing use of intelligent agent software in commercial
applications. Given the exponential growth in the availability of on-line
information through networked computer systems, AI routines are being developed
to filter information, based on the user's own stated needs and preferences.
In this article Jaron Lanier, who originated the term `virtual reality',
argues that the use of intelligent agents will devalue human intelligence
and creativity and diminish the role of conscious experience. The mind-body
debate needs to move beyond the confines of academic philosophy as it has
important implications for practical issues such as the design of computer
systems.
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