JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 66-90
Valerie Gray Hardcastle,
Department of Philosophy,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg,
Virginia 24061-0126,
USA.
Email: valerie@vt.edu
Abstract:
Given what we know about the segregated nature of the brain and the
relative absence of multi-modal association areas in the cortex, how percepts
become unified is not clear. However, if we could work out how and where
the brain joins together segregated outputs, we would have a start in localizing
the neuronal processes that correlate with conscious perceptual experiences.
In this essay, I critically examine data relevant for understanding the
neurophysiological underpinnings of perception. In particular, I examine
the possibility that 40 Hz. oscillatory firing patterns in cortex are important
lower-level neuronal events related to perceptual experiences. I suggest
that ``binding'' - understood as a process of hooking together disparate
psychological units - reduces to a property inherent in the structure of
our brain's firing patterns. However, this reduction may not reflect the
firing rates of individual cells, but instead a ``higher level'' order
superimposed on individual cells' activity.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 91-118
Stuart R. Hameroff
Advanced Biotechnology Laboratory,
Department of Anesthesiology,
University of Arizona Health Sciences Center,
Tucson, AZ 85724,
USA
Email: SRH@ccit.arizona.edu
Abstract:
The paper begins with a general introduction to the nature of human
consciousness and outlines several different philosophical approaches.
A critique of traditional reductionist and dualist positions is offered
and it is suggested that consciousness should be viewed as an emergent
property of physical systems. However, although consciousness has its origin
in distributed brain processes it has macroscopic properties - most notably
the `unitary sense of self', non-deterministic free will, and non-algorithmic
`intuitive' processing - which can best be described by quantum-mechanical
principles.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 119-26
Benjamin Libet,
Department of Physiology,
University of California,
San Francisco,
CA 94143-0444, USA
Abstract:
The paper begins by contrasting the unitary nature of conscious experience
with the demonstrable localization of neural events. Philosophers and neuroscientists
have developed models to account for this paradox, but they have yet to
be tested empirically. The author proposes a `Conscious Mental Field',
which is produced by, but is phenomenologically distinct from, brain activity.
The hypothesis is, in principle, open to experimental verification. The
paper suggests appropriate surgical procedures and some of the difficulties
that would need to be overcome in such an experiment.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 127-139
C.M.H. Nunn,
Department of Psychiatry,
Royal South Hants Hospital,
Brintons Terrace,
Southampton S09 4PE,
UK
C.J.S. Clarke,
Faculty of Mathematical Studies,
University of Southampton,
Southampton S09 5NH,
UK
B.H. Blott,
Department of Physics,
University of Southampton,
Southampton S09 5NH,
UK
Abstract:
Experiments are described, using electroencephalography (EEG) and simple
tests of performance, which support the hypothesis that collapse of a quantum
field is of importance to the functioning of the brain. The theoretical
basis of our experiments is derived from Penrose (1989) who suggested that
conscious decision-making is a manifestation of the outcome of quantum
computation in the brain involving collapse of some relevant wave function.
He also proposed that collapse of any wave function depends on a gravitational
criterion. As different brain areas are known to subserve different functions,
we argue that `Penrose collapse' must occur in a particular brain area
when performing a task that uses it. Further, taking an EEG from the area
should amplify the gravitational prerequisite for collapse, so affecting
task performance. There are no non-quantum theories which could lead one
to expect that taking an EEG could directly affect task performance by
subjects. The results of both pilot and main experiments indicated that
task performance was indeed influenced by taking an EEG from relevant brain
areas. Control experiments suggested that the influence was quantum mechanical
in origin, and was not due to any experimental artefact. The results are
statistically significant and merit attempts at replication in an independent
laboratory, preferably with more sophisticated equipment than was available
to us.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 32-37
John Beloff,
Department of Psychology,
University of Edinburgh,
George Square,
Edinburgh EH8 9JZ,
UK
Abstract:
The article begins with a discussion about what might constitute consciousness
in entities other than oneself and the implications of the mind-brain debate
for the possibility of a conscious machine. While referring to several
other facets of the philosophy of mind, the author focuses on epiphenomenalism
and interactionism and presents a critique of the former in terms of biological
evolution. The interactionist argument supports the relevance of parapsychology
to the problem of consciousness and the statistical technique of meta-analysis
is cited in support of this position.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 38-49
Robert K.C. Forman,
Program in Religion,
Hunter College of the City University of New York,
695 Park Avenue,
New York 10021,
USA
Email: rforman@shiva.hunter.cuny.edu
Abstract:
While a surprising number of people, both religious and non-religious,
have had deep and significant mystical experiences, scholars have reached
little agreement about their cause and character. Many analyze mystical
experiences as if they are formed by the same linguistic processes that
shape ordinary experiences. This paper shows that this is based on a misunderstanding,
for these experiences result from letting go of language. The paper concludes
that we need to think about mystical experiences - and what they have to
teach about consciousness and reality - in a new light.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 50-65
Eleanor Rosch,
Department of Psychology,
University of California,
Berkeley,
CA 94720,
USA
Abstract:
Using as a framework the logical treatment of causality in the Buddhist
Madhyamika, a theory of the psychology of event coherence and causal connectedness
is developed, and suggestive experimental evidence is offered. The basic
claim is that events are perceived as coherent and causally bound to the
extent that the outcome is seen to be already contained in the ground
of the event in some form and the connecting link between them is
seen as the appropriate means for changing the outcome-in-the-ground to
the outcome-as-perceived. There are four types of such connections: (a)
the identity of the object in the ground and outcome is seen as the same
(as in the phi phenomenon); (b) a property is seen to be transferred from
ground to outcome (as in a Michottean analysis of perceived causal motion);
(c) for animate beings, a cognitive representation and a state of the world
are seen to match - either the representation-as-outcome coming to match
the world-as-ground (as in the folk psychology of perception) or the world-as-outcome
coming to match the representation-as-ground (as in intentional action);
(d) the `essence' of a category is seen to manifest itself (as in folk
explanations based on personality). The standard critique of such coherence
explanations is that they are tautological. We demonstrate that `nontautological'
scientific accounts become convincing coherent explanations only to he
extent that the outcome is re-introduced (in a disguised form) into the
ground. Explanations which are noncausal altogether, such as probability
or chance, are shown to be psychologically unstable. This critique suggests
some new perspectives on causal thinking both in the cognitive sciences
and the folk theories of daily life.
JCS, 1 (1), 1994, pp. 140-148
Willis Harman,
Institute of Noetic Sciences,
475 Gate Five Road,
Suite 300,
PO Box 909,
Sausalito,
CA 94966-0909,
USA
Abstract:
The statement below is an outgrowth of a retreat at Tomales Bay,California,
December 3-6, 1992, at which fifteen scientists and philosophersattempted
to explore the question of an appropriate epistemology for consciousness
research. Contributions were made by the scholars listed below and others;
the final synthesis was performed by Willis Harman. The statement is submitted
to the broader scientific community, and to the concerned public, to stimulate
dialogue about a long-standing question, and to foster interest in an ever-deepening
scientific study of human consciousness. Basically, the question is: How
does it happen that our powerful methods of scientific enquiry appear so
ill-suited to the study of consciousness? If understanding our own consciousness
is so central to understanding anything else, will we not have to take
this question more seriously than has been the case so far?
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