ABSTRACTS
Duarte Araújo and Keith Davids
What Exactly is Acquired During Skill Acquisition?
Abstract: In this paper we propose that the term skill acquisition, as
commonly used in traditional psychology, and the philosophy, education,
movement science and performance development literatures, has been biased
by an organismic asymmetry. In cognitive and experimental psychology, for
example, it refers to the establishment of an internal state or representation
of an act which is believed to be acquired as a result of learning and
task experience. Here we elucidate an ecological perspective which suggests
that the term skill acquisition may not refer to an entity but rather to
the emergence of an adaptive, functional relationship between an organism
and its environment, thus avoiding an inherent organismic asymmetry in
theorizing. In this respect, the terms ‘skill adaptation’ or ‘skill attunement’
might be more suitable to describe this process.
Correspondence: Duarte Araújo, Faculty of Human Kinetics, Technical
University of Lisbon, Portugal Keith Davids, School of Human Movement Studies,
Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Franco Chiereghin
Paradoxes of the Notion of Antedating: A Philosophical Critique to Libet’s
Theory of the Relationships Between Neural Activity and Awareness of Sensory
Stimuli
Abstract: Among Benjamin Libet’s experiments on the relationship between
consciousness and neural activity, those pointing at a substantive difference
between subjective timing of a sensory experience and the experimental
measure of the time needed to produce that experience appear particularly
interesting. From a subjective standpoint, one is immediately conscious
of a sensory experience, whereas, as a result of objective measured time
of reaction, unconscious neural activation in the presence of a sensory
stimulus begins 500 msec before one being aware of the stimulus. In order
to compensate this discrepancy, Libet introduces the notion of antedating.
However, there is no fully satisfactory answer to the question about the
conditions of possibility for antedating. Therefore, the very notion of
antedating is highly problematic, though not infertile: the paradoxes present
in this conception foster a profound review of the meaning of our experience
of time and of the relationships between objective and subjective time.
Correspondence: Email: franco.chiereghin@unipd.it
Joseph Corabi
Why the Evolutionary Argument is not Really an Evolutionary Argument After
All
Abstract: The evolutionary argument is one of the most well-known empirical
arguments against epiphenomenalism. In its most persuasive form, it aims
to show that because of evolutionary considerations, the smooth correlations
between painful qualia and noxious stimuli would be highly unexpected if
epiphenomenalism were true, but just what we would expect if an alternative
mind–body theory were. Thus, the presence of these correlations is strong
evidence against epiphenomenalism. After formulating a canonical version
of the argument, I demonstrate that the evolutionary evidence adduced as
part of it is superfluous, and could easily be jettisoned without damaging
whatever force the argument has. I then proceed to show an even stronger
result — that the evolutionary evidence is actually nothing more than a
distraction from the elements of the argument that actually give it its
dialectical strength.
Correspondence: Joseph Corabi, Department of Philosophy, Saint Joseph’s
University, 5600 City Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19131 USA
Email: Jcorabi@sju.edu
Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin
Conceptual Freedom of the Globalized Mind
Multicultural Experiences Enhance Human Cognition Through the Expansion
of Conceptual Categories
Abstract: This work provides a psychological perspective on globalization.
It argues that multicultural experience may facilitate a merge of different
cultural values, which forms a distinctively new state of mind. Experience
with multicultural settings expands conceptual category boundaries, interrupts
categorical thinking, and subsequently creates a new frame of thought.
Studies identifying the important role of the multicultural experience
in cognitive development and enhancement of creative abilities are presented
to support this argument. The article questions the validity a of common
critique that globalization brings the world to the unified model of thought.
It argues that this critique is an oversimplification of the matter caused
by individuals’ closed-mindedness and unreceptiveness to a new experience.
Correspondence: Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin, Department of International
Studies, American University of Sharjah, P.O. Box 26666, Sharjah, UAE Tel:
+971-50-394-9640 Email: akharkhurin@aus.edu
Monica Meijsing
The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space
Abstract: This paper deals with the perception of depth in two-dimensional
pictures. Two indirect theories of perception, the Mainstream Theory and
the Projection Theory, are compared with a direct Adverbial Theory. Apart
from seeming to be the philosophical counterpart to present-day empirical
theories of perception, the first two theories seem to be tailor-made to
deal with this phenomenon, where the perceived space is certainly not out
there, on or behind the canvas: they claim that pictorial space is constructed
by the brain as the direct object of perception. In contrast, the Adverbial
Theory seems unsuited to deal with this phenomenon. I argue, however, that
both constructivist theories are incoherent. They misconstrue the intentionality
of perception, and fail to attend to the perceptual experience itself.
The version of the Adverbial Theory that I defend claims that nothing needs
to be constructed: the picture is the direct object of perception, but
we perceive it in a certain way. The brain creates no pictorial space;
there is only a perceptual experience as of a three-dimensional scene.
The Adverbial Theory can thus account for the empirical data, without suffering
from coherence problems.
Correspondence: Monica Meijsing, Department of Philosophy, Section Philosophy
of Mind, University of Tilburg, Weezenhof 3713, 6536 HH Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Tel: +31 24 3444810 Email: M.A.M.M.Meijsing@uvt.nl
Vincent Picciuto
Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought
Abstract: In this paper it is argued that existing ‘self-representational’
theories of phenomenal consciousness do not adequately address the problem
of higher-order misrepresentation. Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts
literature, a novel self-representational account is introduced that does.
This is the quotational theory of phenomenal consciousness, according to
which the higher-order component of a conscious state is constituted by
the quotational component of a quotational phenomenal concept. According
to the quotational theory of consciousness, phenomenal concepts help to
account for the very nature of phenomenally conscious states. Thus, the
paper integrates two largely distinct explanatory projects in the field
of consciousness studies: (i) the project of explaining how we think about
our phenomenally conscious states, and (ii) the project of explaining what
phenomenally conscious states are in the first place.
Correspondence: Email: vpicciuto@gmail.com
Patricia E. Sharp
Buddhist Enlightenmentand the Destruction of Attractor Networks
A Neuroscientific Speculation on the Buddhist Path from Everyday Consciousness
to Buddha-Awakening
Abstract: Buddhist philosophy asserts that human suffering is caused
by ignorance regarding the true nature of reality. According to this, perceptions
and thoughts are largely fabrications of our own minds, based on conditioned
tendencies which often involve problematic fears, aversions, compulsions,
etc. In Buddhist psychology, these tendencies reside in a portion of mind
known as Store consciousness. Here, I suggest a correspondence between
this Buddhist Store consciousness and the neuroscientific idea of stored
(Hebbian) synaptic weights. These weights are strong synaptic connections
built in through experience. Buddhist philosophy claims that humans can
find relief from suffering through a process in which the Store consciousness
is transformed. Here, I argue that this Buddhist ‘transformation at the
base’ corresponds to a loosening of the learned synaptic connections. I
will argue that Buddhist meditation practices create conditions in the
brain which are optimal for diminishing the strength of our conditioned
perceptual and behavioural tendencies.
Correspondence: Patricia E. Sharp, JP Scott Center for Mind, Brain and
Behavior, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling
Green, Ohio 43403 Email: psharp@bgsu.edu
Richard Swinburne
Could Anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism?
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism claims that all conscious events are caused
immediately by brain events, and no conscious events cause brain events.
In order to have a justified belief in a theory someone needs a justified
belief that it or some higher-level theory predicts certain events and
those events occurred. To have either of the latter beliefs we depend ultimately
on the evidence of apparent experience, memory, and testimony, which is
credible in the absence of defeaters; it is an undermining defeater to
a belief produced by apparent memory that it was not caused by a past belief,
and to a belief produced by apparent testimony that it was not caused by
an intention to say what the speaker believes. A justified belief in epiphenomenalism
requires either evidence about when conscious events occurred or evidence
about what some theory that brain events are caused solely by physical
events predicts, but epiphenomenalism rules out the availability of the
evidence of apparent memory and testimony on these matters. Hence only
a rare individual scientist who could hold in her mind at one time the
proof that a theory makes certain predictions could have a justified belief
that epiphenomenalism is true. It follows that recent neurophysiological
work in the tradition of Libet has no tendency whatever to provide a justified
belief in epiphenomenalism.
Correspondence: Professor Richard Swinburne, 50, Butler Close, Oxford
OX2 6JG, U.K.Email: richard.swinburne@oriel.ox.ac.uk
B. Alan Wallace
A Buddhist View of Free Will: Beyond Determinism and Indeterminism
Abstract: While the question of free will does not figure as prominently
in Buddhist writings as it does in western theology, philosophy, and psychology,
it is a topic that was addressed in the earliest Buddhist writings. According
to these accounts, for pragmatic and ethical reasons, the Buddha rejected
both determinism and indeterminism as understood at that time. Rather than
asking the metaphysical question of whether already humans have free will,
Buddhist tradition takes a more pragmatic approach, exploring ways in which
we can acquire greater freedom to make wise choices that are truly conducive
to our own and others’ genuine well-being. One key to achieving such freedom
is the cultivation of attentional skills so that one can deliberately focus
one’s attention with continuity and clarity on one’s chosen object. A second
theme is the cultivation of insight into the manner in which our own attitudes
shape experience, allowing for the possibility of altering not only the
way we experience events in the present, but also how we are influenced
by our memories of the past. Finally, the Great Perfection school of Tibetan
Buddhism emphasizes the realization of the deepest dimension of consciousness
— pristine awareness — which transcends the nexus of causality. This is
regarded as the ultimate source of freedom and the ultimate nature of human
identity.
Correspondence: Email: balanwallace@me.com
