ABSTRACTS
Jason Brown
Simultaneity & Serial Order
Extract: What does it mean for something to be held in memory if the immediate
past no longer exists in actuality? If the past must be revived in the
present, how is temporal order maintained, revived, perceived? If the past
fully perished and could not be revived, every object would be a momentary
and unfamiliar novelty, as would the self that perceives it. Without at
least an implicit memory of antecedents there would be a stroboscopic succession
of disconnected selves and worlds. Clearly, the past must be within the
present — indeed, the major part of the present — for both the stability
of an object and its change over time.
Correspondence: Dr Jason Brown, 66 E. 79th Street, New York, NY 10075.
Email: drjbrown@hotmail.com
Ted Dace
Analysis of Russell
Extract: Whether known as the Grand Doctrine, the Mechanical Philosophy,
reductionism, materialism or Russell’s own ‘logical atomism’, the basic
idea is that the world consists of simple discrete entities that behave
and combine according to timeless mathematical laws of nature. Reality
is particle and law. All else is imaginary, a pointless if amusing dream.
In the new intellectual climate, the job of philosophers, if they still
have one, is to accept the atomized worldview without protest and investigate
issues of human existence in light of it. However, blinded by his need
to verify the reduction of the world to tangible matter and timeless law,
Russell missed the message of the mind, which is neither one nor the other.
Correspondence: Email: tedacious@gmail.com
Paula Droege
The Role of Unconsciousness in Free Will
Abstract: Does neuroscience show that free will is an illusion? No, it
shows that unconscious mental states are causally effective in action.
Because free will includes initiation by both conscious and unconscious
states, the self as free agent should be characterized in terms of more
than her conscious deliberations to range over unconscious beliefs, memories
and feelings. Further, the ways social relations influence action and the
ways actions influence the social environment are relevant to a full account
of free will. Given this broader perspective, it is clear that recent neuroscientific
studies only show that the conscious feeling of volition does not play
the agential role it seems to play. Consciousness is nonetheless causally
effective in planning and monitoring actions to ensure they conform to
goals. This causal process unfolds over a span of time and encompasses
a wide array of factors.
Correspondence: Paula Droege, Philosophy Department, Pennsylvania State
University, University Park, PA 16801 Email: pdroege@psu.edu
Doris Feil and Harald Atmanspacher
Acategorial States in a Representational Theory of Mental Processes
Abstract: We propose a distinction between precategorial, acategorial and
categorial states within a scientifically oriented understanding of mental
processes. This distinction can be specified by approaches developed in
cognitive neuroscience and the analytical philosophy of mind. On the basis
of a representational theory of mental processes, acategoriality refers
to a form of knowledge that presumes fully developed categorial mental
representations, yet refers to non-conceptual experiences in mental states
beyond such established categories. It relies on a simultaneous apprehension
of individual representations and their actual ‘representational ground’,
an undifferentiated precategorial state. This simultaneity is possible
if the mental state does not reside in a representation but in between
representations. Acategoriality can be formally modeled as an unstable
state of a dynamical mental system that is subject to particular stability
criteria.
Correspondence: Email: haa@igpp.de
Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka
Experiencing: A Jamesian Approach
Abstract: This paper suggests an approach to consciousness that focuses
on the evolutionary transition from pre-conscious animals to the simplest
types of conscious (experiencing) animals. Our argument is that experiencing
originated with the evolution of associative learning, and that one of
the major functions of experiencing was what William James called ‘fighting
for ends’: endowing animals with motivation. We propose that the sensory
states generated during associative learning act as internal guides and
selectors of new neural relations, new behaviours, and new ends, leading
to the unitary, subjective and intentional internal dynamic states that
we recognize as experiencing.
Correspondence: Professor Simona Ginsburg, Dept. of Natural Science,
The Open University of Israel, 1 University Road, P.O.Box 808, Raanana
43107, Israel.
Email: simona@openu.ac.il jablonka@post.tau.ac.il
Gordon Globus
Dissipative Thermofield Logic of the Tao Symbol
Abstract: The well-known symbol of the Tao is freshly interpreted in terms
of dissipative quantum thermofield brain dynamics. The primary duality
of the Tao is between two dynamical modes of operation. The secondary duality
(‘holes’) within each mode of the Tao symbolizes creation and annihilation
operations. The relation between the dual modes is ‘intrinsic’ in that
these modes do not exist independently of their relationship. What is ontologically
primary is the dual modes belonging-together in the ‘between-two’. Three
sources of constraint on the between-two are considered: sensory input,
intention and ‘re-traces’ of recognitions. ‘Awareness’, ‘subjectivity’,
‘intentionality’ and ‘world’ are located in the dissipative thermofield
framework. On this interpretation the Tao symbol’s composure is monadological.
Correspondence: Professor Gordon Globus, 400 Newport Center Dr., Suite
701, Newport Beach, CA 92660, USA. Email: ggglobus@uci.edu
Mostyn W. Jones
How To Make Mind–Brain Relations Clear
Abstract: A clear, simple mind–body solution is suggested here. Neuroscience
is finding growing evidence of neurochemical correlates to memory, perception
and emotion. This supports mind-as-brain views over mind-as-computer views.
Admittedly, the former can’t intelligibly reduce privately experienced
pain, fear, etc. to publicly observed neurochemistry. Yet ideas in Strawson,
Stoljar, etc. can be reworked to treat pain as what certain neurochemical
activity is like beyond observed appearances. This bridges the gulf between
pains and brains, for (unlike reductions) it intelligibly explains why
hidden, private pains accompany pain-detector activity (instead of this
activity being nonconscious). By contrast, mind-as-computer views are obscure.
They connect radically disparate entities — private pains, abstract computations
and neural hardwares — through puzzling reductions and multiple realizations.
The mind-as-brain view may thus offer a clear, simple solution to the mind–body
problem that explains current experimental evidence without perennial metaphysical
obscurities (reductionism, multiple realization, dualism, etc.). It may
make mind–body relations clear.
Correspondence: Email: mwj@comcast.net
Axel Seemann
The Other Person in Joint Attention: A Relational Approach
Abstract: John Campbell recommends a relational view on joint attention.
In this paper, I ask what his position implies for the perceptual experience
of jointly engaged persons, and suggest that this experience can be accounted
for by taking seriously the notion of intersubjectivity. I provide an account
of what I call the ‘direct acquaintance’ of jointly engaged persons with
one another. To be so acquainted is to enjoy an experience of feelings
that are shared in a particular way. I spell out what it is for feelings
to be so shared and end by briefly introducing the idea that the subjects
of such feelings may be best understood as part of a system that also consists
of aspects of their natural and social environment.
Correspondence: Axel Seemann, Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy,
Bentley University, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452. Email: aseemann@bentley.edu
