ABSTRACTS
Kristin Andrews
Telling Stories without Words
I will argue here that we can take a functional approach to FP that identifies
it with the practice of explaining behaviour -- that is, we can understand
folk psychology as having the purpose of explaining behaviour and promoting
social cohesion by making others’ behaviour comprehensible, without thinking
that this ability must be limited to those with linguistic abilities. One
reason for thinking that language must be implicated in FP explanations
arises from the history of theorizing about the nature of scientific explanation.
I will show that there are other models of explanation that are free from
the metaphysical linguistic baggage of the traditional models, and argue
that such models can be profitably used to make sense of an explanation-centred
FP that need not involve the attribution of propositional attitudes or
a functioning linguistic competence. Further, I will argue that there is
evidence that pre-linguistic human children engage in explanatory practices,
and that some of these explanations may be seen as narrative explanations
in an important sense.
Email: andrewsk@yorku.ca
Matthew K. Belmonte
What’s the Story behind ‘Theory of Mind’ and Autism?
Abstract: Complex, mature cognition is the endpoint of a developmental
process in which elementary capacities interact with the environment and
with each other in predictable ways that depend on appropriate inputs.
‘Theory of mind’, the capacity to attribute thoughts and beliefs to other
persons, is characterised by the Narrative Practice Hypothesis as emerging
from the interactive experience of stories about people acting for reasons.
The case of autism has been cited in support of the contrary view, that
‘theory of mind’ is an innately specified cognitive module, because the
surface characteristics of autistic behaviour seem explicable as a circumscribed
failure of such a module. So if one accepts the Narrative Practice Hypothesis,
is one then robbed of an explanation for autism? The answer is an emphatic
no: ‘theory of mind’ dysfunction is not universal in autism, and is developmentally
preceded and predicted by abnormalities of attention, executive function
and language consonant with the Narrative Practice Hypothesis.
Correspondence: Matthew K. Belmonte, Department of Human Development,
Cornell University, G77 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853-4401.
Email: belmonte@mit.edu
Shaun Gallagher
Two Problems of Intersubjectivity
Abstract: I propose a distinction between two closely related problems:
the problem of social cognition and the problem of participatory sense-making.
One problem focuses on how we understand others; the other problem focuses
on how, with others, we make sense out of the world. Both understanding
others and making sense out of the world involve social interaction. The
importance of participatory sense-making is highlighted by reviewing some
recent accounts of perception that are philosophically autistic — i.e.,
accounts that ignore the involvement of others in our perception of the
world.
Correspondence: Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences, Institute of Simulation
and Training, University of Central Florida (USA), Philosophy, University
of Hertfordshire (UK).
Email: gallaghr@mail.ucf.edu
Jill de Villiers and Jay Garfield
Evidentiality and Narrative
Abstract: In this paper we argue that the phenomenon of evidentiality,
the grammatical marking in some languages of the source of one’s knowledge,
gives us a revealing window into the developmental processes in middle
childhood that subserve the achievement of narrative competence. First,
we argue that the mastery of evidentiality is connected to the development
of an understanding of inference, and of the ability to mobilize this understanding
in the construction of human narratives. Second, we examine the role that
parent-child discourse plays in clarifying the contrastive uses of sources
of knowledge. Finally, we discuss the difference between first person and
third person narratives, and suggest that evidentials might reveal something
of the sources of evidence for persistence of self as the protagonist in
one’s own life story.
Correspondence: Jill de Villiers, Smith College. Email: jdevilli@email.smith.edu
Jay Garfield, Smith College, The Central University of Tibetan Studies
& The University of Melbourne. Email: jgarfield@smith.edu
David Herman
Storied Minds: Narrative Scaffolding for Folk Psychology
Abstract: Using Ian McEwan’s 2007 novel On Chesil Beach as a case study,
this paper seeks to enhance opportunities for dialogue between researchers
in the cognitive sciences and scholars of story. More specifically, now
that narrative alternatives to theories of mind have begun to shape debates
about the nature and status of folk psychology, it is time to flesh out
those alternatives by highlighting the action-modelling capacity built
into the structure of stories. Narrative practices like McEwan’s demonstrate
how stories can be used to configure and reconfigure characters’ behaviour
from different temporal, spatial, and evaluative standpoints, in the way
that a complex molecule or architectural structure can be displayed and
manipulated in virtual space with the help of an advanced computer graphics
program. In turn, interpreting narrative as a system for building models
of action underscores the relevance of narratology for the philosophy of
mind — and vice versa.
Email: herman.145@osu.edu
Jonathan D. Hill
‘Hearing is Believing’: Amazonian Trickster Myths as Folk Psychological
Narratives
Abstract: This essay explores cultural and psychological dynamics in indigenous
Amazonian narratives about a powerful trickster figure named Made-from-Bone.
Particular attention is given to the ways in which speaking verbs, quoted
speeches, and dialogical interactions are used as psychological tools for
understanding and explaining others’ inner thoughts and emotions. Comparative
analysis of two narratives set in the distant mythical past demonstrates
how intentionality is a semiotic ideology that emerges through dialogical
interaction. These narrative practices are deeply rooted in shamanic healing
practices, especially the use of musical and other symbolic sound elements
as a privileged sense modality for expressing and experiencing psychological
processes of making dreams, emotions, and inner thoughts into objects of
conscious thought and discourse.
Correspondence: Dept. of Anthropology, Mail Code 4502, Southern Illinois
University, Carbondale, IL 62901 USA. Email: jhill@siu.edu
David A. Leavens & Timothy P. Racine
Joint Attention in Apes and Humans: Are Humans Unique?
Abstract: Joint attention is the ability to intentionally co-orient towards
a common focus. This ability develops in a protracted, mosaic fashion in
humans. We review evidence of joint attention in humans and great apes,
finding that great apes display every phenomenon described as joint attention
in humans, although there is considerable variation among apes of different
rearing histories. We conclude that there is little evidence for human
species-unique cognitive adaptations in the non-verbal communication of
humans in the first 18 months of life. This conclusion is consistent with
the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) because the NPH posits training
in folk psychological narratives as a basis for folk psychological competence.
Correspondence: David A. Leavens, Psychology Department, School of Life
Sciences, University of Sussex, Falmer, East Sussex, BN1 9QH. Email: davidl@sussex.ac.uk
Heidi Maibom
In Defence of (Model) Theory Theory
Abstract: In this paper, I present a version of theory theory, so-called
model theory, according to which theories are families of models, which
represent real-world phenomena when combined with relevant hypotheses,
best interpreted in terms of know-how. This form of theory theory has a
number of advantages over traditional forms, and is not subject to some
recent charges coming from narrativity theory. Most importantly, practice
is central to model theory. Practice matters because folk psychological
knowledge is knowledge of the (empirical) world only if it is combined
with knowledge of how to apply it. By combining the general and the particular
in this way, model theory gives a deep and explanatorily satisfactory account
of the centrality of practice. Model theory accounts not just as well as,
but better than, narrativity theory for the fact that our folk psychological
explanations appear to contain, or form part of, narratives.
Correspondence: Heidi L. Maibom, Dept of Philosophy, Paterson Hall 3A39,
Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 8W8, Canada.
Email: heidi_maibom@carleton.ca
Katherine Nelson
Narrative Practices and Folk Psychology: A Perspective from Developmental
Psychology
Abstract: Herein developmental psychological research complementary to
Hutto’s narrative practices hypothesis is considered. Specifically, I discuss
experiential development from the perspective of first, second and third
person in the acquisition of knowledge and the construction and comprehension
of narratives, with relevance for theories of ‘theory of mind’ and in particular
tests of the child’s understanding of false belief. I propose that the
development of distinct third person belief states requires significant
developmental work, which is advanced through social sharing of memory
and knowledge, by means of linguistic representations especially through
narrative practices of different kinds, personal narratives and story telling.
The final sections summarize the view that these developments are part
of a broader expansion of consciousness that is evident in many aspects
of cognitive change during the later preschool years (Nelson, 2007).
Correspondence: 50 Riverside Drive #4B, New York, NY 10024. Email: knelson@gc.cuny.edu
Matthew Ratcliffe
There Are No Folk Psychological Narratives
Abstract: I argue that the task of describing our so-called ‘folk psychology’
requires difficult philosophical work. Consequently, any statement of the
folk view is actually a debatable philosophical position, rather than an
uncontroversial description of pre-philosophical commonsense. The problem
with the current folk psychology debate, I suggest, is that the relevant
philosophical work has not been done. Consequently, the orthodox account
of folk psychology is an uninformative caricature of an understanding that
is implicit in everyday discourse and social interaction, and also in literary
narratives. I conclude by considering two recent departures from it, so-called
‘experimental philosophy’ and Daniel Hutto’s ‘narrative practice hypothesis’.
Both, I claim, take steps in the right direction but retain unhelpful assumptions
that they inherit from the orthodox view.
Correspondence: Matthew Ratcliffe, Department of Philosophy, Durham
University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK. Email: m.j.ratcliffe@durham.ac.uk
Chris Sinha
Objects in a Storied World: Materiality, Normativity, Narrativity
Abstract: There exists broad agreement that participatory, intersubjective
engagements in infancy and early childhood, particularly triadic engagements,
pave the way for the folk psychological capacities that emerge in middle
childhood. There is little agreement, however, about the extent to which
early participatory engagements are cognitively prerequisite to the later
capacities; and there remain serious questions about exactly how narrative
and other language practices can be shown to bridge the gap between early
engagements and later abilities, without presupposing the very abilities
that they are supposed to account for. A key issue here is the normativity
inherent in requesting, proferring and inferring reasons. I point out that
normativity is not a property only of linguistic interactions. Normativity
and conventionality are also materially instantiated in the artefactual
objects that are most frequently implicated in early triadic engagements.
The conventional, canonical functions of artefacts may, however, be overlaid
in symbolic play by significations rooted in children’s experience of blended
actual and virtual worlds. Artefactual objects are amplifiers, as well
as objects of consciousness. Interwoven with the symbolic forms of language,
they co-constitute a specifically human biocultural niche, within and in
virtue of which developing human beings become competent folk psychologists.
Email: chris.sinha@port.ac.uk
Corrado Sinigaglia
Mirror in Action
Abstract: Several authors have recently pointed out the hypermentalism
of the standard mindreading models, arguing for the need of an embodied
and enactive approach to social cognition. Various attempts to provide
an account of the primary ways of interacting with others, however, have
fallen short of allowing for both what kind of intentional engagement is
crucial in the basic forms of social navigation and also what neural mechanisms
can be thought to underpin them. The aim of the paper is to counter this
fault by showing that most of the primary ways of making sense of others
are motor in nature and rooted in a specific brain mechanism: the mirror
mechanism. I shall argue that the mirror-based making sense of others not
only can be construed within the enactive approach to social cognition,
but also allows us to refine it, supplying a plausible and unitary account
of the early forms of social interaction.
Correspondence: Corrado Sinigaglia, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università
di Milano, via Festa del Perdono 7, I-20122 Milano, Italy. Email: corrado.sinigaglia@unimi.it
Marc Slors
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and Externalist Theory Theory: For Compatibility,
Against Collapse
Abstract: What defence does the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) have
against the charge that it is a covert form of externalist theory theory
(TT)? I discuss and reject Dan Hutto’s own strategies and argue that the
NPH remains vulnerable to a threat of collapse into externalist TT as long
as narrative folk-psychological explanation is differentiated from simple
belief-desire explanation merely by a degree of complexity, subtlety and/or
context-sensitivity. It is entirely plausible, however, that there is a
more principled distinction between these two types of explanation of human
behaviour. I defend such a distinction and show how it eliminates the threat
of collapse into TT entirely.
Correspondence: Prof. dr. M.V.P. Slors, Faculty of Philosophy, Radboud
University Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, P.O. Box 9103, 6500 HD Nijmegen,
The Netherlands. Email: marc.slors@phil.ru.nl
Michelle Scalise Sugiyama
The Plot Thickens: What Children’s Stories tell us about Mindreading
Abstract: Because a major selection pressure on humans has been humans
themselves, ancestral humans needed to construct a map of their social
world. The ability to attribute mental states to others is necessary for
this map, but not sufficient: a social map must show the intentions, emotions
and beliefs of individuals relative to one another. This task, which I
call goal mapping, can be divided into four subcomponents: (1) noting and
remembering the actions performed by a specific individual; (2) determining
which of the individual’s actions subserve which of the individual’s goals;
(3) integrating this representation with representations of the goals and
actions of the other individuals in one’s social world; and (4) identifying
points of conflict between the goals of these individuals. Stories told
by children point to the existence of capacities dedicated to this task.
Children’s stories initially lack plot, which consists of three key components
that appear to emerge independently and correspond to the tasks of goal
mapping: character constancy, goal-directed action and conflict. This study
traces the development of these capacities in two existing samples of children’s
narratives.
Correspondence: Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Anthropology Department and
Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences, University of Oregon, Eugene,
OR 97403.
William Turnbull, Jeremy I.M. Carpendale & Timothy
P. Racine
Talk and Children’s Understanding of Mind
Abstract: Research has demonstrated that language is important for the
development of an everyday understanding of mind. The Theory of Mind (ToM)
framework is the dominant conception of what and how children develop in
coming to understand mind. As such, much current thinking in developmental
psychology about the way language makes a difference to the development
of mentalistic understanding is tainted by certain deeply entrenched philosophical
assumptions. Following an examination of views of language and mind that
continue to frame, if only tacitly, the ToM tradition, we offer an alternative
conception of the nature of mental state concepts and how language-based
engagements between children and care-givers introduce an understanding
of such concepts. Based on that alternative conception of language and
mind we propose that parent-child discussion about situations involving
minds facilitate the child’s development of an understanding of mind. We
attempt to demonstrate that the development of the foundational skills
necessary for understanding the meaning of psychological terms through
such conversation make the construction and appreciation of narratives
possible, deepening and extending the child’s mentalistic understanding.
We then review three studies of parent-child talk about situations involving
mind that offer empirical support for the claim that such talk is an important
context for developing an understanding of aspects of human activity that
involve reasons for action, emotion and belief. We conclude by describing
the situated and sequential nature of meaning that our view of language
and mind entails.
Correspondence: Jeremy I.M. Carpendale, Department of Psychology, 8888
University Ave, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby BC Canada V5A 1S6. Email:
jcarpend@sfu.ca
