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Rob Jarman
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Robert Arp, Scenario Visualisation
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James Messina
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Sebastian Rödl, Self-Consciousness
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Anthony Freeman
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Susan Blackmore, Ten Zen Questions
ABSTRACTS
Sam Coleman
Why the Ability Hypothesis Is Best Forgotten
Abstract: According to the knowledge argument, physicalism fails because
when physically omniscient Mary first sees red, her gain in phenomenal
knowledge involves a gain in factual knowledge. Thus not all facts are
physical facts. According to the ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument
fails because Mary only acquires abilities to imagine, remember and recognise
redness, and not new factual knowledge. I argue that reducing Mary’s new
knowledge to abilities does not affect the issue of whether she also learns
factually: I show that gaining specific new phenomenal knowledge is required
for acquiring abilities of the relevant kind. Phenomenal knowledge being
basic to abilities, and not vice versa, it is left an open question whether
someone who acquires such abilities also learns something factual. The
answer depends on whether the new phenomenal knowledge involved is factual.
But this is the same question we wanted to settle when first considering
the knowledge argument. The ability hypothesis, therefore, has offered
us no dialectical progress with the knowledge argument, and is best forgotten.
Correspondence: Dr. Sam Coleman, Dept. of Philosophy, de Havilland Campus,
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield AL10 9AB, U.K. Email: s.coleman@herts.ac.uk
Colin Hales
Dual Aspect Science
Abstract: Our chronically impoverished explanatory capacity in respect
of P-consciousness is highly suggestive of a problem with science itself,
rather than its lack of acquisition of some particular knowledge. The hidden
assumption built into science is that science itself is a completed human
behaviour. Removal of this assumption is achieved through a simple revision
to our science model which is constructed, outlined and named ‘dual aspect
science’ (DAS). It is constructed with reference to existing science being
‘single aspect science’. DAS is consistent with and predictive of the very
explanatory poverty that generated it and is simultaneously a seamless
upgrade; no existing law of nature is altered or lost. The framework is
completely empirically self-consistent and is validated empirically. DAS
eliminates the behavioural inconsistencies currently inhabiting a world
in which single aspect science has been inherited rather than chosen and
in which its presuppositions are implemented through habit rather than
by scientific examination of options by the scientists actually carrying
out science. The proposed DAS framework provides a working vantage point
from which an explanation of P-consciousness becomes expected and meaningful.
The framework requires that we rediscover what we scientists do and then
discover something new about ourselves: that how we have been doing science
is not the entire story. Dual aspect science shows us what we have not
been doing.
Correspondence: Colin.Hales@nicta.com.au
Joel W. Krueger
Enacting Musical Experience
Abstract: I argue for an enactive account of musical experience — that
is, the experience of listening ‘deeply’ (i.e., sensitively and understandingly)
to a piece of music. The guiding question is: what do we do when we listen
‘deeply’ to music? I argue that these music listening episodes are, in
fact, doings. They are instances of active perceiving, robust sensorimotor
engagements with and manipulations of sonic structures within musical pieces.
Music is thus experiential art, and in Nietzsche’s words, ‘we listen to
music with our muscles’. This paper attempts to explicate and defend this
claim. First, I discuss enactive approaches to consciousness and cognition
generally. Next, I apply an enactive model of perceptual consciousness
to the experience of listening to music. To clarify what is at stake, I
use Peter Kivy’s ‘enhanced formalism’ as a philosophical foil. I then look
at how the animate body shapes musical experience.
Correspondence: Joel W. Krueger, Center for Subjectivity Research, University
of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th Floor, DK-2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark.
Email: joelk@hum.ku.dk
Gregory Minissale
Enacting Higher-Order Thoughts: Velasquez and Las Meninas
The special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on ‘Las Meninas
and Self-representation’ is a major contribution to our understanding of
how higher forms of consciousness engage with art. It deserves also to
have a lasting impact on art history’s methods and concerns. One could
take certain aspects of Uziel Awret’s broad approach in the lead essay,
‘Las Meninas and the search for self-representation’ — in particular the
attempt to show a relation between higher-order thoughts (HOTs) and Las
Meninas — and extend them to a good many other works of art. In Velasquez’s
oeuvre alone, there are paintings such as Christ in the House of Martha
and Mary (1619–20) and Las Hilanderas or The Weavers (1667) which share
important visual principles with Las Meninas, and cooperate with consciousness
and self- consciousness in similar ways. They do this by employing complex
frames-in-frames, shown as pictures-in-pictures or rooms within rooms or,
in the case of Las Meninas, as a framed mirror inside a room with framed
pictures on the wall in the background. These framing devices were produced
by the artist’s higher-order thought and have continued to stimulate such
thought about the painting long after the seventeenth century. This paper
is an attempt to examine in detail how HOTs process these focal points
depicted in Las Meninas.
Correspondence: Email: g.minissale@newarthistory.co.uk
Verna Muitt
Las Meninas from an Alchemical Perspective
The recent articles in this journal on Velasquez’s Las Meninas (JCS, volume
15, issue no. 9) demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the painting’s
meaning for the observer. However, all interpretations must engage with
the gazes, the representation of the artist within the painting, and the
mysterious mirror image of the King and Queen. It is suggested here that
Velasquez is exploring states of consciousness itself via representations
of perception and mental (possibly ‘reflective’) images. It is also thought
that the painting might be more holistically viewed from an alchemical
perspective, because several alchemical symbols can be found in it, the
King and Queen being the most highly significant. Further, the painting
is naturally embedded in seventeenth- century knowledge, when alchemy was
at its height or just beginning to wane, and Velasquez, as an ambitious
and intelligent man must have been aware of, even if not actually practising,
the art of alchemy.
Correspondence: verna.m@btinternet.com
Ravi Prakash, Zia Ul Haq, Om Prakash, Sujit Sarkhel
and Devvarta Kumar
Inner Light Perception of Vihangam Yogis: A Qualitative Study
Abstract: Meditation hasrecently emerged as a topic of interest for
the medicinal scientists as well as for the neuropsychological scientists
for different reasons. The methods used by both of these approaches have
been mostly objective. This quest of objectification has led to vigorous
use of tools like EEG and ERP, which has definitely led to revealing of
marvellous aspects of meditation. However, the subjective states of meditation
have been much less explored, especially when seen in contrast to the objective
states. The need of the hour is to use the qualitative methods for exploration
of these states because these methods better depict the unique experiences
of meditation. In this context, we conducted a qualitative study in the
form of Interpretative phenomenological analysis to explore the subjective
experiences associated with the inner-light perception of a group of meditators
practising the meditation technique of Vihangam Yoga. It is an ancient
meditation technique of India, initiated by HH Sadguru Sadafal Deoji Maharaj
in the year 1924 and now being propogated by HH Sadguru Swatantra Deoji
Maharaj. When asked in detail, the practitioners often report of many mystique
experiences. This particular Yoga group was chosen because in a survey
of among four groups, the maximum number of confident mediators reporting
of perceiving some sort of luminance during meditation was found in this
group. For this study, the inner-light perception experience of this meditation
was chosen because of the divine value attached to this experience across
all the cultures and religions. This experience was also chosen because
of the great impact on their lives that Vihangam Yogis attributed to this
experience. As the results of the study, four major themes were obtained
which were: (a) Uniqueness of the nature of light (b) Experiences during
light perception (c) Explanations of the source of light (d) Change in
outlook towards world and associated changes in thinking.
Correspondence: Dr Ravi Prakash (Senior Resident), Boys Hostel No. 1,
Room No. 10, Central Institute of Psychiatry, Kanke, Ranchi, India – 834006.
Email: drravi2121@gmail.com
Peter Ryser
Creative Choice: How the Mind could Causally Affect the Brain
Abstract: In this paper a new interactionistic model of mental causation
is developed. By analysing the results of physics and neuroscience it is
shown that the macroscopic cerebral activity and the resulting behavioural
output is not strictly determined. This opens up the possibility that a
non-physical mind can influence which of the physically allowed brain states
is realised. Most models of mental causation postulate that there are coherent
quantum states in the brain which could be influenced by a local mind-brain
interaction. Due to environmental decoherence, however, it is questionable
whether coherent quantum states can exist in the warm and wet brain. The
here presented ‘creative choice theory’ solves the problem of environmental
decoherence by including the environment. The whole universe is considered
as a quantum system that is in superposition of alternative realities.
It is then assumed that a universal mind collapses the universal wave-function
whilst individual minds (as part of the universal mind) interact with individual
brains. This leads to a holistic model of reality that could also provide
an explanation for ESP-phenomena and mystical experiences.
Correspondence: Peter Ryser, Guntramstr. 58, 79106 Freiburg, Germany.
Email: ryserpeter@web.de
Elizabeth Schechter
Persons and Psychological Frameworks: A Critique of Tye
This paper concerns the relationships between persons, brains, behaviour,
and psychological explanation. Tye defines a ‘psychological framework’
(PF) as a set of token beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, streams
of consciousness, higher-order mental states, etc., that ‘form a coherent
whole’ and against which a creature’s ‘behavior can be explained’ (p. 141).
A person is the subject of such a psychological framework. Each person
has one PF, and with each new PF there is a new person. Meanwhile materialism
tells us, according to Tye, that brains are the bearers of mental states.
In other words, ‘each person is a brain’ (p. 142) — or rather a ‘global
physical state of the brain,’ since Tye believes that a single brain might
realize multiple PFs and thus constitute multiple persons. Most of this
paper simply assumes Tye’s account of personal identity, in order to expose
certain contradictions within what Tye says about personhood in split-brain
subjects. Towards the end of the paper, however, I turn to alternative
accounts of persons. While a method of individuating persons grounded in
scientific psychology would identify persons with psychological frameworks,
as Tye does, perhaps an account of personhood grounded either in a non-psychological
science, or in non-scientific psychology, would better fit the interests
we have in personal identity.
Correspondence: Email: lizschechter@gmail.com
