Contents

Target Paper

David Hodgson
A Plain Person’s Free Will  abstract

Peer Commentary

Graham Cairns-Smith
Remarks on Evolution and Time-Scales
Thomas W. Clark
Hodgson’s Black Box
Ravi Gomatam
Commentary on Hodgson’s Paper
Gilberto Gomes
What Should We Retain from A Plain Person’s Concept of Free Will?
Liberty Jaswal
Isolating Disparate Challenges to Hodgson’s Account of Free Will
Robert Kane
Free Agency and Laws of Nature
Nicholas Maxwell
Science Versus Realization of Value, Not Determinism Versus Choice
J.J.C. Smart
Comments on Hodgson
Sean A. Spence
The View from Within
Henry Stapp
Commentary on Hodgson

Response from Author of Target Paper

David Hodgson
Response to Commentators

ABSTRACTS

David Hodgson

A Plain Person’s Free Will

Abstract: In my experience, plain persons (here meaning persons who are neither philosophers or cognitive scientists) tend to accept something like a libertarian position on free will, namely that free will exists and is inconsistent with determinism. That position is widely debunked by philosophers and cognitive scientists. My view at present is that something like this plain person’s position is not only defensible but likely to be closer to the truth than opposing views. To put this to the test, I have written a simple and straightforward outline of what I hope is a philosophically and scientifically respectable version of the plain person’s position on free will, and have offered it for demolition by those who say such a view is untenable.
My account of free will is a robust one, explicitly inconsistent with determinism and intended to support equally robust views of personal responsibility for conduct. I see three broad areas of difficulty for this account.
  • The randomness problem: how can there be an intelligible and plausible alternative to determinism that is not mere randomness? Cf. Smart (1961).
  • The moral luck problem: we are products of genes and environment, so how can the way we are at any time and therefore the way we act be other than due to things outside our control, that is, be other than just a matter of luck? Cf. Strawson (1986; 1998; 2002).
  • The supernaturalism problem: science has given us a successful and comprehensive naturalistic account of how the world works, so is it not unreasonable to propose that human beings are somehow outside this account and outside the causal order apparently demonstrated by this account?
    • Correspondence: David Hodgson, Supreme Court of NSW, Queens Square, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia
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