Contents

REFEREED PAPERS

Benny Shanon    abstract
Hallucinations
Peter Poellner   abstract
Non-Conceptual Content, Experience and the Self

CONTINUING DEBATE

Amy Ione   abstract
Examining Semir Zeki’s ‘Neural Concept Formation and Art: Dante, Michelangelo, Wagner’

CONFERENCE REPORT

J. Andrew Ross   full text
The Self: From Soul to Brain: NYAS Conference, 26–28 September, 2002

BOOK REVIEW ARTICLE

Keith Sutherland   full text
Straw Men and Diamond Dogs: A Review of John Gray’s Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals

ABSTRACTS

Benny Shanon

Hallucinations

This paper examines the standard conceptualizations of the notion of hallucination in light of various non-ordinary phenomenological patterns associated with altered states of consciousness induced by psychoactive agents. It is argued that in general, the conceptualizations encountered in the literature do not do justice to the richness and complexity that the psychological phenomenology actually exhibits. A close inspection of this phenomenology reveals some pertinent distinctions which are usually not made in the scientific literature. On the one hand, the discussion is based on first-hand experiences and, on the other hand, it is grounded in empirical and theoretical cognitive investigations of the phenomenology of human consciousness. Theoretically, the discussion is grounded in an approach highlighting the centrality of experience, meaning and action in cognition.

Correspondence: Benny Shanon, Psychology Dept, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. Email: b.shanon@mscc.huji.ac.il

Peter Poellner

Non-Conceptual Content, Experience and the Self

Traditionally the intentionality of consciousness has been understood as the idea that many conscious states are about something, that they have objects in a broad sense — including states of affairs — which they represent, and it is on account of being representational that they are said to have contents. It has also been claimed, more controversially, that conscious intentional contents must be available to the subject as reasons for her judgments or actions, and that they are therefore necessarily conceptual. This paper challenges the assumptions (1) that all conscious intentional contents are representations of objects, and (2) that they are essentially conceptual. Both assumptions will be shown to be intimately connected. The first main part of the paper offers an account of conscious intentionality that is not prejudicial on the issue of whether all intentional contents of conscious mental states represent objects which the mental state can be said to be about. The author then shows that many personal-level perceptual contents, including those involved in our evaluative stance towards aspects of the world, have non-conceptual components even on a wide construal of the conceptual sphere (associated especially with the work of John McDowell), allowing for demonstrative concepts. In the second main part of the paper it is argued that experiences themselves, as contrasted with what they are experiences of, are non-conceptual contents. To this purpose the author reconstructs and develops some suggestive observations found in the phenomenology of Husserl to the effect that experiences as directly presented or ‘lived through’ are not objects of consciousness. It is argued that this thesis, properly understood, is true and that it entails that experiences as directly presented in consciousness are themselves non-conceptual intentional contents. Husserl’s thesis is illuminating and important, allowing among other things a more satisfactory account of the elusive phenomenon of depth we normally attribute to the conscious self — the idea that there is always more to our experienced selves at any moment than what we are capable of articulating at the time.

Correspondence: Dr. Peter Poellner, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K. E-mail: Peter.Poellner@warwick.ac.uk

Amy Ione

Examining Semir Zeki’s ‘Neural Concept Formation and Art: Dante, Michelangelo, Wagner’

In his paper, ‘Neural Concept Formation and Art: Dante, Michelangelo, Wagner’ Semir Zeki writes ‘we can trace the origins of art to a fundamental characteristic of the brain, namely its capacity to form concepts’ (Zeki, 2002, p. 53). He proposes that ‘this capacity is itself the by-product of an essential characteristic of the brain. That characteristic is abstraction, and is imposed upon the brain by one of its chief functions, namely the acquisition of knowledge.’ (ibid., p. 53). Then, centring his argument around ‘the ideal of love’, he claims that Dante, Michelangelo and Wagner ‘had created in their brains’, he further asserts that ‘none of the three found that ideal in real life, and each was impelled in a different way to create works of art in response to that gap’ (ibid., pp. 53–4).

After reading through the piece several times I find the speculative hypothesis weak on data and scientifically unconvincing. This is not just a result of Zeki’s ill-conceived definition of art. His theoretical view also puts aside the degree to which developing and appreciating artworks involves a number of complex operations. Indeed, perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Zeki’s theory is the degree to which it undermines his own premise that a real theory of art and aesthetics must be neurologically based. Instead, after asserting that his approach is dictated by a truth that he believes to be axiomatic — ‘that all human activity is dictated by the organization and laws of the brain: that therefore, there can be no real theory of art and aesthetics unless neurologically based’ (Zeki, 2002, p. 54), he presents a tautological and psychologically-based argument best summed up by the phrase ‘and then a miracle occurs’.

Correspondence: Amy Ione, PO Box 12748, Berkeley, CA 94712-3748, USA. Email: ione@diatrope.com URL: www.diatrope.com.

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