

Introduction

More than a Name

'Must a name mean something?' Alice asked doubtfully.

'Of course it must', Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh: 'my name means the shape I am — and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost.'¹

Robin George Collingwood's name is familiar to history educators around the world. It has been invoked to validate educational policies and programs and notions of historical scholarship. Yet few appreciate the depth, scope and shape of his views on what it means to be educated in history. The problem is not simply that some of Collingwood's ideas have been emphasised at the expense of others, as was the case with the neglect of his political philosophy.² It is more basic and fundamental than that: the Collingwood that educators know is constrained by prevailing assumptions about the territory and boundaries of education, subjects like history and philosophy, and the nature of concepts. He is simply not expected to offer anything more than advice to those who teach and formulate policies on the curriculum subject of history. The time has come to loosen those constraints and look anew at what Collingwood has to offer.

Life and Education

Even the briefest account of Collingwood's life suggests that this was a man whose connection with education was anything but usual. Born on 22 February 1889 at Cartmel Fell in Lancashire, Collingwood was the son of William Gershom Collingwood (1854–1932) and Edith 'Dorothy' Mary Isaac (1857–1928), and grandson of the artist William Collingwood (1819–1903).

[1] Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There* (London, 1871), p. 162.

[2] For a corrective to that imbalance, see D. Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood* (Cambridge, 1989).

W.G. Collingwood was John Ruskin's secretary and biographer and a writer, art historian, archaeologist, and painter, and later the Chair of Fine Art at University College, Reading. Edith Collingwood was a musician and a noted painter of miniatures. Collingwood had three sisters, Dora, Barbara and Ursula. Dora became a watercolour artist, Barbara a sculptor and Ursula an art teacher, painter of miniatures and midwife.

Collingwood's education, he tells us, began soon after his birth. In *An Autobiography* he reports that his father took him to an archaeological excavation at the Roman fort of Hardknott Castle at the age of three weeks.³ From then until the age of thirteen, he was educated at home. Under the guidance of his parents and later his sisters, he was taught to read ancient and modern languages, sing, play the piano, write, sculpt, draw, paint, bind books and sail. He was also encouraged to develop his interest in archaeology, philosophy and the natural sciences. For example, in a letter to Dora, he wrote:

I have made some gunpowder, and have made a stand to hold a full cartridge. Like this [drawing] The candle underneath red-heats the brass cartridge-shell, and the powder goes off. Next you open the window ...⁴

His earliest extant letters date from when he was three and a half, and by the time he was eleven he had written, illustrated and bound several books including a guide to Furness Abbey (1896) and accounts of the fictional place called 'Jipandland'.⁵ Even his earliest works show a remarkable awareness of writing and publication styles. For example, the first of his books on 'Jipandland' includes the following title page:

Vol. *Jipandland*.
 Pictures and stories by R. Collingwood.
 Nov 1895. Lanehead.
 Part I. Discoveries.
 Part II Maps.
 Part III A dictionary.
 Part IV Alphabet and words.
 [Part] V Sketches.
 Part V [*sic*] Verbs.
 Part VI Stories of Japes.
 Printed and illustrated by R. Collingwood Dec. 14 1895.⁶

[3] R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography* (Oxford, 1939), p. 80.

[4] As quoted in T. Smith, "'This Ring of Thought': Notes on Early Influences", *Collingwood Studies*, Vol. 1 (1994), p. 34.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[6] As quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 32.

These early experiences, as Boucher points out, provided Collingwood with a model of what education could be.⁷ It is a model that he turned to repeatedly in his writings, as we shall see.

In 1902, Collingwood was sent to school at Grange, and a year later he gained a scholarship to Rugby. Collingwood's five years at Rugby were not happy: the curriculum was stultifying, sport was seen as a surrogate for intellectual engagement and the living conditions were akin to a 'pigsty'. He later wrote of:

... the frightful boredom of being taught things (and things which ought to have been frightfully interesting) by weary, absent-minded or incompetent masters ... the torment of living by a time-table expressly devised to fill up the day with scraps and snippets of occupation in such a manner that no one could get down to a job of work and make something of it, and, in particular, devised to prevent one from doing that 'thinking' in which, long ago, I had recognised my own vocation.⁸

Here again we see Collingwood's educational views hinted at, views that can be found across his writings. In 1908, Collingwood was 'let out of prison' and gained a scholarship to University College, Oxford, to read *Literae Humaniores* — classics — as his father had done.⁹ In 1912 he was awarded a first class degree and a fellowship in philosophy at Pembroke College. With the exception of the years 1914 to 1918, when he served in the Admiralty's intelligence department, and 1931–2 when he contracted a serious bout of chickenpox, Collingwood dedicated himself to his teaching duties and writing projects with incredible energy.¹⁰ And he did both with the same depth and range of intellectual interest that his family encouraged in him as a boy. Out of his lectures emerged major works on religion (*Religion and Philosophy*, 1916), the nature of knowledge (*Speculum Mentis*, 1924), philosophy and metaphysics (*An Essay on Philosophical Method*, 1933; *An Essay on Metaphysics*, 1940), art (*Outlines of a Philosophy of Art*, 1925; *The Principles of Art*, 1938), politics (*The New Leviathan*, 1942) and archaeology (*The Archaeology of Roman Britain*, 1930; *Roman Britain and the English Settlements*, 1937). Collingwood's efforts earned him a number of distinctions in his lifetime, most notably election as a fellow of the Royal Society in 1934, appointment as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College in 1935 and receipt of an honorary LL.D from the University of St. Andrews in 1938.

[7] D. Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood*, p. 4.

[8] R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, p. 8.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[10] J.M. Winter, 'Oxford and the First World War', *The History of the University of Oxford*, ed. B. Harrison, Vol. 8 (Oxford, 1994), p. 9.

He was, however, unable to collect his honorary degree in person, because he suffered the first of a number of strokes that would contribute to his death at the age of fifty-four. After his first stroke, Collingwood took a year off from teaching duties and embarked on a sea voyage to Indonesia. During the journey, and the three and a half months that he spent in Indonesia, he corrected the page proofs of *An Autobiography* (1939), and worked on *An Essay on Metaphysics* and a manuscript called 'The Principles of History'.¹¹ After he submitted the manuscript of *An Essay on Metaphysics* to Oxford University Press, he was off sailing again on a voyage that would be described in his *First Mate's Log* (1940). At his death in 1943, Collingwood left few publications specifically on history: a collection of articles from the 1920s that were later brought together by Debbsins as *Essays in the Philosophy of History* (1965); a leaflet entitled *The Philosophy of History* (1930); *The Historical Imagination*, his inaugural lecture as Waynflete Professor in 1935; and a lecture given to the British Academy in 1936 entitled 'Human Nature and Human History'.

But he also left behind a large collection of unpublished manuscripts, on topics ranging from history, religion, folklore, and magic to sense perception, archaeology, metaphysics, art and music. T.M. Knox, a former student of Collingwood's, took upon himself the responsibility of guiding some of those writings to publication. First to be published were lectures on the history of theories of cosmology from 1934, 1935 and 1937, which Collingwood began to work up for publication in 1939. These appeared under the title *The Idea of Nature* in 1945. Second was a course of lectures on philosophy of history that Collingwood first delivered in 1936 and revised under the title 'The Idea of History' in 1940. And third was 'The Principles of History', penned in 1939. On the first page of the latter, Collingwood wrote a note to his first wife, Ethel, which reads:

If this [manuscript] comes into your hands and I am prevented from finishing it, I authorise you to publish it with the above title, with a preface by yourself explaining that it is a fragment of what I had, for 25 years at least, looked forward to writing as my chief work.¹²

Despite these instructions, Knox was of the opinion that a 'good deal of the second and third chapters is contained already in the *Autobiography* and the *Essay on Metaphysics*, and I am not satisfied

[11] On the composition of *An Essay on Metaphysics*, see R. Martin, 'Editor's Introduction', *An Essay on Metaphysics*, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1998), pp. xv-xxi.

[12] R.G. Collingwood, 'The Principles of History' [1939], *The Principles of History and Other Writings*, ed. W.H. Dray and W.J. van der Dussen (Oxford, 1999), p. 3.

that we ought to press the wording of a note written in all probability when R.G. Collingwood was unusually ill'.¹³ He then combined 'The Principles of History', 'The Idea of History', 'Human Nature and Human History' and *The Historical Imagination* and published them under the title *The Idea of History* (1946). While some editorial alterations to the content of that text have been identified,¹⁴ Knox's influence is most evident in his arrangement of materials. Most problematic is the fifth section, the 'Epilegomena', in which sections of lectures, published essays and 'The Principles of History', which date from 1935 to 1939 are cobbled together in an apparently seamless fashion. Without van der Dussen's introduction to the revised edition of that text, readers would have little clue as to the different dates, purposes and audiences of these writings.

In 1978, Collingwood's second wife Kate deposited many of his manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 'The Principles of History', though, was not among them, leading scholars to conclude that it must have been lost or destroyed. It is hard to convey in words, then, just how exciting it was when in 1995 archivists at Oxford University Press found the missing chapters of 'The Principles of History' and two early drafts of conclusions for what became *The Idea of Nature* (1945). These were published with other manuscripts – including the rough draft of Collingwood's inaugural Waynflete lecture – in 1999. Those manuscripts play an important part in this work.

It seems that we now have a better chance to grasp Collingwood's ideas than ever before. Knox's role in bringing Collingwood's works to publication, though, will continue to be a source of regret as long as his construction of *The Idea of History* remains in print.

Approaching Collingwood

Issues of accessibility to Collingwood's unpublished works have, until recently, formed a major obstacle to the analysis of his ideas. Publication of a number of manuscripts – in the revised editions of *The New Leviathan* (1992), *The Idea of History* (1993) and *An Essay on Metaphysics* (1998), and in *Essays in Political Philosophy* (1995) and *The Principles of History and Other Writings in Philosophy of History* (1999) – has helped to alleviate that problem. Current educational scholarship, though, suggests little familiarity with Collingwood's writings beyond a few sections of *The Idea of History* and *An Autobiography*.

[13] As quoted in W.J. van der Dussen, 'Editor's Introduction', *The Idea of History*, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1993), p. xii.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. xvi–xix.

Rather, educators appear to be highly dependent on the comments of Collingwood scholars, and I believe this dependency has served to reinforce an unnecessarily limited account of his views. This is so for at least two reasons. First, the bulk of scholarship on Collingwood looks almost exclusively to his views on history and philosophy. More specifically, analysis of his directives on re-enactment and 'all history is the history of thought' abounds and shows no signs of abating. This in itself is not a bad thing, for considerable advances have been made in interpreting Collingwood's ideas, advances that inform this work. They have, however, suggested a firmer boundary between history and other mental, social and political activities than Collingwood wanted. It is therefore easy for educators to slip into viewing Collingwood as offering advice only on the distinct profession and curriculum subject of history. History, as we shall see, meant much more to Collingwood. Works that take a wider perspective are not impossible to find, but are still more limited than they need be. Since the publication of Mink's *Mind, History and Dialectic* (1969), for instance, it has become accepted that Collingwood's views on history are better understood in the context of his philosophy of mind.¹⁵ Van der Dussen, for example, has revealed the staggering scope and depth of Collingwood's understanding of history as a form of knowledge and inquiry.¹⁶ Only recently, though, have scholars begun to respond to Boucher's invitation to cast the net even wider and consider Collingwood's vision of history in the context of his social and political thought.¹⁷ Helgeby, for example, has argued for the inter-connection of Collingwood's views on history, epistemology, moral philosophy and civilisation.¹⁸ This work is informed by that same broadening of focus not only because it aligns with Collingwood's own approach to scholarship, but because, as I hope to show, it leads to a better understanding of some of his most discussed and debated ideas.

Second, it is a source of considerable irony that Collingwood tends to be approached by some of the same philosophical methods that he tried to distance himself from.¹⁹ During the period that Collingwood was at Oxford, a varied group of philosophers there and at Cambridge — including Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle — adopted a

[15] L.O. Mink, *Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood* (Bloomington, IN, 1969).

[16] W.J. van der Dussen, *History as a Science: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood* (The Hague, 1981).

[17] D. Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood*.

[18] S. Helgeby, 'Action, Duty and Self-Knowledge in R.G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History', *Collingwood Studies*, Vol. 1 (1994), pp. 86-107.

[19] R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, pp. 19-22, 56.

style of research and writing that came to be identified as 'ordinary language', 'analytic' or 'Oxford' philosophy.²⁰ Uniting this loose-knit group was a determination to free philosophical writing from what were seen as the vague and lofty claims of idealists like Hegel and Kant, the almost mystical tone of contemporary continental European philosophy, and neologisms, jargon and technical terms. Philosophy was to be written, as much as possible, in ordinary language. Indeed, Wittgenstein even claimed that philosophical problems were at base due to confusions and distortions in ordinary language.

These stylistic aims accord with Collingwood's own. One of the most appealing aspects of Collingwood's writing is its clarity. This is no incidental feature of his work: in *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, he informs us of his determination to avoid the use of technical terms or jargon in favour of ordinary language.²¹ It is therefore relatively easy to slip into reading him as an ordinary language or analytic philosopher, despite, as Dray points out, his own objections to that approach. Interestingly, though, Dray himself clearly feels tugged by an analytic reading of Collingwood, and seems to regret that Collingwood does not meet the standard:

It cannot be said . . . that Collingwood's writings, when carefully read, are easy to grasp. Although often graceful, they are not always careful. They do not exhibit that exact love of language which analytic philosophers have since made *de rigueur* . . .²²

So what is the difficulty with this reading of Collingwood? Here we need to turn to Collingwood's own complaints against ordinary language philosophy.

Collingwood's major complaint against his analytic contemporaries was that they were insufficiently historical in their approach to research and writing. In practice, ordinary language philosophers tended to confine their analyses to present-day usages of concepts or to show little concern that past usages might be shaped by very different assumptions.²³ This is a complaint I understand well, having been advised when I first started work in this area that I should work

[20] See J.L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', *Philosophical Papers* (3rd edn, Oxford, 1979), pp. 175–204; G. Kyle, 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2 (London, 1971), pp. 39–62; and L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans G.E.M. Anscombe, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees and G.H. von Wright (Oxford, 1953). See also C.E. Caton (ed.), *Philosophy and Ordinary Language* (Urbana, IL, 1963).

[21] R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Oxford, 1933), p. 207.

[22] W.H. Dray, *History as Re-enactment: R.G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History* (Oxford, 1995), p. 27.

[23] R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, pp. 58–61.

simply to clarify current usages of the terms 'historical' and 'imagination'. And this ahistorical orientation still persists in some form in writings on Collingwood's philosophy of history. While no Collingwood scholars are as dismissive of history as Collingwood claimed his analytic contemporaries to be, it does not inform their approach to his ideas as thoroughly as it might. A good case in point is the copious literature on re-enactment. Few writers offer anything more than a brief survey of antecedent thinkers, variations in Collingwood's view and or a history of the reception of Collingwood's idea. Typical are Nielsen's careful analysis of Collingwood's use of the term 're-enactment' and its cognates and Saari's critical assessment of various interpretations of Collingwood's idea.²⁴ Looking at these works, readers are offered no inkling of the relatively long historical context in which the idea of re-enactment may be located. That history is not only interesting, but also helps us to understand the degree to which Collingwood's views were a response to earlier philosophical and literary theories. In particular, it helps us to illuminate Collingwood's judgement on which terms are cognates of re-enactment and which ones *are not*, a point that is relatively neglected in Collingwood scholarship.²⁵ This is not just a minor semantic issue, as we will see when we look to British policy discussions from the 1960s to the mid-1990s on the role of 'empathy', 'sympathy', 're-enactment' and the 'historical imagination' in history education. Similarly, accounts of Collingwood's views on the 'historical imagination' give readers little reason to believe that any theories existed prior to that of Collingwood. A good case in point is Dray's analysis in *History as Re-enactment*, which includes only a brief mention of antecedent thinkers named by Collingwood himself: Macaulay, Kant and Hume.²⁶ This is a pity, for a more thorough examination of earlier theories of imagination and historical imagination highlights the breadth and innovative structure of Collingwood's view.

Problematic too are the views of concepts that are commonly coupled with the analytic approach, which are not sufficiently expansive and dynamic to match Collingwood's contribution to philosophical thought. Few Collingwood scholars have read

[24] M.H. Nielsen, 'Re-enactment and Reconstruction in Collingwood's Philosophy of History', *History and Theory*, 1981, Vol. 20 (1), pp. 1-31; and H. Saari, *Re-enactment: A Study in R.G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History* (Åbo, 1984).

[25] Rex Martin, for instance, talks of the 'empathetic dimension' in re-enactment, a view that will be challenged in this work. See R. Martin, *Re-enactment and Practical Inference* (London, 1977), pp. 53-4.

[26] W.H. Dray, *History as Re-enactment*, ch. 6.

Collingwood according to his own view of concepts, and even fewer educators have done so. The expectation is that, for instance, the clarification of terms like 're-enactment' or 'historical imagination' will probably lead to the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions equally present in all and only phenomena so labelled, as Frege would have it. Less popular is the more open alternative of Wittgenstein — in which phenomena are connected by a network of overlapping similarities — but this is not a good match for Collingwood's ideas either. To Collingwood, instantiations of a concept are arranged in a hierarchical, cumulative scale. What is remarkable is that Collingwood scholars and educators persist with these views of concepts, despite the many problems they have raised and the promise of Collingwood's own theory.

In sum, then, approaching Collingwood requires the same intellectual breadth and fusion of history and philosophy that his writings epitomise. And cultivating this approach, as we shall discover, is the cornerstone of Collingwood's vision of education and society.

The Shape of this Book

The shape of this book is that of a spiral: it begins with the facets of Collingwood's work best known to educators — re-enactment and the historical imagination — and locates them in the widening contexts of both Collingwood's and earlier writers' views on empathy, sympathy, imagination, education and society. This choice of arrangement is quite deliberate, for it matches Collingwood's vision of the process of education as an 'infinitely increasing spiral'.²⁷ The selection of re-enactment and the historical imagination as starting points will perhaps generate a groan from readers who are aware of the copious body of scholarship already available on those topics. There is no doubting that re-enactment and the historical imagination are well-worn topics in Collingwood studies. Despite that, I contend that the nature and role of re-enactment and the historical imagination in Collingwood's educational, social and political thought is little understood.

'Re-enactment', the 'historical imagination' and the seemingly related concepts of 'empathy' and 'sympathy' occupy a prominent place in discussions on history education from the mid-twentieth century onwards. Around that time, history education around the world took a turn towards epistemology and educators became increasingly interested in fostering an awareness of both the nature

[27] R.G. Collingwood, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Art* [1925] (Bristol, 1994), p. 95.

and methods of history. For all the attention on these concepts, though, it soon became apparent that educators did not have a clear understanding of what they referred to, let alone how they could be developed. In some places, they appeared in and disappeared from educational discussions and policies with relatively little fuss. In other places, such as Britain, they came under increasing public scrutiny and were used by conservatives as evidence of the emptiness and invalidity of the 'new' ('method-centred') approach to history education. In chapter one I chart the rise and fall of re-enactment, historical imagination, empathy and sympathy in British educational policy and discourse from the 1960s to mid-1990s, identify some of the underlying factors, and note the role of Collingwood as a frequently-cited name in those developments.

Educators commonly associate Collingwood's name with these concepts. This connection is made, however, on the basis of only a slight knowledge of Collingwood's writings. Few educators have ventured beyond page 218 of *The Idea of History* or page 111 of *An Autobiography* to establish whether Collingwood used all of those terms, what he meant by the ones he did use, and whether he saw them as linked. In chapter two, I argue that while Collingwood was not as careful in his writing as Dray would like, he was certainly not careless in his choice and connection of terms. I begin by describing philosophical and literary works on empathy and sympathy that predate Collingwood, and suggest some reasons why he avoided the use of those terms in association with his own historiographical views. Our attention then shifts to an explanation of Collingwood's requirement that re-enactment entails the historian having *the same* thought as the historical agent. Analogical and intuitionist explanations are rejected in favour of the conceptual view proposed by Saari, but to that will be added further evidence from Collingwood's unpublished manuscripts. Of particular interest will be his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* (1913–14), his lectures on metaphysics from 1935 and 'The Principles of History'. Moreover, it will be shown that Collingwood's views on re-enactment are best understood in the light of his writings on language, mind and 'reading'. Along the way I identify commonalities in Collingwood and Wittgenstein's later writings on mind and language. This will be the first of a number of occasions where I hope to show that Wittgenstein is perhaps not the ahistorical antithesis of Collingwood that some commentators have taken him to be.

In chapter three, I extend our analysis of the conceptual view of re-enactment, asking what in history is open to it. In particular, I use

'The Principles of History' to refute the common view of Collingwood as offering a narrow, rational, individualistic view of history. Re-enactment applies to the reasonable and unreasonable activities and emotions of both specified and non-specified historical agents. Additionally, I explain why Collingwood saw emotions as connected with thought. Taking stock of his views, I then draw out and critically examine the suggestion in Collingwood's writings that humans might be able to re-enact the experiences of non-human animals. I then look to Collingwood's understanding of philosophy, and argue in agreement with Boucher that re-enactment can allow historians to gain access to the fundamental assumptions or 'presuppositions' that shape the activities of historical agents. Here again we find concordance between Collingwood and Wittgenstein, not just on the nature and roles of presuppositions, but also in the endorsement of a temporal foundationalism. As we shall discover, though, Collingwood departs from Wittgenstein in being unwilling to restrict philosophy to a retrospective descriptive role. Points of similarity and difference between Collingwood's constellations of presuppositions, Kuhn's paradigms and Foucault's notions of the *epistémê* and *archive* are also noted.

Before moving on to explore the relationship between re-enactment and the historical imagination in Collingwood's writings, in chapter four I offer a survey of theories of imagination and historical imagination from Plato to Derrida. This serves a dual purpose, showing first the context of Collingwood's ideas, and second the importance of Hayden White's argument for the analysis of both the content *and* form of theories, including those on the imagination. In chapter five, Collingwood's concepts of imagination and historical imagination are unpacked. What we find is neither a collection of activities bound by an equally present essence nor a network of overlapping similarities, but a cumulative scale of forms in which autonomous, dutiful reason is at least minimally present. Looking across Collingwood's writings, four forms of imagination are identified: imaging, pure or free, perceptual and historical. Importantly, all of these forms are to be found in the activities of ordinary people, not just exceptional adults. At the top of the scale is the historical imagination, for this, to Collingwood, best epitomises autonomous reason at present. Here again we see Collingwood's affirmation of temporal foundationalism. Thus for him, I argue, the historical imagination is the imagination. Further, I show that while re-enactment might be a part of the historical imagination, it is certainly not synonymous with it.

In chapter six, our field of analysis widens further as I locate Collingwood's ideas on imagination within his vision of education and society. Collingwood wrote little directly on education, but as I argue, his works are infused with an educational purpose. To Collingwood, education is a process of socialisation that has as its endpoint freedom of the will and an historical civilisation. Students are to be guided through the various forms of experience — art, religion, science and 'history/philosophy' — which embody various forms of rational conduct. These forms of experience and of rational conduct — utilitarian, regularian and dutiful — are both arranged as a cumulative scale of forms. Dutiful action is characterised by autonomous reasoning, a commitment to foster freedom of the will in others and ourselves and freedom from capriciousness and insincerity. Particular attention is given to the experience of history/philosophy and the imagination, which are identified as the epitome and mainspring of rational development respectively. I also stress that history/philosophy is not necessarily synonymous with a particular discipline or curriculum subject, but refers more to a rational, autonomous orientation towards the world and an awareness of the temporal foundations of the human form and forms of life. Experience of history/philosophy is not restricted to institutional education or controlled by professional educators or historians. Everyone is capable of experiencing history/philosophy, but moreover, in Collingwood's view, they have a duty to do so. This is the reasoning behind his request that we should all ask 'How good an historian shall I be?'

After a critical examination of Collingwood's suggestion that parents ought to be the primary providers of education, we then return to where we began, with a consideration of Collingwood's ideas on education in the context of recent educational developments. This time, though, Collingwood is treated as more than a name or the provider of advice on the particular curriculum subject of history. Rather, we look to the influential curriculum innovations of Hirst, Bruner and Bloom and argue that Collingwood's commitment to history, the imagination and the creation of a social, global community is unmatched. In the conclusion, I reiterate Collingwood's challenge to current notions of history education, including public history education.