Contents

Note: As these essays and commentaries were originally published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies (Vol.8, No.9-10, 2001), full abstracts are also available from our ejournals site:
Anthony Freeman
Editor's Introduction Full Text
Robert Van Gulick   Summary
Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind–Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview
Harry T. Hunt   Summary
Some Perils of Quantum Consciousness: Epistemological Pan-Experientialism and the Emergence–Submergence of Consciousness
Natika Newton   Summary
Emergence and the Uniqueness of Consciousness
Michael Silberstein   Summary
Converging on Emergence: Consciousness, Causation and Explanation
Scott Hagan and Masayuki Hirafuji  Summary
Constraints on an Emergent Formulation of Conscious Mental States
Todd E. Feinberg   Summary
Why the Mind Is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain
Anthony Freeman   Summary
God as an Emergent Property
Alwyn Scott
We Could Be Siblings Yet: Reflections on Huston Smith’s Why Religion Matters

Chapter Summaries

Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, 541 HL, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1170, USA

Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem

My aim here is to give an overview of the recent philosophic discussion to serve as a map in locating issues and options. I will not offer a comprehensive survey of the debate or mark every important variant to be found in the recent literature. I will mark the principal features of the philosophic landscape that one might use as general orientation points in navigating the terrain.

I will focus in particular on three central and interrelated ideas: those of emergence, reduction, and nonreductive physicalism. The third of these, which has emerged as more or less the majority view among current philosophers of mind, combines a pluralist view about the diversity of what needs to be explained by science with an underlying metaphysical commitment to the physical as the ultimate basis of all that is real. The view has been challenged from both left and right, on one side from dualists (Chalmers, 1996) and on the other from hard core reductive materialists (Kim, 1989). Despite their differences, those critics agree in finding nonreductive physicalism an unacceptable and perhaps even incoherent position. They agree as well in treating reducibility as the essential criterion for physicality; they differ only about whether the criterion can be met. Reductive physicalists argue that it can, and dualists deny it.

The terms ‘reduction’, ‘nonreductive’ and ‘emergence’ get used in a bewildering variety of ways in the mind–body literature, none of which is uniquely privileged or standard. Thus clarity about one’s intended meaning is crucial to avoid confusion and merely verbal disagreements. Thus, much of my mapping will be devoted to sorting out the main versions of reduction and emergence before turning to assess their interrelations and plausibility. My intent is to act largely as a guide and not an advocate. Though I am sure my biases will sometimes affect how I describe the issues, my goal is to lay out the logical geography in a more-or-less neutral way.

Todd E. Feinberg, Beth Israel Medical Center, Fierman Hall, 317 East 17th Street, New York, NY 10003, USA

Why the Mind is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain

In this article I will attempt to refute the claim that the mind is a radically emergent feature of the brain. First, the inter-related concepts of emergence, reducibility and constraint are considered, particularly as these ideas relate to hierarchical biological systems. The implications of radical emergence theories of the mind such as the one posited by Roger Sperry, are explored. I then argue that the failure of Sperry’s model is based on the notion that consciousness arises as a radically emergent feature ‘at the top command’ of a non-nested neurological hierarchy. An alternative model, one that avoids the dualism inherent in radical emergence theories, is offered in which the brain is described as producing a nested hierarchy of meaning and purpose that has no ‘top’ or ‘summit’. Finally, I will argue there remains a non-reducible aspect of consciousness that does not depend upon radical emergence theory, but rather on the mutual irreducibility of the subjective and objective points of view. This irreducible aspect of consciousness can be understood as the non-mysterious result of brain evolution and normal neural functioning.

Anthony Freeman, Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

God As An Emergent Property

Treating conscious states as emergent properties of brain states has religious implications. Emergence claims the neutral ground between substance dualism (perceived as hostile to science) and reductive physicalism (perceived as hostile to religion). This neutrality makes possible a theory of human experience that is religious, yet lies wholly within the natural order and open to scientific investigation. One attempt to explain the soul as an emergent property of brain states is studied and found wanting, because of a dogmatic assumption that God is ‘beyond all material form’. Reflection on the central Christian claim that Jesus Christ was human and divine suggests the alternative view that God and the soul are both emergent properties. Unlike the philosopher’s or physicist’s remote and isolated ‘first cause’, this God is immediate and personal and social.

Scott Hagan, Mathematics Department, British Columbia Institute of Technology, 3700 Willingdon Avenue, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5G 3H2 Canada

Masayuki Hirafuji, Computational Modeling Lab, Department of Information Research, NARC, 3-1-1 Kannondai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8666 Japan

Constraints on an Emergent Formulation of Conscious Mental States

Fundamental limitations constraining the application of emergence to formulations of conscious mental states are explored within the paradigm of classical science. This paradigm includes standard interpretations of functionalism, computationalism and complex systems theories of mind — theories which are ultimately justified by an appeal to emergentist principles. We define a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic accounts of emergent conscious states, and examine the prospects for both. Extrinsic accounts are subject to relativities with respect to external observers that must be resolved if the ontological character of conscious states is to be preserved. While this can, in some cases, be accomplished by imposing an appropriate invariance, no such strategy exists in the case of relativity with respect to boundary without absurd consequences. If, on the other hand, conscious states require intrinsic definition, a specification of the system boundary must be explicitly available if the conscious ontology is to be uniquely specified. Even minimal information requirements make this incompatible with locality constraints. We investigate what progress can be made in overcoming these obstacles by relaxing various assumptions.

Harry T. Hunt, Department of Pychology, Brock University, St Catherine’s, Ontario, L2S 3A1 Canada

Some Perils of Quantum Consciousness. Epistemological Pan-experientialism and the Emergence–Submergence of Consciousness

If consciousness emerges into ontological reality at some point in nature, as system complexity increases, then it also ‘submerges’ at some adjoining point, as structures simplify. This has led some to posit a ‘latent-consciousness’ in what Bohr saw as the consciousness-like spontaneity of quantum phenomena. Yet to move on this basis to Whitehead’s ontological pan-experientialism or to direct quantum explanations of consciousness (Hameroff and Penrose) faces serious epistemological limitations — perhaps being more unwittingly projective than genuinely explanatory. More reasonable would be an epistemological pan- experientialism in the sense of the later James. Consciousness, as the ultimate lens and medium of all knowledge, is inseparable from the physical reality it would know, especially at the very limits of empirical observation in microphysics. ‘Submerged’ consciousness is better understood in Jamesian pragmatic terms than via assumed but unprovable ontologies.

Natika Newton, Department of Philosophy, Nassau County Community College, Garden City, NY 11530

Emergence and the Uniqueness of Consciousness

This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness arises from the forced blending of components that are incompatible, or even logically contradictory, when combined by direct methods available to the subject; and that it is, as a result, analytically, ostensively and comparatively indefinable. First, I examine a variety of cases in which unpredictable novelties arise from the forced merging of contradictory elements, or at least elements that are unable in human experience to co-occur. The point is to show that the uniqueness of consciousness is comprehensible in terms of a more general kind of emergence. I then argue that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves synchronous activations of representations of ‘identical’ intentional objects with distinct temporal tags, and is thus a case of the emergence of novelty from forced blending of incompatible components. It follows from the general nature of such emergence that consciousness would be indefinable and hence seem mysterious. This analysis will show why phenomenal consciousness would be impossible to resolve into its constituents by the conscious subject. The result is, I hope, a happy blend of physicalist explanation with respectful acknowledgement of the robustness of subjective experience.

Michael Silberstein, Department of Philosophy, Wenger Center, Elizabethtown College, One Alpha Drive, Elizabethtown, PA 17022, USA

Converging on Emergence Consciousness, Causation and Explanation

I will argue that emergence is an empirically plausible and unique philosophical/ scientific framework for bridging the ontological gap and the explanatory gap with respect to phenomenal consciousness. On my view the ontological gap is the gap between fundamental ingredients/parts of reality that are not conscious (such as particles and fields) and beings/wholes (such as ourselves) that are conscious. The explanatory gap is the current lack of a philosophical/scientific theory that explains how non-conscious parts can become conscious wholes. Both gaps are of course conceptual as well as empirical in nature. Section I will be devoted to these issues as well as providing other general criteria for an account of consciousness. In section II, different types of emergence will be defined in the context of a more general taxonomy of reduction and emergence. Emergentism about consciousness becomes much more plausible when we see that the ancient ‘atomism’ (i.e., mereological and nomological supervenience) that drives physicalism on one end, and fundamental property dualism on the other, is probably false. Backing up this claim will be the primary burden of section III. In section IV I will conjecture that phenomenal consciousness is mereologically and perhaps nomologically emergent from neurochemical/ quantum processes, just as many other properties are so emergent. In section V I defend my view of emergence against the objections that: (1) it cannot bridge the explanatory/ontological gap between matter and consciousness and (2) it cannot account for the causal efficacy of consciousness in itself. Finally, in section VI, there is speculation about where all of this might take us in the future.
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