The new journal, Evolution and Cognition has some fundamental traits in common with Cybernetics & Human Knowing. In particular, both journals complement studies of the observed with studies of the observer. In Cybernetics & Human Knowing this study is based on second order cybernetics, while in the new journal it is based on the evolutionary study of cognition, also called Evolutionary Epistemology (EE).
EE was from the beginning based on general evolutionary biology, which like all biology assumes the existence of an external world, independent of the human observer (materialist realism). The studies of EE led, however, to the result that our cognitive apparatus is a product of biological evolution, and that our cognition’s (including the assumption of an external world) must depend on our cognitive apparatus. This of course led to difficulties with the basic assumption of a world independent of the human observer; materialist realism was then modified into "hypothetical realism".
In the beginning hypothetical realism was understood as saying that our scientific theories and "laws" of the external world should be regarded as hypotheses, while the idea that realism itself could be regarded as an hypothesis was not earnestly considered, Wuketits (1984, see i.a. p. 212). Now in 1995 - 96, however, several authors in Evolution & Cognition consider realism as an hypothesis and even suggest alternative hypotheses. Eva Krall for instance regards "objects as invariance’s in observations and not as something that may or may not exist in reality " (Vol. l, No. l, see note 9, p. 84 ). This development in EE is welcomed by the present reviewer, since I have for many years thought along similar lines, Randrup et al. (1982), Marchais & Randrup (1991, see pp. 2-5). I also think that observations can be regarded as mental or conscious experiences, a view which combined with Eva Krall's view will approximate philosophical idealism; but the authors in Evolution & Cognition seem to stop short of this possibility, perhaps it will be discussed in later issues of the journal.
It is often argued that if one resigns from materialist realism, he must also resign from other human beings as parts of reality, which would lead to epistemological solipsism (Diettrich, Vol. l, No. 2, p. 111). Here Artigiani's article on mind conceived as "the experience of brains in social networks" is relevant and interesting. In my interpretation Artigiani comes close to the notions "collective mind" and "collective brain", which have been conceived as alternatives to solipsism (Vol. 2, No. 1).
Self-organizing processes, self-reference and semiotics are important subjects in Cybernetics & Human Knowing associated with the study of the human observer, and also these subjects are discussed in Evolution & Cognition, based on evolutionary views. Thus Oeser writes about EE as a self-referential epistemology of natural science (Vol. 2, No. 1) and Krall discusses structural coupling between organism and environment and in this context regards changes in the organism's internal parameters as "adaptive self-modification" (Vol. 1, No.1, p. 79 f). Language is discussed extensively by Sjölander (Vol.1, No.1) and by Witzany (Vol.1, No. 2); both stress the use of language as important for its meaning and formation. Wimmer associates meaning with concrete action, and later in the development of a child and in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens with emotions separated from the area of concrete actions and perceptions. Wimmer also writes about the production of meaning and here refers to two expressive Cerman terms: Bedeutungsverleihung, Bedeutungsgebung (Vol. l, No.1, pp. 41 and 47-48).
Besides these issues of fundamental scientific and philosophical significance, Evolution & Cognition also treats subjects of more specific and practical nature.
For me Riedl's paper on deficiencies of adaptation in human reason is particularly interesting, because Riedl combines his theoretical views with topical world problems such as class differences, overpopulation, overkill capacity and environment degradation (Vol. l, No. 1).
Wimmer writes about the evolutionary roots of emotions. He finds that emotions are founded "as deeply as cognition in basic biological-regulative processes" and distinguishes between two main types of human emotionality: emotions at the sensorimotor level and emotions at the level of symbolic information-processing mechanisms. Wimmer's investigations lead to "an extension of the concept "emotion" and, of necessity, cognition such that their basic form of acquiring knowledge (Kenntnisgewinn) is a unified affective-cognitive process" ( Vol. l, No. 1). These views are further elaborated in an article with Ciompi, (Vol. 2, No. 1) where it is stated that the organizing and integrating function of affects on cognition is an essential element within the affective cognitive interactions.
Gisela Miller-Kipp discusses what pedagogues may expect from EE. As a pedagogue she is of course particularly interested in ontogenetic development, but she believes that EE can contribute useful aspects from the hypothesis of biological evolution. Thus EE urges pedagogues to consider the relationship between the cognitively active human individual (the "subject" in their terms) and the environment as a process of structural adaptation. She also thinks that the learning process called "life " is an evolutive continuum encompassing both biological and cultural history. Therefore "In the light of evolution learning is to be comprehended as a constructive interaction with environment in accordance to a hereditary pattern" (Vol. 2, No. 1).
Evolution & Cognition is open both to papers reporting empirical research work and to theoretical papers. In the first issues theory predominates strongly, but a few experiments are reported. Thus Huber reports experiments showing, clear evidence of single alternation behavior in goldfish (Vol. l, No. 1) and Lalouschek et al. report experiments on the ability of humans to distinguish between regularly and randomly occurring events (Vol. l, No. 2). Perhaps the journal itself will inspire more empirical research in the field of EE.
Clearly, efforts have been made to write correct English in the journal. Still, several authors write long German periods, in English which makes the reading more difficult. There are also a substantial number of misprints, some of them disturbing (e.g. "is" in stead of "as"). Of course these formalities can be improved in future issues.
Generally l find that the quality of Evolution & Cognition is at a high level, and I think that this journal will be of interest for all students of cognitive science and of evolutionary biology. For me the reading of the first three issues has been an illuminating update of my orientation in EE, and it has given me a very acute impression of the close relations between EE and second order cybernetics.
Evolution & Cognition appears in two issues per year, each about 85 pages. The annual subscription rate is 50 $, single issue price 30 $. Requests can be sent to Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, A-3422 Altenberg, Adolf-Lorenz-Gasse 2, Austria. E-mail: sec@kla.univie.ac.at Internet: http://www.kla.univie.ac.at
References
Marchais, P. & A. Randrup: 1991, "De la spatio-temporalité. Etude psychiatrique et interdisciplinaire," Ann. Méd.-Psychol. (Paris) 149 (l), 1 - 33.
Randrup, A. , I. Munkvad & R. Fog: 1982, A Theory for Mind-Matter and Mind-Brain Relations which may be Helpful for Topical Research Problems in Psychopharmacology, Poster at l3th Congress of Collegium Internationale Neuro-Psychopharmacologicum (CINP), Jerusalem.
Wuketits, F.M. (Ed.): 1984, Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht.
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