The question of the significance of altering ones consciousness internally (via altering one's central nervous system functioning-- altering the observer) versus altering it externally (via altering external means of observing) has come up in a number of recent postings (on "consciousness"), often linked to the contrast between altering one's consciousness by traditional mystical practices and by pharmacological means.
This is not the only way the cake can be cut, of course. Compare Bertrand Russell a generation ago, where, he argued that From a scientific point of view, we can make no distinction between the man who eats little and sees heaven and the man who drinks much and sees snakes. For Each is in a abnormal physical condition, and htherefore has abnormal perceptions...[and] in abnormal perceptions there is no reason to expect...correspondence [with fact]. Thus the "mystic," in contrast with "the man of science," by changing himself (his physiology) rather than an objective instrument, is essentially suspect. ("Critique of Mysticism," in his "Religion and Science," Oxford U. Pr., 1961)
It seems to me, however, that Russell missed something obvious here. For a change in a person's perceptions resulting from a change in his/her "self" (i.e., physiology) may happen to be a change *for the better* as well as a change *for the worse*. Thus the term "abnormal," while appropriate here in the basic sense of "out of the norm," also has presumptiously negative connotations here. The empirical question then becomes whether the change in question is one for the better or the worse, and how this can be determined. The simplest beginning point is in terms of the person's competence in the kinds of tasks (perceptual, motor, intellectual, etc.) that we are ordinarily familiar with. By most accounts, changes produced by drugs are quite often, of course, obviously associated with decremental functioning. In contrast, according to much folklore and many (although by all means not all) historical anacdotal accounts, changes produced by various sorts of yogic practices are (supposedly) often in the direction of enhancement of ordinary sorts of functioning (cp, for example, typical stories about Zen and martial arts "masters," etc.), and this latter perspective now receives some support from contemporary research on traditional meditation practices.
Whatever the end result of such research, however, the significant thing, it seems to me, is not whether there is an unusual change of functioning of one's central nervous system, nor, by itself, whether such a change is permanent, but one of the overall functional and affective significance of such changes as measured in terms of the things we are ordinarily concerned with. If *these* changes are in what we take to be positive directions (a big "if," to be sure), then the conservative sorts of worries often expressed would seem to be addressed; if in negative directions, then well-taken. But, contrary to Russell, and it seems some of the earlier online postings, in each case (*specific*, rather than generically construed, ascetic practices, drugs, medition techniques, etc.) this will be an empirical, rather than a merely logical question (of changing the observer vs external means of observation, permanent vs temporary, etc.).
Further, *if* nervous systems can be altered in a way that we have such grounds for judging them enhanced rather than damaged, *then* the question of coming to grips with any related unusual experiential reports becomes much more interesting. (A short discussion of these and related questions can be found in my "On Mystical Experiences as Support for the Perennial Philosophy," in the J. of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. LXII, No. 2, Summer 1994.)
Jonathan Shear
jcs@richmond.infi.net
I don't think it does at all. I think Russell, who was at least usually a fairly precise thinker (I'll ignore the howls of protest), was probably using the word "abnormal" in its exact scientific sense of "not [statistically] normal". All he's saying is that you can't automatically trust perceptions that are in any way abnormal, for "better" or "worse". And I think he was right (despite the fact that he himself was highly abnormal, in the sense of being smarter than 99.9% of the population). But what *I* think he was missing is that you can't automatically trust normal perceptions either!
And in this context another thing Russell was missing in holding up normal as the gold standard and denigrating religion in the same breath is that religion of one sort or another actually *is* the statistical norm.
Sue Pockett
pockett@scrc.umanitoba.ca
jcs-online
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