Could there be such a thing as a science of subjectivity or is this
a contradiction in terms? Focusing on studies of phenomenology, introspection,
meditation and intuition, the authors of this special issue examine the
possibility of a disciplined, methodical approach to subjective states.
Full text
of editorial introduction
Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear: First-person accounts: why, what, and how full text
Pierre Vermersch: Introspection as practice Abstract Claire Petitmengin-Peugeot: The intuitive experience: a first-person empirical investigation Abstract Carl Ginsburg: Body-image, movement and consciousness: examples from a somatic practice in the Feldenkreis method Abstract
Natalie Depraz: Phenomenological reduction as praxis Abstract Francisco Varela: Present-time consciousness Abstract Andrew R. Bailey: Beyond the Fringe: William James on the transitional parts of the stream of consciousness Abstract Jean Naudin, Caroline Gros-Azorin, Aaron Mishara, Osborne P. Wiggins, Michael A. Schwartz, Jean-Michel Azorin: The use of the Husserlian reduction as a method of investigation in psychiatry Abstract
Alan Wallace: The Buddhist tradition of samatha: methods for refining and examining consciousness Abstract Jonathan Shear and Ronald Jevning: Pure consciousness: scientific exporation of meditation techniques Abstract
Invited commentators: James Austin, Bernard Baars, Guy Claxton, David Galin, Shaun Gallagher, Eugene Gendlin, William Haney, Rachel Henley, Piet Hut, William Lyons, Bruce Mangan, Eduard Marbach, Gregory Nixon, Ian Owen, John Pickering, Jean Richard, Jonathan Schooler, Jeffrey Schwartz, Mark Sullivan, and Max Velmans.
One of the aspects of consciousness deserving of study is what might be called its subjective unity - the way in which, though conscious experience moves from object to object, and can be said to have distinct 'states', it nevertheless in some sense apparently forms a singular flux divided only by periods of unconsciousness. The work of William James provides a valuable, and rather unique, source of analysis of this feature of consciousness; however, in my opinion, this component of James' theory of the mind has so far gone under-emphasized in the scholarly literature. This paper undertakes some philosophical geography, trying to draw out and elucidate some of the relevant ideas from James' corpus, and also subjects those ideas to some analysis to try and assist in judgements of their current importance.
Depraz N. 45 bis, rue Pouchet, 75017 Paris, France
'. . . through the epochè, the gaze of the philosopher in truth first becomes fully free. . . . [F]ree of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pre-givenness of the world.' (Husserl, Krisis, § 41) This paper is concerned with the method of phenomenological reduction understood as a disciplined embodied practice.
Ginsburg C. Eschersheimer Landstrasse 70, D-60322 Frankfurt,
Germany Email: 110633.450@compuserve.com
We think of consciousness as a thing. Observation of our experience indicates that we are actually consciousing, and that experiencing is closely related to movement and the muscular sense. The position of this paper is that mind and body are not two entities related to each other but an inseparable whole while functioning. From concrete examples from the Feldenkrais Method, it is shown that changes in the organization of movement and functioning are intimately related and that one cannot change without conscious experience. Implications for the resolution of controversies in the field of consciousness studies and the neurosciences are suggested.
Naudin J. et al. 55 bis Bd Rodocanachi, 13008 Marseille, France artsnaud@aix.pacwan.net
Husserlian reduction is a rigorous method for describing the foundations of psychiatric experience. With Jaspers we consider three main principles inspired by phenomenological reduction: direct givenness, absence of presuppositions, re-presentation. But with Binswanger alone we refer to eidetic and transcendental reduction: (1) to establish a critical epistemology; (2) to directly investigate the constitutive processes of mental phenomena and their disturbances, freed from their nosological background; (3) to question the constitution of our own experience when facing a person with mental illness. Regarding the last item, we suggest a specific kind of reduction, typically intersubjective from the start, which we call the 'looking-glass reduction'. The schizophrenic experience -- understood as a 'loss of taken-for-grantedness' implying the constitutions of the body, of the other, and of internal time -- is a real 'epochal provocation' for the psychiatrist. As the horizon it opens seems to be both corporeal and narrative, this 'provoking' of an epochè in the attitude of the psychiatrist himself and the resistances it implies raise important issues regarding the general constitution of human experience.
Petitmengin-Peugeot C. Institut National des Telecommunications, 9 rue Charles Fourier, 91011 Evry, France claire.peugeot@int-evry.fr
Our research comes as the result of our surprise at the silence surrounding the intuitive experience, though it seems to be at the heart of human experience. We wanted to go a little further into the description of the intuitive experience, to attempt the adventure of the psycho-phenomenology of intuition. Specifically, we wanted to verify to what degree intuition is an experience which mobilizes our whole being, not only its intellectual dimension but also its sensorial, emotional dimension. To do this, we carried out a series of interviews, adopting a special method of exploration which we will describe in the first section: how to have access to the pre-thought-out aspects of the intuitive experience, how to clarify them, how to analyse and compare the descriptions we have obtained. To our surprise, we saw a generic structure of the intuitive experience emerge from this work of description and analysis. This structure is made up of an established succession of very precise interior gestures with a surprising regularity from one experience to another and from one subject to another. In our second section we will present the most significant aspects of this generic experiential structure. In a third section we will bring up a number of considerations and questions resulting from this phenomenological description.
Shear J. Department of Philosophy, Virginia Commonwealth University,
Richmond, VA 23284-2025, USA jcs@richmond.infi.net
Jevning R.
This paper will explore the integration of elements of traditional Eastern meditative procedures with modern objective scientific methodologies. In contrast to the introspective methods usually relied on in modern Western treatments of consciousness, the Eastern procedures in question have the possible advantage of being the products of centuries of effort to develop systematic first-person exploratory methodologies. But since these methodologies developed outside of the context of our traditions of science, their reported results of course cannot simply be taken at face value. Nevertheless, aspects of their internal logic and putative results appear to be cross-culturally congruent, despite great differences of metaphysical frameworks and social milieux. Thus examining them and their effects in the context of modern scientific methodologies and criteria may well prove useful to us in our own task of developing a significant science of consciousness. In the paper we will accordingly describe some common methodological features and claimed results found in several major Eastern meditative traditions, discuss conceptual and methodological problems they raise, review some relevant scientific research on contemporary meditating subjects, and suggest some implications for the scientific study of consciousness. In particular, it will be suggested that the existing meditation-related research already indicates that Eastern varieties of meditative procedures should prove to be a useful component of any future science of consciousness.
Varela F.J. LENA (Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Cérébrale), CNRS UPR 640, Hôpital de la Salpètrîere, 47 Blvd. de l'Hôpital, 75651 Paris, Cedex 13, France
My purpose in this article is to propose an explicitly naturalized account
of the experience of present nowness on the basis of two complementary
sources: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean
by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays will become
clear as the paper unfolds, but the main intention is to use the consciousness
of present time as a study case for the phenomenological framework presented
by Depraz in this Special Issue.
Vermersch P. CNRS, GREX, Place de la Mairie, 43300 Saint-Eble, France pvermers@es-conseil.fr
In this article I am not going to try and define introspection. I am going to try to state as precisely as possible how the practice of introspection can be improved, starting from the principle that there exists a disjunction between the logic of action and of conceptualization and the practice of introspection does not require that one should already be in possession of an exhaustive scientific knowledge bearing upon it. (Just suppose that before studying cognition, you were required to define it or that you were required to have a complete knowledge of perception before being permitted to read a set of instructions). To make matters worse, innumerable commentators upon what passes for introspection do not seem to have practised it and have certainly never contributed anything to its development. My aim is therefore to bring to light a procedure for progressive improvement in the practice of introspection when it is employed in a programme of progressive improvement in the practice of introspection when it is employed in a programme of research.
Wallace B.A. Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
[author abstract not supplied]