Contents

Vol. 16, No.5, May 2009
Special Issue on Defining Consciousness, ed. Chris Nunn
Chris Nunn   full text
Editor’s Introduction: Defining Consciousness

Refereed Paper

Ram L.P. Vimal   abstract
Meanings Attributed to the Term ‘Consciousness’
Alfredo Pereira & Hans Ricke   abstract
What is Consciousness?
Anders Sogaard & Stine Osterskov Sogaard   abstract
On Definitions of Consciousness
Bill Faw   abstract
Cutting ‘Consciousness’ at its Joints
Penelope Rowlatt   abstract
Consciousness and Memory
David Skrbina   abstract
Transcending Consciousness: Thoughts on a Universal Conception of Mind
Michael Beaton   abstract
Qualia and Introspection
Steve Torrance   abstract
Contesting the Concept of Consciousness
Sophie Allen   abstract
The Definition of Consciousness: Is Triviality or Falsehood Inevitable?
Max Velmans   abstract
How To Define Consciousness — And How Not To Define Consciousness

ABSTRACTS

Sophie Allen

The Definition of Consciousness: Is Triviality or Falsehood Inevitable?

It is now more than two centuries since David Hume asserted that the longevity of some philosophical controversies lay in incompatibilities of definition, thus implying that their resolution required careful attention to the meanings of terms and the removal of ambiguity. He had in mind, when writing the passage above, debates about the compatibility of free will and determinism, but perhaps contemporary debates over consciousness provide equally good examples of how ambiguity and equivocation can fuel philosophical and empirical confusion, and hinder explanation.
This paper discusses why the (implied) Humean resolution is unachievable. I will argue that the main difficulty faced by anyone engaged in defining consciousness is to find a way between triviality on the one hand, and falsehood on the other (or, more accurately, probable falsehood, since there is always the possibility of unjustified truth), and that this problem is insurmountable. The best outcome would be the provision of a useful, and most probably fairly trivial, working definition or range of definitions, which furthered the empirical (and conceptual) exploration of the phenomenon or phenomena which they are intended to capture. Such working definitions of consciousness would not be definitive in the usual strict, unrevisable sense as they would need to be open to revision as investigation proceeded; if we are to explain consciousness, we have to be prepared for our conception of consciousness to change as our understanding of it improves.

Correspondence: St Peter’s College, Oxford. Email: sophie.allen@spc.ox.ac.uk

Michael Beaton

Qualia and Introspection

Abstract: The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. Accepting this starting point amounts to at least implicitly endorsing certain theoretical claims about the nature of introspection. I therefore suggest that we allow ourselves to be guided, in our quest to understand qualia, by whatever independently plausible theories of introspection we have. I propose that we adopt a more moderate definition of qualia, as those introspectible properties which cannot be fully specified simply by specifying the non-controversially introspectible ‘propositional attitude’ mental states (including seeing x, experiencing x, and so on, where x is a specification of a potentially public state of affairs). Qualia thus defined may well fit plausible, naturalisable accounts of introspection. If so, such accounts have the potential to explain, rather than explain away, the problematic intuitions discussed earlier; an approach that should allow integration of our understanding of qualia with the rest of science.

Correspondence: Mike Beaton, Centre for Research in Cognitive Science, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9QJ, UK. Email: M.J.S.Beaton@sussex.ac.uk

Bill Faw

Cutting ‘Consciousness’ at its Joints

Abstract: To define ‘consciousness’ is to describe its uses and determine its boundaries, essential nature, and mechanisms. I distinguish between ‘normal waking consciousness’; altered forms of waking consciousness underlying trance, absorption, hypnosis, dissociation, meditative states, drug states, and out of body experiences; and REM/dreaming and slow-wave/deep sleep — examining them by the basic characteristics and mechanisms of normal waking consciousness: cortical arousal, qualitative experiences, first-person subjectivity, intentionality, knowing objects and self, interaction with e

Correspondence: Bill Faw, Brewton Parker College, Georgia, USA. Email: bfaw@bpc.edu

Alfredo Pereira Jr. & Hans Ricke

What is Consciousness? Towards a Preliminary Definition

Abstract: There is little or no general agreement about what researchers should focus on when studying consciousness. The most active scientific studies often use the methods of Cognitive Neuroscience and focus mainly on vision. Other aspects and contents of consciousness, namely thoughts and emotions, are much less studied, possibly leading to a biased view of what consciousness is and how it works. In this essay we describe what we call a referential nucleus, implicit in much of consciousness research. In this context, ‘consciousness’ refers to (partially) reportable content experienced by living individuals. We then discuss the philosophical concept of a phenomenal world and another contemporary view that conscious experience involves, besides integration of information in the brain, participation in action-perception cycles in a natural, social and cultural environment. These views imply a need to reconceptualize ‘qualia’ as the conscious aspect of subjective experiences, thus stating properties of consciousness that pose serious challenges to an exclusive approach via Cognitive Neuroscience, because experimental settings oversimplify conscious experiences, narrowing them to fragments correlated with measured brain activity and behaviour. In conclusion we argue that a science of consciousness requires a broad interdisciplinary range of research, including qualitative methods from the Human Sciences.

Correspondence: Alfredo Pereira Jr., Adjunct Professor; São Paulo State University (UNESP) — 18618–000 — Botucatu-SP — Brasil. E-mail: apj@ibb.unesp.br
Hans Ricke, Physician, Medical Sociologist, Gestaltist; Zürich — Switzerland. E-mail: ricke@gmx.ch

Penelope Rowlatt

Consciousness and Memory

Thomas Nagel famously suggested that: ‘an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — something it is like for the organism’ (Nagel, 1974, p. 436). However, it is difficult to imagine a creature being conscious of anything if it has no memory. As Baars and McGovern (1996, p. 66) pointed out, the only conscious events we can study are those that are ‘reportable’, that is, remembered for a short time at least. In this paper I examine the idea that Nagel-type consciousness might be what it is like to have certain types of memory. If this were the case, then different types of consciousness, ‘phenomenal’ or ‘access’ for example, could be defined in terms of the respective relevant memory stores.

Correspondence: Email: penelope@medicinetoday.co.uk

David Skrbina

Transcending Consciousness: Thoughts on a Universal Conception of Mind

A panpsychist approach provides a double benefit: it gives us a new perspective on our own human mentality, and it allows, by extension, a better understanding of non-human minds. We can see both as existing on one continuum, comparable to and parallel with the physical continuum of being that we have long accepted. This provides us with a more naturalistic and parsimonious account of mind and consciousness. It avoids human chauvinism and neo-Cartesianism. And it bypasses the intractable problem of brute emergence of mind.

Correspondence: E-mail: skrbina@umd.umich.edu

Anders Sogaard & Stine Osterskov Sogaard

On Definitions of Consciousness

Abstract: It is argued that consciousness studies suffer from a Problem of Essentialism. In response, it is proposed that definitions of consciousness be treated as stipulative definitions. Some example definitions and their relevance for scientific inquiry are discussed.

Correspondence: Email: anders@cst.dk

Steve Torrance

Contesting the Concept of Consciousness

I will investigate our concept of consciousness, in the light of three ‘myths’ (as I contentiously call them). Several decades ago, Wilfrid Sellars coined a phrase: ‘The Myth of the Given’.
I think that, in a similar vein, we may propose that certain ‘myths’ have grown up surrounding recent (and not-so-recent) conceptions of consciousness in the growing literature. To my mind at least three kinds of myth have grown up around consciousness:
  • The Myth of the Inner;
  • The Myth of the Hidden; and
  • The Myth of the Single.

    • I’m going to deal with each of these in turn — the first at some length, the second more briefly, and the third very briefly indeed. What I hope to show is that, as a result of holding on to these myths, a somewhat restrictive view of what consciousness is has emerged as a dominant view within the consciousness community. I think we need to look at where we can travel if we move away from that view. In doing so we may find that there is a lot more room than imagined for contestation when exploring our concept or concepts of consciousness.

    Correspondence: Centre for Research in Cognitive Science (COGS), University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9QJ, UK. Email: stevet@sussex.ac.uk

    Max Velmans

    How to Define Consciousness. And how Not to Define Consciousness

    Abstract: Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives examples of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in connection with how a ‘conscious process’ is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of ‘consciousness’ is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as ‘energy’, and ‘time’.

    Correspondence: Max Velmans, Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, London SE14 6NW; email: m.velmans@gold.ac.uk; http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/psychology/ staff/velmans.php

    Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal

    Meanings Attributed to the Term ‘Consciousness’: An Overview

    Abstract: I here describe meanings (or aspects) attributed to the term consciousness, extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually exclusive — and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors’ views about the basis of consciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its contents. The prospects for reaching any single, agreed, theory independent definition of consciousness thus appear remote. However, much confusion could be avoided if authors were always to specify which aspects of consciousness they refer to when using the term. An example is outlined of how this can be done (using a ‘PE–SE’ framework).

    Correspondence: Email: rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in; http://www.geocities.com/rlpvimal/

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