Special Issue: "Trusting the Subject Part 2"
Edited by Anthony Jack and Andreas Roepstorff

See also: Trusting the Subject, Part 1
Andreas Roepstorff & Anthony I. Jack   full text
Trust or Interaction?  Editorial Introduction
Alvin Goldman   abstract
Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports
Jonathan Schooler & Charles A. Schreiber  abstract
Experience, Meta-consciousness, and  the Paradox of Introspection
Jesse J. Prinz  abstract
 The Fractionation of Introspection
Eric Schwitzgebel   abstract
Introspective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener’s Lab Manual
Morten Overgaard & Thomas Alrik Sørensen  abstract
Introspection Distinct From First-Order Experiences
Derek J. Snyder, Katherine Fast & Linda M. Bartoshuk  abstract
Valid Comparisons of Suprathreshold Sensations
Russell T. Hurlburt & Christopher L. Heavey  abstract
To Beep or Not To Beep: Obtaining Accurate Reports About Awareness
Philip Robbins  abstract
Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection
Elisabeth L. Hill, David Sally & Uta Frith  abstract
Does Mentalising Ability Influence Cooperative Decision-making in a Social Dilemma? Introspective Evidence from a Study of Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner  abstract
The Phenomenology of Free Will
Jakob Hohwy & Chris Frith  abstract
Can Neuroscience Explain Consciousness?

TEN YEAR CUMULATIVE INDEX

Ten Year Index of Authors
Ten Year Index of Titles

ABSTRACTS

Alvin I. Goldman

Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports

The question of trusting introspective reports is a question about evidential warrant or justification. It is therefore a question of epistemology, and it behoves us to approach it within the framework of epistemology, which addresses evidential warrant across a broad spectrum of topics and sources. This paper examines the scientific status of introspective reports from the vantage point of general epistemological theorizing.

Correspondence: Alvin I. Goldman, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 26 Nichol Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA. Email: goldman@philosophy.rutgers.edu

E.L. Hill, D. Sally & U. Frith

Does Mentalising Ability Influence Cooperative Decision-making in a Social Dilemma?

Introspective Evidence from a Study of Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Abstract: The choice to cooperate or compete with others confronts us on a daily basis, and it is plausible that we use our mentalising skills to aid decision-making in such situations. We investigated the relationship between mentalising and decision-making in the prisoner’s dilemma in adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), who show impaired mentalising, and normal adults. After completion of three versions of the prisoner’s dilemma, we conducted a semi-structured interview. This interview attempted to elicit a participant’s spontaneous strategy when playing each version of the game, as well as on their conception of the nature and strategy choice of their opponents (human vs. computer).

Contrary to expectations, the behavioural choices of the adults with and without ASD were quantitatively similar, as were the qualitative responses to questions used in the interview. The consistency of the evidence from both measures suggests that mentalising ability was not involved in selecting the choices made in these prisoner’s dilemma tasks. Instead they suggest the hypothesis that a purely logical strategy may have been adopted. The introspections of at least a subgroup of high-functioning individuals with ASD can on the whole be trusted and this use of mixed methods strengthens the validity of the conclusions drawn.

Correspondence: Elisabeth L. Hill, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, New Cross, London. SE14 6NW. UK., Email: e.hill@gold.ac.uk

Jakob Hohwy and Chris Frith

Can Neuroscience Explain Consciousness?

Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience aspires to explain how the brain produces conscious states. Many people think this aspiration is threatened by the subjective nature of introspective reports, as well as by certain philosophical arguments. We propose that good neuroscientific explanations of conscious states can consolidate an interpretation of introspective reports, in spite of their subjective nature. This is because the relative quality of explanations can be evaluated on independent, methodological grounds. To illustrate, we review studies that suggest that aspects of the feeling of being in control of one’s bodily movement can be explained in terms of the complex and surprising way the brain predicts movement. This is a modest type of functional, contrastive explanation. Though we do not refute the threatening philosophical arguments, we show that they do not apply to this type of explanation.

Correspondence: Jakob Hohwy, Dept of Philosophy, Aarhus University, Ringgade DK-8000 Aarhus C. Denmark.
Chris Frith, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square London WC1N 3BG, UK.

Russell T. Hurlburt and Christopher L. Heavey

To Beep or Not To Beep: Obtaining Accurate Reports About Awareness

Abstract: We begin by accepting that introspective evidence is important to cognitive science. However, as its history shows, introspection is risky, so methods should be used that minimize those risks. We argue that there are 13 ways that a beeper can reduce those risks, dividing those ways into three categories: time sampling per se, minimizing the reactive disturbance of evanescent phenomena, and aiding phenomenological fidelity. We turn aside six criticisms of beeper-based research, and describe five characteristics of a good beep.

Correspondence: Russell T. Hurlburt, Dept. of Psychology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 S. Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5030, USA. Email: russ@unlv.nevada.edu

Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Jason Turner

The Phenomenology of Free Will

Abstract: Philosophers often suggest that their theories of free will are supported by our phenomenology. Just as their theories conflict, their descriptions of the phenomenology of free will often conflict as well. We suggest that this should motivate an effort to study the phenomenology of free will in a more systematic way that goes beyond merely the introspective reports of the philosophers themselves. After presenting three disputes about the phenomenology of free will, we survey the (limited) psychological research on the experiences relevant to the philosophical debates and then describe some pilot studies of our own with the aim of encouraging further research. The data seem to support compatibilist descriptions of the phenomenology more than libertarian descriptions. We conclude that the burden is on libertarians to find empirical support for their more demanding metaphysical theories with their more controversial phenomenological claims.

Correspondence: Eddy Nahmias, Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306- 1500, USA. Email: enahmias@fsu.edu

Morten Overgaard & Thomas Alrik Sørensen

Introspection Distinct From First-Order Experiences

In this paper, in the course of 4 experiments and an analysis of an experiment conducted by Anthony Marcel, we first of all argue for the possibility of separating introspective states of consciousness from non-introspective ones. Second, we argue that the introspective instruction changes the perceptual process when the subject is informed about which way to respond while perceiving a stimulus introspectively, compared to perceiving without a preparedness to respond in a specific way or when not introspecting. We claim that this result indicates that subjects are introspective when perceiving the stimulus, and that this is the cause of what looks like noise.

Correspondence: Morten Overgaard, Danish National Research Foundation’s Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience,  Aarhus University Hospital & University of Aarhus, Building 30, Norrebrogade 44, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. E-mail: Overgard@pet.au.dk
Thomas A. Sørensen, Dept. of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 80, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark.

Jesse J. Prinz

The Fractionation of Introspection

In this paper, I offer a speculative taxonomy of types of introspection. If these speculations are right, then researchers wishing to study introspection must exercise special caution. Different species may lend themselves to different investigative methodologies, and it may be difficult to make generalizations about introspection. Many researchers implicitly or explicitly recognize that introspection is not monolithic, but generalizations are not uncommon. We are sometimes told, for example, that introspective reports are hopelessly inaccurate (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). On the face of it, this is difficult to reconcile with recent efforts to exonerate introspective psychology (e.g., Jack and Roepstorff, 2002). If introspection is not monolithic, then both sides could be right. Some forms of introspection may be reliable, while others are not. This is just what Titchener believed.

Correspondence: Jesse Prinz, Department of Philosophy, Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. Email: jesse@subcortex.com

Philip Robbins

Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection

Abstract: Does the ability to know one’s own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the ‘theory theory’ of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the ‘monitoring theory’, suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, intentions, and the like), I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can do justice to competing intuitions about the nature of introspective self-awareness. I close by drawing some methodological morals about the study of mentalizing and the role of introspective evidence in cognitive science.

Correspondence: Philip Robbins, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University, Campus Box 1073, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, USA. Email: probbins@wustl.edu

Jonathan W. Schooler & Charles A. Schreiber

Experience, Meta-consciousness, and the Paradox of Introspection

Abstract: Introspection is paradoxical in that it is simultaneously so compelling yet so elusive. This paradox emerges because although experience itself is indisputable, our ability to explicitly characterize experience is often inadequate. Ultimately, the accuracy of introspective reports depends on individuals’ imperfect ability to take stock (i.e., to become meta-conscious) of their experience. Although there is no ideal yardstick for assessing introspection, examination of the degree to which self-reports systematically covary with the environmental, behavioural, and physiological concomitants of experience can help to establish the correspondence between meta-consciousness and experience. We illustrate the viability of such an approach in three domains, imagery, mind-wandering, and hedonic appraisal, identifying both the situations in which introspections appear to be accurate and those in which they seem to diverge from underlying experience. We conclude with a discussion of the various factors (including issues of detection, transformation, and substitution) that may cause meta-consciousness to misrepresent experience.

Correspondence: Jonathan W. Schooler, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4.

Eric Schwitzgebel

Introspective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener’s Lab Manual

Abstract: To study conscious experience we must, to some extent, trust introspective reports; yet introspective reports often do not merit our trust. A century ago, E.B. Titchener advocated extensive introspective training as a means of resolving this difficulty. He describes many of his training techniques in his four-volume laboratory manual of 1901–1905. This paper explores Titchener’s laboratory manual with an eye to general questions about the prospects of introspective training for contemporary consciousness studies, with a focus on the following examples: introspective knowledge of the combination tones that arise when a musical interval is played; the ‘flight of colours’ in the afterimage of a field of bright, broad- spectrum light; and the possibility of non-obvious visual illusions. Introspective training appears to have some merit, but also to involve significant hazards.

Correspondence: Eric Schwitzgebel, Dept of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521-0201, USA. Email: eschwitz@citrus.ucr.edu

Derek J. Snyder, Katharine Fast and Linda M. Bartoshuk

Valid Comparisons of Suprathreshold Sensations

Abstract: Individual experience is subjective: We can describe experiences, but we cannot share them directly. Thus, many investigators favour threshold measures of experience (which can be compared across subjects easily), while suprathreshold methods (which are much harder to compare) are met with scepticism. We believe that suprathreshold measures are useful, as they reveal group differences in sensation (e.g., taste, oral burn) that cannot be observed with thresholds. These differences, however, are distorted when scales are used incorrectly. Of particular interest, oral sensory intensity predicts long-term health outcomes (e.g., cardiovascular disease, cancer risk); these findings are validated by robust differences in oral anatomy, suggesting that valid suprathreshold comparisons convey accurate and meaningful differences in experience.

Correspondence: Yale University School of Medicine, P.O. Box 208041, New Haven, CT 06520-8041, USA. Email: Derek.Snyder@Yale.edu, Katharine.Fast@Yale.edu, Linda.Bartoshuk@Yale.edu

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