Contents

Interview

Shaun Gallagher
Nailing the Lie: An Interview with Jonathan Cole    abstract

Refereed Papers

Susan Pockett
Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour?    abstract
J.J.C. Smart
Consciousness and Awareness    abstract
Alwyn Scott
Reductionism Revisited    abstract

Review Articles and Book Reviews

Bill Faw
Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Review Article
Arkady Plotnitsky
A New Look at an Old Question: Review of Andrei Khrennikov
John Dance
Dermot Moran & Timothy Mooney (ed.), The Phenomenology Reader
Steve Stewart-Williams
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (ed.), Concepts: Core Readings
Bruno Deschênes
Anna Bonshek, Mirror of Consciousness: Art, Creativity & Veda
Bruno Deschênes
Patrick N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda (ed.), Music & Emotion: Theory & Research
Amy Ione
Rawley Silver, Three Art Assessments
Adriano Palma
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions
C. Jason Throop
Stephen P. Reyna, Connections: Brain, Mind, and Culture in Social Anthropology
Gary Fuhrman
Seán Ó Nualláin, The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science
Jung-In Kwon
Arnold H. Modell, Imagination and the Meaningful Brain
Emilios Bouratinos
Danah Zohar & Ian Marshall, Spiritual Capital: Wealth We Can Live By
Bruno Deschênes
Bertram F. Malle, Louise J. Moses & A. Dare Baldwin, Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition
Anthony Freeman
Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (ed.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings
Bernard J. Baars, William P. Banks & James B. Newman (ed.), Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness
William Bechtel et al. (ed.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader

TEN YEAR CUMULATIVE INDEX

Ten Year Index of Authors
Ten Year Index of Titles

ABSTRACTS

Shaun Gallagher

Nailing the Lie: An Interview with Jonathan Cole

In his first book, Pride and the Daily Marathon (1995), Jonathan Cole presented the neurology and the phenomenology of an extreme and unusual condition of deafferentation in his patient and friend, Ian Waterman. He showed how Ian, who has a profound difficulty with movement due to a lack of the senses of touch and proprioception below the neck, is nonetheless able to make his way in the world by sheer effort, will power and an ingenious collection of motor tricks. Cole’s second book, About Face (1998), explored the personal and social difficulties faced by people who live with a variety of facial difficulties, including those involved in Möbius syndrome, autism, and blindness. In a book to be published in early 2004, Still Lives, he lays bare the experience of those who suffer from spinal cord injury, persons with paraplegia and tetraplegia, unable to move their bodies, but often quite able to move others, as they pass with varying degrees of success through their lives. These encounters with extraordinary people have put Cole in a unique position to glimpse the significance of those things that form part of our everyday and ordinary lives, but that we take for granted and hardly ever notice. The interview was conducted at the University of Chicago where Cole and several of his colleagues were engaged in a series of experiments with Ian Waterman.

Correspondence: Shaun Gallagher, Department of Philosophy, Colbourn Hall 411, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1352, USA. Email: Gallaghr@mail.ucf.edu

Susan Pockett

Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour?

Abstract: The prevailing folk-psychology of modern Western humans holds that (1) an individual person or self can be identified with that individual’s consciousness and thus that (2) consciousness can cause behaviour. In this paper I assemble a body of experimental and philosophical evidence suggesting that both of these beliefs might be mistaken. I discuss some of the practical and philosophical implications of the idea that consciousness does not in fact cause behaviour and conclude that it is not only a serious academic possibility but also an (almost) intuitively acceptable idea that consciousness may be epiphenomenal.

Correspondence: Susan Pockett, Department of Physics, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand. Email: s.pockett@auckland.ac.nz

Alwyn Scott

Reductionism Revisited

Abstract: From the perspective of nonlinear science, it is argued that one may accept physicalism and reject substance dualism without being forced into reductionism. This permits a property dualism under which biological and mental phenomena may emerge from intricate positive feedback networks, involving many levels of both the biological and cognitive hierarchies.

Correspondence: Alwyn Scott, Department of Mathematics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85711, U.S.A. Email: rover@theriver.com

J.J.C. Smart

Consciousness and Awareness

Abstract: This article is an attempt to show how the so called ‘hard problem’ in the philosophy of mind (that of giving a physicalist account of consciousness) may in fact not be as hard as is usually supposed.

Correspondence: J.J.C. Smart, School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia.

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