00.00-- Abstract No:1174
Little is know about the functional significance of consciousness. In this study, I investigated whether having a conscious representation exerts any influences on ongoing behavior. As a means to impair stimulus visibility backward masking technique was used. In the previous conference (Tucson II), I demonstrated that with practice subjects could respond to stimuli even when they could hardly see the target just in the way they do so when given a normal choice RT task (i.e., with highly visible stimuli). Under the latter situation, it is known that if subjects make an error they become more cautious in the following trial with the result that their RTs are delayed relative to those after correct responses. The purpose of this study is to test whether such a delay also occurs when subjects make speeded discrimination to severely masked, barely visible targets.
In Experiment 1, six subjects were trained to make speeded identification of digits appearing randomly either in the left or right visual field. The digits were followed by two array of masking stimuli ("###") with randomly varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). Subjects' RTs of correct responses were classified according to whether or not they had made an error in the immediately preceding trial and to the SOAs of both preceding and current trials. When target visibility was low in the preceding trial (SOAs were 20 and 30 msec), there was no aftereffect of response correctness. However, when SOA of the preceding trial was 40 msec, having committed an error modulated RTs in the following trials. When target in the current trial was clearly recognizable (SOA of 80 msec), RTs were delayed after error trials relative to those after correct ones. Having made an error in the preceding trial facilitated RTs when SOA of current trials was either 40 or 60 msec. Thus, a significant interaction between SOAs of current trials and the error condition obtained.
In Experiment 2, the possibility was explored whether an external feedback message could surrogate an endogenous error signal. Another six subjects were trained to make speeded discrimination of the digits under the same backward masking condition. They were given immediately after response a feedback message indicating whether their response was correct or not. Although the feedback message was effective in generally facilitating RTs when compared to those of the Experiment 1, it had no influence on the performance. That is, unlike the Experiment 1, whether or not the subjects had made an error in the preceding trial had no effect on the RTs of the next trial.
The findings indicate that when target is consciously represented, subjects can utilize that representation to monitor their current behavior and to modulate their future one. Without conscious representation generated by stimuli, current performance is immune to the past history even if it is supplemented by exogenous information. One implication of these results is that a functional role of consciousness may not be found in its effect on ongoing activities, but on those of the immediate future.
00.00-- Abstract No:1175
I argue that Kant offers an account of what it is to be a unifiedintelligence (thinking subject) and a unified agent (volitional subject)that secures the thinnest sort of self-ascriptions necessary for understanding and choice. First I explain how I understand the principle of thesynthetic unity of apperception, in what sense it is rightly thought to beformal (Allison, Bermudez, Aquila, Guyer, etc.), but also how a strongerself-awareness reading Kitcher, Henrich, Brook, Hatfield, etc.) emergeswhen we move beyond the epistemic concerns of the Transcendental Deduction. Much turns on what we take to be the function of a transcedentalpsychology. I conclude that the possibility of self-ascription that Kantsecures is the sole particular form of knowledge necessary for moldingourselves into what we strive to be.
00.00-- Abstract No:1176
In the study of Mysticism, there have emerged two distinct and opposing viewpoints. The unity thesis argues for a common core to mystical experience that is unmedaited by language or interpretation. The plurality thesis argues that the any shared reality to mystical states is minimal relative to the social construction involved in the identification and recognition of such states. The plurality thesis derives its strongest support from Constructivism, which claims that all experience, including mystical, is constructed or 'mediated' through the individual's conceptual framework consisting, in part, of the complex epistemological interplay between beliefs, expectations and values (Katz, 1978). To experience is to construct; all perception is interpretation. This collapses experience and interpretation, a distinction necessary for the unity theorist. If all experience is constructed, then varying traditions must yield different mystical experiences. Unity theorists have argued that pure conscious experience, itself contentless, cannot by definition be constructed. It is literally an experience of "no-thing." On the other hand, constructivism explicitly denies the possibility of PCEs (Pure Consciousness events) on a priori grounds. However, unity theorists argue that constructivism fails to rule out the possibility of PCEs and contradicts mystical claims (Forman, 1990). Furthermore, the unity thesis provides an explanation for novelty and accounts for an extraordinary degree of unanimity among mystical descriptions that are unlikely to be derived from social constructions. Additionally, the unity thesis is metaphysically advantageous for its' ontological simplicity in the manner of GUT and SUSY theories in physics. By recognizing phenomenological and ontological validity to PCEs, the unity thesis supports the further mystical implications that: 'The self is not limited' and 'There are no boundaries or limitations to the self' (Seth, 1979). This is also exactly what many mystics guide one to expect. Although the unity thesis presents a superior explanation for mystical experience, it is explicitly mute with regard to everyday experience. Instead we must arrive at an explanation for normal experience through a reversed reasoning. If mystical perception is achieved by some process of 'forgetting' or eliminating concepts from consciousness, then it is plausible to reason that normal experience is maintained by adding concepts to consciousness. That personal experience is created by concept-formation is a mystical insight adequately summarized as, 'You make your own reality'. Curiously, that is the constructivists' central premise. Here the mystic and constructivism converge. While the unity thesis explains foundational reality, the constructivist premise accounts for the process of personal experience. One describes the source, the other the process. Both corollaries are necessary to explain the superset, Reality, which we all find ourselves immersed in.
00.00-- Abstract No:1177
Although many philosophers, neurobiologists and cognitive scientists think of themselves as evolutionists, they are not always aware of the consequences of Darwinism for the study of consciousness. They still may be unable to avoid a series of pitfalls, such as:
a) treating consciousness one-sidedly as a cognitive phenomenon (it could well be primarily a motivational phenomenen),
b) focussing in one-sidedly on the neurophsysiological level (forgetting that adaptations are likely to be emergent properties),
c) treating learning as the expression of the plasticity of the mind only (and forgetting that learning abilities are usually designed to acquire very specific skills and types of knowledge).
These misunderstandings derive from an inability to see consciousness as an adaptive phenomenon. In this paper it is proposed that questions relating to the presence and nature of consciousness in animals and man can only be answered by interpreting consciousness as an adaptive phenomenon fully integrated into the behavioural repertoire with which a species has to cope within a particular environment. That implies that all theories which try to explain the neurophysiological `How'? question about consciousness, should be integrated witht he evolutionary `Why?' question, which should be asked from an all-encompassing evolutionary and ethological framework. It is shown that in some current theories about consciousness the degree to which the brain is genetically prewired is still underestimated and it is proposed that the phenomenon of radical subjectivity is best explained by cross-fertilizing evolutionary psychology with the theory of value-driven decision systems. Evolutionary psychology, building of selfish-gen theory, explains why consciousness is thoroughly perspectivistic and related to the interests of the individual or even of its genes. Value-driven decision system-theory, as developed by G.E. Pugh, explains the necessity of a decision system in which different behavioural options can be compared and `weighed'. It is shown that consciousness constitutes a cognitive and motivational straitjacket which `subjectively forces' animals to act in an adaptive, and (inclusive) fitness maximizing, manner in unpredictable environments. `Innate structures of experience' are needed to supply values that enable animals to weigh different behavioural options: they supply heuristic approximations of the survival values of different experimental behavioural strategies (which may be explored during play). With a variation on a recent concept of Melzack, they may constitute a `genetically prewired neuromatrix for adaptive decisions'. The model suggests a functional and realistice interpretation of qualia and stimulates the search for their behavioural correlates in animals. It is suggested that play behaviour and dreaming both can be related tot he ability to `weigh' different scenarios using the experiential criteria for the ability to experience and to suffer. Consequently, it is proposed that consciousness is not dependent on a capacity for language, although language certainly must have enormously expanded the horizon within which organisms experience and thus evaluate their world and its promises and possibilities.
00.00-- Abstract No:1178
Act, Reflect, Revers
Emergent approaches to problems are in essence the telematic future. Truths of one system do not necessarily translate into another. Ultimately, how does one know? Or, actually determine new values, morality, in a new matrix?
Trials and Testaments
With a mandate to search for new meanings in the transit of paradigm change comes obligation to investigate spiritual dimension in connectivity, commitment to liberatory rapport, resonance, communion, and conviction to undergo uncertainty in extremis. Or, the terror of a pentecost.
Scars and Scab Constructions
And in the alpha-omega of courage to live the ambiguity, a catholicity all-embracing and tolerant, the scar is self-evident. In the beginning was the image. Presence and response. Visions of Apocalypse and Revelation. Meeting and spoken word. Then, promptings enciphered.
These are reflections on psychic and physical transformation, actual, subject to concentrated human effort. An ethical being's deciphering of messages from a closeness to existence.
They point to self-definition in Paglia's 'sensual torrent' of multiple identities. And the role of imagination in re-constitution. Included are the relevance of metaphysical view and mystical vision, the immediacy of mindful flaw and micronarrative. The spiritual ambitions of east and west, profane and sacred pursuits, even eukharistia, thanksgiving. And what is there to celebrate and how is it to be celebrated? In the abdication of the arts and sciences for direction, compassion, justice?
They address possible wisdom-technologies of enough. A techno-cultural reversal, a point of being, gravity, in accelerated intensity, power and ravage of speed (genocide, starvation, waste) consistent failures to sense humanity, condition and spirit.
Also modest science approaches and the dynamics of dialogic culture. On the grounds of mutual protection, stability, from the atrophy of reductionism, the diminishment of selection. What is wanted from us, is to be understood? A re-activation of the ever central mythologies of Job, Oedipus?
And the re-search of cultural institutions and industries a continuing course of critical investigation, cultural formations, the predispositions of mass communications systems, precedents and judgements. What is the received covenant?
Questions of what global consciousness is being bought into. Deception as common ground of suspect being, fraudulent authorities of recency, instantaneous legitimacies, orthodoxes of radicality. Gardens where money grows on trees and fame like Judas is far from fleeting, in the hidden denial of market maintenance, Caesar over human essence. And what now is gospel and according to who?
These are remarks on navigating creativity and contagion. With respect to the medieval Julian (a) of Norwich, witness of showings, and a new language of cyberspirituality. In the given technical means, what image in genesis, the beloved 'milieu divin' of Chardin, in trust, relation, community, or in fear, evasion, moral cowardice, the untenable? When in actuality, brute-elegance, substance-refinement, are inextricable. And to hold conflicting ideas in the mind is intelligent.
00.00-- Abstract No:1179
A women presented with a left hemiplegia following a right haemorrhage. Clinical examination also revealed a left hemianopia, a left hemianesthesia and a strong left unilateral neglect, with a full anosognosia of all these unilateral deficits. She was acknowledging that "something has changed" and that she was "not the same as previously", but always attributed these changes to her clumsiness or laziness, overwhelmed herself with many other pejorative adjectives. In no occasion she concealed that something was wrong about her left body, and, when further questioned, vehemently denied to be hemiplegic. On many occasions she took her left hand in her right hand and shaken it to demonstrate it could move, commenting on her weak volition.
When specifically asked whether she could perform a list of sensori-motor task, like walking, putting socks on, peal an apple, switching on the light, pulling a drawer, she answered positively, and spontaneously reported she would perform in every task as well as before entering the hospital. However, when the patient was asked to rate herself for the same list of sensori-motor tasks, significantly lower notes were observed for bimanual items than for monomanual items.
In the somatosensory domain, she was reporting touch sensation on her left arm only when tested with eyes open. No feeling of touch could be reported when blindfolded. However, she grimaced when gently pinched on the arm.
We will argue from these examples that they reflect interactions between implicit and explicit processing.
00.00-- Abstract No:1180
We are seeking design principles for intelligent systems that can interact with very complex, variable, and poorly modeled environments, in the presence of high-dimensional inputs and massive memory. As we will show below, we believe this can be accomplished by borrowing ideas from neurophysiology and psychology, in particular the idea of ``awareness".
We created a complex environment in a computer game "Desert Survival". Two opponent Sheiks have an army of camels each, and are trying to overtake each other's oases in order to make money. The camels can perform some simple tasks without supervision, namely navigate, buy water (necessary for their survival) and take over an opponent's oasis, if it contains less than a critical number of camels. The Sheiks coordinate the camels' actions in real time. The desert is a 100 x 100 grid with 144 oases. Each sheik start with 50 camels. Solving "Desert Survival" by exhaustive calculation is computationally prohibitive.
Inspired by visual psychophysics, we limit the range of action of each Sheik to an "attentional window" of size A x A, where 5 < A < 25. At any given moment, the center of the window is the "salient" or "most interesting" location in the desert from the Sheik's perspective, namely the location where the Sheik is most vulnerable compared to his opponent. Once the attentional window is located, the Sheik decides where to send his camels that are inside the window based on a probabilistic algorithm. A Sheik who applies such an algorithm makes approximately 20% more money against a randomized control Sheik (whose camels pick random targets) for A between 15-17. Performance drops to chance if A < 10 because there is not enough information inside the attentional window, or if A > 20 because then the Sheik does not manage to process all the information in real time.
We also endowed the Sheiks with memory, which allows them to adapt their strategies between aggressive and restrained according to the evaluation of past decisions taken in similar situations. The result of the memory search is merged with the attentional search result to form the basis of the Sheiks' decision. We compared a memory-endowed Sheik against a control who follows the algorithm with A=15 but without adaptation. The adaptive Sheik makes 100% more money if he also has A=15. He performs below chance if A < 11 because learning with few variables is not meaningful, and his gain drops to only 20% if A > 17, because then learning cannot be completed within the time allotted. The principal idea inherent in our architecture is to endow the system with a compact representation of the relevant events in "Desert Survival" within a specified attentional window and to make this information available to the planning and memory stages of the algorithm. Clearly, knowing all of the information throughout the desert would lead to optimal performance, but only when the time needed to evaluate this information is not taken into consideration. In the real world, a compact and selective way of selecting much -- but not all -- of the relevant information for planning and memory purposes can lead to better performance as shown here. This is very much reminiscent of the role accorded to the neuronal correlate of awareness in the primate brain by Crick and Koch (1995). The computational paradigm developed and tested with the aid of "Desert Survival" can be applied to many technological applications, such as autonomous robots, intelligent buildings, interactive conference software, city traffic control, and high-performance chess without a supercomputer.
00.00-- Abstract No:1181
We (Crick and Koch, 1995) have hypothesized that the function of visual awareness is to produce the best current interpretation of the visual scene, in the light of past experience, and to make it available, for a sufficient time, to the parts of the brain that contemplate, plan and execute voluntary motor outputs. This suggest that the neurons that express the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) must project from visual cortices to the frontal lobe, and in particular to prefrontal cortex.
We therefore predict that patients unfortunate enough to have lost their entire prefrontal cortex on both sides (including Broca's area) would not be visually conscious, although they might still have well-preserved, but unconscious, visual-motor abilities. No such patient is known to us (not even Brickner's famous patient). The visual abilities of any such "frontal lobe" patient needs to be carefully evaluated using a battery of appropriate psychophysical tests. The fMRI study of the blindsight patient G.Y. (Sahraie et al., 1997) provides direct evidence for our view by revealing that prefrontal areas 46 and 47 are active when G.Y. is visually aware of a moving stimulus, but not when he is performing in his blind-sight mode. Large-scale lesion experiments carried out in the monkey suggest that the absence of frontal lobes leads to complete blindness (Nakamura and Mishkin, 1980, 1986). One would hope that future monkey experiments reversibly inactivate specific prefrontal areas and demonstrate the specific loss of abilities linked to visual perception while visual-motor behaviors -- mediated by the on-line system -- remain intact. It will be important to study the pattern of connections between the highest levels of the visual hierarchy -- such as inferotemporal cortex -- and premotor and prefrontal cortex.
Our hypothesis, combined with the neuroanatomy of the macaque monkey, suggests that primates are not directly aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex, although they may be aware of such activity in extrastriate cortical areas. I will discuss much recent electrophysiological, psychophysical and clinical evidence that supports this hypothesis.
Finally, it is likely that the NCC neurons are a specific and identifiable subset of cortical/thalamic neurons with unique anatomical, biophysical or other properties. I will discuss the type of experiments --- drawing upon technical advances in molecular biology--- that will be necessary to address these problems experimentally in the foreseeable future.
00.00-- Abstract No:1182
Baas (1993, 1996, 1997) presents a formal framework for explaining emergence in category-theoretic terms. On this scheme, emergence denotes the generation of higher-level stuctures (or emergent- wholes) as a consequence of interactions between lower-level structures suchthat properties associated with higher-level structure are non-observable at lower-levels. Two kinds of emergence are distinguished: (1) deductive or computational emergence and (2) observational or non- computational emergence. In the former, a procedure (algorithm) for determining emergent properties associated with higher-level structures from the components and interactions at lower phenomenal levels can be specified; for the latter, this is impossible. (Baas (1993) cites the existence of Goedel sentences in support of observational emergence.) On this framework, emergence is held to be largely an epistemological phenomenon since it is primarily concerned with issues of observation and only derivatively concerned with issues of production. (In this respect, the theory of autopoietic systems (Maturana, 80) is the natural counterpart to the above scheme.)
While the framework appears to constitute a step forward in the direction of formalizing the concept of emergence, it is, in reality, highly problematic since the observer is included as an intrinsic and irreducible component in the formalism. This poses a problem because questions relating to the ontology of the observer remain largely unresolved. For example, is consciousness a necessary condition for observation ? If this is indeed the case, as Searle (1992, 1995) appears to hold, the above framework solves the `hard problem' (Chalmers, 96) by discharging it, since it then follows that consciousness must be ontologically primitive. However, materialist emergentists (such as Baas) are committed to an evolutionary view in which consciousness appears relatively late in the phenomenal hierarchy, certainly after the emergence of matter and life. Hence, classical emergentists cannot assert that consciousness and matter (assumed to be non- experiential) were historically contemporaneous. The alternative is to maintain that consciousness is merely a contingent phenomenon associated with the observational acts of higher-order systemic structures (such as human beings). According to Emmeche (1992), the environment of a system can readily assume the role of the observer: on this view, (natural-) selection is a sufficient condition for observation; qualia (subjective experiences) or what-it-is-likeness (Nagel, 79) are regarded as non-causal (or epiphenomenal). However, there are two problems with this position: firstly, the epistemological problem of whether selection in the absence of volitional-experience is a meaningful concept; and secondly, assuming this is indeed the case, the ontological problem of how a non-experiential (or ontologically-objective) substrate can generate an experiential (or ontologically-subjective) emergent, viz. the `hard problem'.
In this paper, it is maintained that a commitment to panexperientialism (as against crude panpsychism) constitutes a necessary condition for epistemological and ontological closure in emergentist frameworks. The formal framework for emergence introduced in (Ali, 97) is modified so as to incorporate Baas' scheme using a synthesis of Whiteheadian (1978) organicism and Mead's (1932) social conception of emergence; the former necessitates transcending the duality of chance and necessity characteristic of automata-theory in favour of experiential-volition, while the latter allows for the specification of the environment as an observer defined in terms of an emergent network of individuals.
00.00-- Abstract No:1183
In this paper I attempt to answer the question `How does Consciousness manifest itself, and how can it be developed?' Though the hard problem of Conscious still remains untouched, an examination of the question mentioned will contribute to our understanding of how to relate with this phenomenon that is so immanent within us all. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Dr. R. M. Bucke in his work Cosmic Consciousness examines the topic and shows that there are four different types of consciousness, and that they are related to each other, or rather that each progressive stage is derived from or evolves from the proceeding state. This theory provides an evolutionary timeline for consciousness, and a basis upon which we can relate our current understanding and the direction in which to look for future development.
The first stage of consciousness is the `Perceptual Mind' made up of `percepts' or sense impressions. The second is `Simple Consciousness'; which perceives its surroundings and can act in relation with it. The third is `Self Consciousness'; which is the ability to perceive the self from outside. At this stage begins the formation of concepts and is where most of humanity currently resides. The fourth stage is `Cosmic Consciousness' a stage in which the mind glimpses and conceives the ultimate reality of existence. This is the stage of intuition. Every person is situated in one of these stages, and the whole of humanity is evolving upwards through time.
With these stages in mind I next examine the ability of man to progress from a lower stage to a higher stage. This is done by following the concepts of those who have achieved such higher stages of consciousness, including Christ, the Buddha, Walt Whitman and others. One explanation of this development from the Buddhist tradition is the triangle of Atman, Manas and Buddhi; which represent the methods of attaining the ultimate realization in consciousness, Atman. This attainment of Atman is realized through the development of knowledge or love or through both.
In literature on the state of `Cosmic Consciousness' there are some basic principles for development which remain the same. Firstly, a person must modify his actions, beliefs and disbeliefs because they affect the ability to realize the higher consciousness. Secondly, ones situation in life directly affect the ability to go into higher consciousness. Thirdly, desires, beliefs, concentration, and focused action are used to bring the truths from that higher state of consciousness to our present level of consciousness.
Dr. Bucke's theory provides a valuable construct by which we may measure our progress and determine our present condition and desired direction, with regard to consciousness. It affords the peg upon which we can hang a variety of other experiential theories and measure them one against another. In short it provides the science of consciousness with a relational framework by which it can be understood.
As science has begun to divulge the secrets of the world as seen objectively, scientists are now looking towards more subjective areas of experience. Unfortunately, consciousness is still a very personal and subjective experience, often ineffable and obscured by the obvious, which makes it an illusive topic of study. This science of consciousness is essentially personal, but when studied critically it afford us valuable insights into our own nature.
The four stages of Dr. Bucke's theory express an evolution in consciousness. Each has its own method of perceiving reality, and its own set of contributions to the development of the creature. It has only been in the last hundred years with the theories of Husserl that subjective experiences are beginning to be studied and can be systemized into a science. This understanding comes as a realization that each person is a part of the divine and that within each individual there is a divine part. Through these parts man becomes one with the divine spirit and begins to draw off of it for his own development and the development of others. Some of the laws that are used to develop the self, are a firm belief that a power greater than self exists, and that each person is part of that great divine power.
This evolution is helped in its process by individuals who experience those higher states of consciousness, and communicate it to those around them. Christ, the Buddha, Confucius, and Socrates are included in the list of those great indivually enlightened world teachers. Just as man has been brought out of the stone ages to civilization by the moral instruction of these teachers, so the ethics which they put forward is the social foundation upon which our instituations are founded. With the evolution of the consciousness of man sciences developed and organizations were erected for the usefulness and betterment of human kind. As man has been brought from the dark ages to enlightenment by the teachings of enlightened men. So the move from `Self Consciousness' to `Cosmic Consciousness' is possible through a number of methods. The great composers, mystics and poets have dwelt in these realms and give us the path that leads to this forwarding of Consciousness.
This stage includes the formation of concepts, which allow the mind to solidify numerous pieces of information into concepts which allow us to know our world to an even greater degree.
Consciousness seems to be a part of all living organisms, and it develops as a result of several factors. Bucke states that there are four stages of consciousness, that all living things possess consciousness in one of these stages, and that it is dynamic and alive. Examples are taken from the experiences of man and are studied using the models and methods of science. The stages of consciousness and the methods used to raise it, give strong evidence that there is a fourth and higher state of consciousness to which only a few individuals have reached. Yet a greater understanding of its attributes and the principles upon which it is attained is necessary for the progression of the human race. and we can plainly state that evolution has been working for millions of years to allow us to reach the state we are at, and that in time will develop to the next state as a society and race. The progress of man has been made possible by those who have attained to those higher levels and shared their knowledge with others. . Correct beliefs be held in order to transcend
00.00-- Abstract No:1184
For thousands of years people of all disciplines have been trying to understand the phenomenon of consciousness. I myself, am one of those people. Throughout my life I have searched for clues as to what consciousness might be. I have approached this question from several different angles and I am now ready to come forth with my conclusions. I find it easiest to do this beginning from the standpoint of physics.
As a student of physics I have always been intrigued by the laws of relativity. I was fascinated to learn about the relationship between velocity, mass, space and time. According to the law, the relationship is as follows:
M = m divided by the square root of 1- V squared over C squared
M = mass object as observed by a stationary observer; m = mass of object;
V = the velocity at which the object is traveling; C = the speed of light
What I found so amazing about this law are its implications of traveling at the speed of light `C'. When that is the case, objects traveling at `C' have zero mass with respect to a stationary observer. In addition, the relationship with time and space that the object experiences is also the same. So that when an object is at `C', it has no mass, time, or space as observed by stationary observers.
To try and understand what this may be like, we can look to an object that already posses these characteristics, the photon. It travels at `C' and has no mass and very peculiar space and time characteristics. In fact, there is still a good amount of mystery about what the photon is, and how it behaves. However, because it is at `C' and has no mass we are able to postulate that this is how matter behaves at `C'. That is to say that any matter at `C' may be `photonic' in nature.
How can this possibly relate to consciousness you wonder? Think about it from a universal standpoint. According to the equation, it wouldn't matter what the size of an object was, at `C' the result would be the same, zero mass, time, and space. This would mean that if the entire universe were traveling at `C', it may manifest itself, to us, as a photon. If this were the case it would then mean that our universe is built of itself, and is expressed to us in the form of light.
If the universe were to travel at `C', and we are a part of this universe, then what would happen to our consciousness, and the consciousness of every perceptive object in the universe? One could postulate that consciousness would not be subjected to the laws of relativity since it has no real mass, space, or time characteristics. If this were true, and consciousness were to remain with the universe at `C', and if the universe at `C' appears to us in the form light, then universal consciousness may expressed through light. This would then mean that my consciousness is reflected back at me through all things that posses light, including everything.
If this logic is true, then I exist as my own identity and at the same time as the entire universe. All things are a part of me. When I go out into the world, I am really divulging on a journey into myself. I am the grass, the wind, the earth, the moon, and the stars, and I am myself in the same light. Everyday I wake up to travel throughout my own entity as if I were living within my mind. I learn new and greater truths as I interact with the enormous diversity within me. I am you, we are them, and they are us. The only thing that changes is the perspective you take. We may now be able to explain why, according to countless near death experiences, people die `into the light'. Light simply is the next dimension beyond our consciousness.
00.00-- Abstract No:1185
The psychological testing of commissurotomized patients has often led to hasty philosophical conclusions about the nature of consciousness. In fact, the well-known equation between split brain and split mind relies heavily upon tests of identification and comparison of visual data, and upon the associationist philosophy usually involved in the assessment of disconnection syndromes. But the discrepancy between the behavioural unity shown by the patients and the disunity of their perception remains a puzzling fact without any proper explanation, as long as the pervasive influence of the associationist way of thinking remains dominant and is never questioned in itself. In consequence, it is a philosophical task of some consequence to point out what the weaknesses of assoicationism really are, and what kind of alternative could lead to a better understanding of split brain phenomena.
If we believe, like the associationist does, that a complex idea is composed of simpler ones, then there is no reason why the patient could make (except by chance) a proper judgement on the nature of a given whole when he is deprived of a full and direct access to some part of this whole. But in certain cases, a complex idea (the idea of a pair of letters including at least one vowel, for instance), refers to a specific kind of arrangement, but is not composed of the representation of any visual data as such. Consequently, conjecture about the nature of the whole may succeed where perception would have failed. If the split brain patient succeeds in integrative tasks which involve information about things he cannot identify, it is because the questions he is able to answer are related to the relevance of categories: they do not concern the content of the visual stimuli.
Another advantage of the distinction between consisting of and refering to is that, stressing the importance of the latter, if is no longer necessary to postulate in commissurotomy any convert or implicit knowledge about the visual data, which always brings back to the intricacies of unconscious representation theories. Accurate reference to something involves nothing but specific access to relevant, if partial, information.
Moreover, according to Justine Sergent (Brain, 1986, 1987, 1990), the filtering of information through the subcortical structures is sensitive to the nature of the information itself. What is of some importance for the guiding of action, the analysis of the exteroceptive field, the emotional reaction of the subject, is conveyed. What is not is the aesthetic part of the data, the details that are only secondary in practical perspective. Accordingly, there is no wonder that the integrity of consciousness can survive in most situations the unity of perception, such a unity being nothing in a sense but a kind of biological luxury.
The implications may be even wider. Complex ideas consisting of simpler ones are the product of a rather theoretically-oriented mind; relevant decisions refering to the ambiant world involve a different vision of consciousness. If the latter model prevails on the former, and if the normal brain's activity relies fundamentally on the same information processing mechanism as the divided one's several conclusions can be drawn. The integrity of consciousness is not equivalent to the omniscience of the self; representation should not be considered as the essence of consciousness; and speech is not in its main function the linking of an image and a name. Maurice Merleau-Ponty once wrote that consciousness is not fundamentally something like a `I think that' but is rather a sort of `I can'. Mutatis mutandis, this assertion may be as illuminating for today's cognitive psychology as it has been for the phenomenological research of the middle of this century.
00.00-- Abstract No:1186
A series of experiments are proposed in this paper in an attempt to find out what role an observer plays in the unfolding of events within quantum mechanics known as collapse of the wave-function. These experiments utilize a conventional photon source, a semi-reflecting mirror, photodectors and counters. They will be investigating the possibility that the terms observer and consciousness may be encompassed by not only humans but, photons, Euglena, Paramecium and Escherchi coli. As regards Euglena and Paramecium if they can be shown to display some form of consciousness and act as observers this would tend to strengthen the theories concerning consciousness arising from cytoskeletal microtubules. If however, these same characteristics are displayed by E. coli, which do not possess any microtubules, then we might be looking at something much more basic involving tubulin. We will also be in a position to adjust the `criticial mass' of these entities in order to see if there is a point at which consciousness arises, soemthing which cannot be done in the case of human subjects. The experiments are so arranged that the roles of the apparatus or detectors, the objects or photons and the observers, can be determined at each stage and a relative degree of importance assigned to each one's contribution in the unfolding and collpase of the wave-function as it might apply to that specific experiment.